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Abstract 
 
 
Uncertainty regarding the price of goods has caused parties to divert from traditional fixed-
price approaches to relational, open-price contract. This leads to different approaches under 
the various sales laws. The Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) in the US was drafted to cope 
with the changing market by allowing parties to opt for open price term at the time of entering 
into a contract, while the English Sale of Goods Act 1979 (SGA) and the United Nations 
Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (CISG) provide limited 
flexibility in setting the price, favouring traditional fixed-price contracts. As a result, the 
courts in the SGA and CISG jurisdictions are less likely to enforce contracts where parties 
intentionally leave the price open, even in cases where parties initially intend to be bound by 
the contract. 
 
This thesis provides an assessment of the effectiveness of the UCC in coping with relational 
sales contracts regardless of their duration. It compares the UCC with the SGA and the CISG 
Nations sales using examples of relevant court decisions from both jurisdictions, and critically 
evaluates the difference between flexibility in setting the price at the time of entering into a 
contract under the UCC, and flexibility applied by the courts to remedy a contract upon 
affected by market changes.  
 
This evaluation enables the thesis to propose ways in which SGA and the CISG might be 
made more adaptable with regard to relational sales, by following the example of the UCC in 
allowing open price as a choice for parties rather than as a remedy given by the courts to 
uphold a relational contract. 
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Chapter One: Introduction to the Completeness versus the Incompleteness of 
a Contract 
 
1.0  Introduction 
In any sale between a buyer and seller, price is a crucial term to agree on. This chapter begins by 
explaining the price term in a contract before moving onto a gradual explanation of a contract’s 
‘completeness’. Finally, the question of whether the price term should always be set or left open 
in a sales contract will be discussed. The thesis proposes a flexible approach to the contract, and 
suggests that determining the price when parties first enter the contract will minimise the need for 
courts to make further expensive adjustments during the contract’s later stages. Contractual 
flexibility is a crucial element of merchants, who generally operate in an open-ended manner 
when approaching a contract.  
 
While the US has been successful in implementing flexibility in commercial contracts, the United 
Nations CISG 1980 and the English Sale of Goods Act 1979 failed to adopt a similar idea into 
their respective sales laws. A concept of flexibility would be useful in both jurisdictions when 
dealing with relational contracts that are often exposed to the risks of changing circumstances. 
Changes in circumstance, such as market conditions, should not affect the validity of business 
contracts, irrespective of the duration of the contracts. Conversely, English and CISG courts 
favour rigid, fixed-term methods when deciding cases involving price by focusing entirely on 
written documents that parties have signed or accepted. Arguably, the rigidity of fixed-term 
methods causes courts to discount the often implicit, but nonetheless real, expectations on which 
the parties rely.
1
 
 
To support the adoption of price flexibility into the SGA and the CISG, three main theories are 
used as the background of this thesis. The first theory is the ‘relational contract’ theory 
propounded by Macneil, the second is the ‘self-enforcing contract’ theory by Scott, and the third 
is the ‘joint maximization rule’ by Gergen. These theories are significant for improving the 
                                                 
1
 Stewart Macaulay, ‘The Real and the Paper Deal: Empirical Pictures of Relationships, Complexity and the Urge for 
Transparent Simple Rules,’ 53, in David Campbell, Hugh Collins and John Wightman (eds), Implicit Dimensions of 
Contract: Discrete, Relational & Network Contracts (Oxford, Hart Publishing Co 2003).  
 2 
 
current state of sales law in England and the United Nations when dealing with the validity of 
long-term sales affected by market volatility. Arguably, the three theories support the notion that 
flexibility is a useful extra-legal norm that maintains the validity of a contract without allowing 
parties to be opportunistic on the basis of absence of a fixed price.  
 
Buyers and sellers (along with their lawyers) have responded to times of rapid market change by 
expanding the excuse clauses of their contracts. Of course, the parties could choose to be bound 
by a fixed price, but flexibility is useful in certain types of trade. The thesis recommends that a 
relational sale must be designed with a flexible price term in accordance with the custom of the 
particular trade. Moreover, the thesis suggests taking the nature and purpose of the business into 
account when drafting the contract. A strict compliance with classic contract law which demands 
rigidity in fixing the price term is ‘a convenient trap-door through which the imprudent or 
unscrupulous obligor can escape, leaving the innocent obligee to bear not only the loss of 
expected benefits but also the burden of liability to subpurchasers.’2 Excusing performance on the 
basis of not having a fixed price is unacceptable as it imposes long-term rigidity on the parties 
during changing circumstances.  
 
In the following section, the thesis begins by explaining the general idea of sales law and the 
fundamentals of the concept of incomplete contracts. 
 
1.1  Price term: a crucial element of sales 
Price is at the heart of all sales contracts.
3
 The current economy proves that businesses centre on 
profit, and profit undoubtedly centres on price.
4
 Commerce is an economic activity where price  
clearly constitutes a crucial element of economic success or failure.
5
 In a contract of sale, the 
price (paid or promised) constitutes a consideration to the delivery of the goods.
6
 When a price is 
                                                 
2
 Harold J Berman, ‘Excuse for Nonperformance in the Light of Contract Practices in International Trade’ (Dec, 
1963) Columbia Law Review, vol 63, no 8, 1413-1439, 1437.  
3
 Karl N Llewellyn, Cases and Materials on Sales (Chicago, Callaghan & Co 1930) 1. 
4
 ibid.  
5
 John O Honnold, ‘International Sales Law and the Open-Price Contract’ (1989), 915-933, 915 < 
http://www.bibliojuridica.org/libros/2/645/8.pdf > accessed 5 June 2007. 
6
 L Vold, ‘Open Price Arrangements in the Sale of Goods’ (1930-1931) 5 Temple Law Quarterly 208. 
 3 
 
fixed, there is barely any room for litigation over the matter.
7
 Even if parties deal with each other 
at arm’s length, both being equally competent to contract, they remain the best judges of what is 
likely to be to their advantage.
8
 Indeed, the ultimate goal of any contract is for parties to 
maximise their joint expected return.
9
 
 
However, a contract is not always completely agreed upon. Recent contractual trends have shown 
that business parties intentionally leave some contractual terms undecided.
10
 The next section 
explains the preference for contractual incompleteness and is followed by an example of a court 
decision on the issue. 
 
1.2  The completeness and incompleteness of a contract of sale 
The parties’ ultimate goal in making a contract is to maximise their profit. Often, parties can only 
fulfil their goal during the later stages of the contract, results in the deliberate act of leaving 
essential terms (such as price, quantity and time of delivery) open.
11
 Vold notes that parties 
frequently decide on an open price because fixed prices are too inflexible for their business needs 
when entering into a contract.
12
 Relational contracts commonly expect business parties to 
intentionally leave some contractual terms undecided.
13
  
 
Moreover, the uncertainty of goods, or external matters affecting market conditions, should not 
prevent parties from entering into a contract.
14
 Gilson, Sabel and Scott explained that parties 
respond to future uncertainty by braiding a contract that intertwines both formal and informal 
                                                 
7
 ibid.  
8
 ibid. 
9
 Mark P Gergen, ‘The Use of Open Terms in Contract’ (1992) 92 Columbia Law Review 997, 1000. 
10
 A good example within the CISG jurisdiction is the Germany 3 August 2005 District Court Neubrandenburg 
(Pitted Sour Cherries case) <http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/050803g1.html> accessed 20 March 2010. In this case 
the validity of the sales contract is not hindered by the fact that the parties have only agreed to fix the price ‘during 
the season’.  An example found in the English jurisdiction is the case of Rafsanjan Pistachio Producers Cooperative 
v Kaufmanns Ltd (Independent, January 12, 1998; (Queen’s Bench Division (Commercial Cases), where the contract 
contemplates that delivery should be in instalments and the price clause says: ‘to be agreed before each delivery.’ 
This was because the price for the new 1996 Pistachio crop had not yet been formally appraised in Iran. Hence it was 
common for the plaintiff to agree forward contracts with his major customers for new crop quantities, which left the 
price to be agreed subsequently.  
11
 Llewellyn, Cases and Materials (n 3) 1. 
12
 Vold (n 6). 
13
 Pitted Sour Cherries and Rafsanjan Pistachio (n 10). 
14
 ibid. 
 4 
 
mechanisms; this allows each party to assess the disposition and capacity of the other to respond 
cooperatively and effectively to unpredictable circumstances.
15
 According to DiMatteo, the 
current trend for many modern alliance agreements is to blend fixed terms with more open, 
flexible terms.
16
 Whilst hard and clear terms provide firm protection and boundaries for each 
party’s investments and obligations, open and implicit terms and standards allow for greater 
operational flexibility; this flexibility fully exploits collaborative effort and generates the most 
innovation-related benefits.
17
 This strikes a balance in a contract struck by ‘…interweaving 
explicit and implicit terms that respond to the uncertainty inherent in the innovation process.’18 
 
Through braiding, a buyer and seller leave a range of future adjustments open (for example, 
price, time or quantity) in order to maintain the practicality of a business.
19
 Hillman illustrates 
this form of dealing with the following example: a manufacturer or utility that contemplates long-
term energy needs enters a twenty-year fuel supply agreement.
20
 Both buyer and supplier agree 
on a base price subject to periodic adjustment determined by increased production costs. Initially, 
both parties are satisfied with the agreement, but later an unanticipated event such as an oil 
embargo or high inflation takes place and causes a dramatic rise in costs that outpace the price 
adjustment formula. The buyer refuses to adjust and the supplier, preferring the uncertain results 
of litigation to certain continuing losses, repudiates the agreement. 
 
What possible solutions might the parties take to cope with an unanticipated event that affects the 
contract? Hillman explained five possible ways a court could respond: 1) grant specific 
performance or damages to the relying party; 2) conversely, excuse performance under the 
impracticability doctrine; 3) provide relief based on a party’s restitution or reliance interest; 4) 
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defer any holding and order parties to bargain further; 5) adjust the contract by modifying the 
terms of the agreement and conditioning specific performance on accepting the changes.   
 
Westinghouse Electric Corp v Kerr-McGee Corp
21
 illustrates the inefficiency of a fixed-price 
method. The supplier was to supply uranium to the plants at up to twelve dollars a pound when 
the market price rose sharply to over forty dollars. However, instead of adjusting the contract, the 
court applied the second solution, the doctrine of impracticability, which does excuse 
performance in such a situation. If the court in Westinghouse adjusted the uranium price based on 
the current market price, the contract, despite the unpredictable market conditions, would have 
remained enforceable.
22
 According to Hillman, a court has a duty to adjust modern long-term 
contracts that are susceptible to unanticipated disruption and might affect more than one party. 
However, an adjustment solution, although practical, may not appeal to a traditional contract law 
judge. 
 
Under US sales law, namely Uniform Commercial Code (UCC), parties could voluntarily choose 
an open price when entering into a contract. If they cannot eventually agree on a price term, 
courts would be permitted to adjust the contract by applying ‘reasonable price’ under Section 2-
305. This means that the parties may agree to fix all of a contract’s term,23 but remain free to 
braid the contract, if they wish, by leaving one or more of the contractual terms open until the 
later stages of the contract. Carlton supported the practice of braiding, stating that ‘transactions 
often take place under ‘contract’ … [but] many contracts specify neither a price nor quantity. 
They seem not to be binding legal documents, but rather more like agreements to agree’.24  
 
In the next section, a brief history of flexible, open prices are explored; the issue of how its 
practice tackles a supervening disruption or circumstance affecting modern businesses will also 
be discussed. 
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1.3  The law merchant: origin of preference for flexibility (or ‘adjustability’) rather than 
rigidity in a contract of sale 
This section will demonstrate that the method of leaving a contract incomplete by leaving its 
price open originates from the informal practice of the law merchant.
25
 Section 1.1 above 
explained that a definite, fixed price might be too rigid to accord with the business needs of a 
party when entering into a contract.
26
 To tackle rigidity, both braiding and adjusting the contract 
are equally possible. While a court executes a contract’s adjustment,27 parties choose to braid a 
contract when entering it with a combination of open terms and fixed terms.
28
  
 
The origin of the open price is traced to the eleventh and twelfth centuries when commercial 
renaissance took place in Europe.
29
 This renaissance was partly related to the beginning of trade 
with the Eastern markets, and partly to general political and economic developments within 
Europe including the rise of autonomous political units such as towns and cities.
30
 Gradually, the 
new European trading community grew and created a new system of law to govern its 
commercial activities.
31
 Markets and fairs existed in the West, although without a highly 
developed legal order, for about two or three centuries.
32
 The growth of commerce, the revival of 
the study of law in universities and the growth of legal systems, both ecclesiastical and secular, 
developed the law merchant that included the customs of the markets and fairs as well as 
maritime trade customs.
33
  
 
The law merchant governed trade between merchants in fairs, markets and seaports
34
 and was 
distinguishable from local, feudal, royal and ecclesiastical laws.
35
 The law was unique for being 
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transnational, derived from mercantile customs, administered by merchants themselves, quick 
and informal in procedure and concentrated on equity and fairness.
36
 
 
Although the law merchant was developed in England in a similar manner to other European 
countries,
37
 the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries saw its adoption in the courts of 
Admiralty and Chancery in England.
38
 By late seventeenth century, the common-law courts at 
King’s Bench and Common Pleas succeeded in covering jurisdictions over commercial cases.39 
During this time, questions relating to mercantile custom were submitted for decision to juries 
comprised of merchants.
40
  
 
1.3.1  Formalisation of the law merchant  
The law merchant, being a body of customary law practised by merchants and implicit in jury 
verdicts did not fit precisely into the common law of a leading commercial power such as 
eighteenth century England.
41
 While individual merchants demanded a more clearly defined 
law,
42
 the national policy propagated the need for the law’s formal development instead of its 
continuous reliance on the merchant’s informal commercial experience.43 This policy was evident 
in Lord Mansfield’s opinion, which claimed that the law merchant’s rules should be regarded as 
questions of law that were only appropriate to be decided by courts.
44
  
 
Nevertheless, the law merchant did not just apply to merchants alone, but to all people and, 
subsequently, became an integral part of substantive English common law.
45
 Lord Mansfield and 
his successors’ decisions resulted in the creation of a body of judicially declared English 
commercial law, which incorporated and refined rules developed earlier in Europe.
46
 The 
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incorporation of the law merchant added a cosmopolitan dimension to English common law, 
making the common law courts fulfil the needs of Britain’s growing commerce.47  
 
However, the law merchant gradually became less influential when sales law was codified.
48
 
Commercial law was nationalised and separated from the experience of merchants in England, 
the US, France, Germany and other European countries.
49
 Clearly, codified sales law prevailed 
over the law merchant in most jurisdictions, but the US, upon the enactment of the UCC in 1952, 
is an exception to this.
50
   
 
The international community of merchants engaged in trade across national boundaries and was 
absorbed by the UCC, which proves the relevance of mercantile elements such as retaining a 
flexible, open price in sales.
51
 Arguably, the adoption of the UCC’s approach to open prices 
improves the adaptability of the SGA and the CISG as sales laws, especially during changing 
circumstances. To fulfil this purpose, the adoption of the law merchant principles is crucial; this 
will be discussed in the next section.  
 
1.3.2  General principles of the law merchant 
Despite the formalisation caused by the nationalisation and separation of commercial law from 
the experience of merchants, there are several general principles of the law merchant that have 
been absorbed into sales legislation and, have crucial roles in resolving disputes.
52
 Lando 
explained that the law merchant principles are derived from public international law, uniform 
laws, the general principles of law, the rules of international organisations, customs and usages, 
standard form contracts and reports on arbitral awards.
53
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Mustill listed the rules that fostered the evolution of a transnational commercial legal system into 
one single, open-ended set of rules and principles.
54
 While the list consists of a total of seventy 
eight rules, only eight are crucial for discussion in this thesis: 
 
1) Parties are free to enter into contracts and to determine their contents (the principle of 
party autonomy). 
2) Parties must act in accordance with the standard of good faith and fair dealing in 
international trade. 
3) A valid contract is binding upon parties. 
4) Parties must always act in accordance with a reasonable view of the specific nature of 
their contract and the circumstances involved. This is particularly important when 
considering the economic interests and expectations of parties. 
5) Parties are bound by any usages that they have agreed on, and by any practice that they 
have established between themselves. Unless otherwise agreed, the parties are considered 
to have applied to their contract a usage that the parties knew or ought to have known 
within the particular trade. 
6) Each party is under a good faith obligation to renegotiate the contract if there is a need to 
adapt it to changed circumstances. However, this should only be carried out if the parties 
can expect a reasonable and continuation of performance from one another. 
7) Each party is under a good faith obligation to notify the other party of any problems that 
occur in the performance of a contract. Parties are also expected to cooperate with each 
other when such cooperation can reasonably be expected to fulfil the contract.  
8) A contract should be performed in good faith. 
 
These principles are further elaborated in Chapter Two with the discussion of how a sales law 
could be designed to accommodate an open price. The essence of commercial law rules, usages 
and documentary forms is moulded by the business world,
55
 and it is obvious that commercial 
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law should facilitate legitimate commercial development instead of hindering it.
56
 This is 
achieved through the development of principles within a sound conceptual framework, and not 
simply by supplying ad hoc responses to specific problems.
57
 Primarily, the principles, rules and 
statutory provisions that uphold and protect acceptable mercantile customs and practices should 
also characterise commercial law.
58
  
 
It is important to realise that any branch of law embodies contradictions, competing policies, 
uncertainties and, on occasion, injustices.
59
 This includes commercial law’s own tensions, which 
are not easily resolved.
60
 Merchants prefer practical, flexible and familiar practice in modern 
business, for they are receptive towards the solemnity of the contract but do not care about its 
details.
61
 This preference created a dilemma for contract law in handling long-term deals, which 
was especially apparent when a contract’s flexibility depended, in some way, upon environmental 
elements.
62
 The strain between the need to fix responsibilities at the outset, yet require them to be 
readjusted over time, permeates the existence of a long-term contractual relationship.
63
 
 
As opposed to the law merchant, the cardinal common law principle established that an 
agreement was not enforceable if it was uncertain and indefinite in its material terms.
64
 If the 
contract was sufficiently definite, then the courts were to enforce the agreement by filling 
contractual gaps where necessary.
65
 If otherwise, the courts were bound by the common law to 
deny enforcement and leave the losses ‘to lie where they fall’.66 Clearly, formalisation may 
enhance legitimacy and facilitate clarity by ensuring better coordination between parties, but 
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arguably it also results in fewer long-term contracts along with reduced flexibility, motivation, 
innovation and creativity.
67
 Furthermore, classic contract law demands that any modification in 
the contract should comply with rules governing the formation of contracts, which were often 
designed to fulfil short-term economic interest.
68
 
 
On the other hand, modern legislation, such as the UCC, reflects law merchant principles and 
favours a contract’s enforcement by upholding the parties’ intentions.69 If parties choose an open 
price, the price term is filled by an agreed standard between them; if the agreed method by the 
parties fails, a court can fill the price term by applying a reasonable price during the later stages 
of a contract.
70
 This approach seems better equipped to cope with the relational nature of highly 
complex, long-term sales.  
 
Before progressing into a deeper explanation of how open prices could become more sustainable 
within the SGA and the CISG, the following section will explore the ideas of the supporters of 
contractual flexibility, Llewellyn, Macaulay, Macneil and Scott. These scholars support, and 
argue for, the relevance of the merchant’s approach to flexible pricing in contemporary sales. 
 
1.4  The pro-flexibility scholars 
1.4.1  Llewellyn 
Llewellyn, one of the earliest scholars that propounded the idea of flexibility in contracting, was 
also the main force behind drafting the UCC in the US.
71
 When observing changes in the 
development of commercial law, Llewellyn discovered flexible contracting among merchants in 
the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries,
72
 which, he noted, was an ‘abnormal’ 
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practice.
73
  Evolution from the typical, classic contract to relational contracts found support from 
Justice Holmes: 
In a modern market contracts are not defined to sales for immediate delivery. People will 
endeavour to forecast the future and to make agreements according to their prophecy. Speculation 
of this kind by competent men is the self-adjustment of society to the probable. Its value is well 
known as a means of avoiding or mitigating catastrophes, equalizing prices and providing for 
periods of want.
74
  
 
The critical transformation took place in the US between 1870 and 1920, when the economy went 
from an agrarian exchange of localism in nature and face-to-face communications to modern, 
industrialised practices characterised by cosmopolitanism.
75
 By the early 1940s, parties had been 
communicating at arm’s length, (departing from traditional, ‘face-to-face’ communication 
between a seller and buyer), and Llewellyn thought it was time to replace the classic law 
paradigm with actual business practices.
76
 The UCC was drafted to apply Llewellyn’s idea of 
realism between law and commerce, and it allowed commercial practice to be a source of legal 
rules.
77
  
 
Llewellyn believed that many transactions were too dependent on the traditional law.
78
 
Subsequently, the rigid, traditional law was gradually replaced by the compelling need for a less 
constrictive commercial law in long-range planning and commercial commitments within a 
modern mass-production economy.
79
 The framework of the UCC pays less attention to the 
abstract rules.
80
 Instead, it assists the courts to determine, whether the parties have acted 
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reasonably or in accordance with the customs and usage of trade.
81
 For example, open price was 
constructed in the spirit of upholding the reality of modern commercial dealings.
82
 
 
Clearly, the UCC is dedicated to clarity and good business sense in commercial law, and has 
brought the best laws and practices in the US together into one coherent statement.
83
 Llewellyn 
claimed that ‘if a statute is to make sense, it must be read in the light of some assumed purpose. 
A statute merely declaring rule, with no purpose or objective, is nonsense.’84 As the principal 
author of the UCC, Llewellyn directed the courts to address legal issues using practical, open-
ended methods
85
 of the UCC.  
 
Llewellyn’s views regarding contract law’s evolution and the tacit presuppositions of promises 
are elaborated in his article What Price Contract? An Essay in Perspective, which forms a crux to 
the idea of contractual flexibility proposed by this thesis. 
 
‘What Price Contract? An Essay in Perspective’86 
Llewellyn began his explanation by strictly defining ‘contract’ as the specific legal machinery 
appropriate when a specialised economy (which relies on exchange, instead of tradition or 
authority) moves into the phase of credit and future dealings.
87
 Contracts are formed in the 
market for land, goods, services, credit or any combination of these markets.
88
 The mutual 
reliance of two dealers on their respective promise is of crucial importance,
89
 but economy, deals 
and promises are such normal course of dealing within a credit economy that reliance on them is 
a matter of tacit presupposition.
90
 Due to this, Llewellyn claimed that a deal or promise should be 
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enforceable unless a reason appears to the contrary.
91
 In this view, the duty of the law should be 
to enforce the agreements of laymen when, and if, they make them.
92
 
 
The rapid change of the economy created complex contracts that older models are somewhat 
inadequate to cover the rights and obligations of the parties.
93
 In addition to the legal obligation 
to perform the contract, Llewellyn also highlighted the social sense of duty to perform (or 
roughly labelled as the ‘non-legal obligation’).94 Compared to traditional practice, legal 
obligation is a relatively new development.
95
 Furthermore, the non-legal obligation (or the social 
or ‘moral’ obligation) is barely recognised in law, and the distinction between the two obligations 
has received little attention.
96
 
 
To meet the needs of a rapidly changing economy, Llewellyn extended the nature of contractual 
flexibility to include several contractual types. These were: output and requirements contracts; 
maximum and minimum contracts; and contracts for products of varying quality, quantity and 
kind to be specified on a monthly basis.
97
 Today, possessing an element of flexibility is a marked 
trend in marketing goods where long-term buyer-seller relations are more important than an exact 
definition of the risks affecting quantity, quality or price in a particular trade.
98
 
 
In the following chapters, this thesis will seek to analyse the technique of adopting a less precise 
price term in order to maintain parties’ relations with each other. The extent of price flexibility 
within the SGA and the CISG will be compared with the view of Llewellyn adopted by the UCC. 
As the final joint product of the American Law Institute and the Conference of Commissioners 
on Uniform State Laws, drafted under the direction of Llewellyn as its chief reporter, the UCC is 
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a model for other sales laws to emulate is further discussed in Chapter Three. The SGA and the 
CISG will be discussed in Chapters Four and Five respectively.
99
 
 
1.4.2  Macaulay  
As an internationally recognised leader of the law-in-action approach to the contract, Macaulay 
pioneered the study of business practices and the work of lawyers related to questions of contract 
law and was regarded by Yale's Grant Gilmore as ‘the Lord High Executioner of the Contract is 
Dead Movement.’100 Concurring with Llewellyn’s view, Macaulay stated that it was too common 
to find discussions on complex contracts, such as franchises and dealerships, in the form of 
discrete transactions.
101
 While Llewellyn regarded complex contracts as ‘abnormal’,102 Macaulay 
employed the term ‘relational’ to describe contracts belonging to franchises and dealerships.  
 
Parties who formed relational contracts thought excessive planning destabilised the trust between 
them, which lead to a decrease in flexibility and productivity in their business relationship.
103
 
When governing transactions, the choice between legal and non-legal measures greatly depends 
on the interplay of various factors. For example, the qualities of the contracting partner, the 
frequency of contracting, the internal management and the organisational objectives.
104
 
 
Macaulay distinguished ‘relational’ contracts from ‘discrete’ contracts in the example: a true 
discrete contract is where a motorist who, after embarking on a long trip, drives into a service 
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station on a major highway far from the city.
105
 The service station attendant advises him that his 
vehicle’s tires are dangerously defective, and that the rest of his journey can only be completed 
safely by replacing them with new ones. The station attendant also knows that the motorist is far 
from home and unlikely to return to the station, and indeed the motorist affirms that he will not 
be visiting the station again. Due to this, the sale of the new tires could be referred to as a discrete 
transaction.
106
 However, other elements may make the simple transaction take on a more 
relational function. For instance, the driver could hold a credit card, and the credit card company 
could influence the types of businesses that accept that particular card. Moreover, if the gas 
station was a franchise of a major oil company, the oil company could seek to influence the gas 
station.   
 
A truly relational contract goes beyond the simple act of a motorist seeking tires at a local station, 
and incorporates a much more complex web of relationships. In this type of transaction, the tire 
sale is just one part of a stream of transactions involving factors contingent on the past, present 
and future. Although the motorist could look elsewhere, he would need to find another service 
station that met the same need his present one did, and a similar relationship would have to be 
established at her new station. If there was a violation of the present relationship’s norm, the 
service station might stop giving special privileges to the regular motorist. While market forces 
might push the service station to continue favourable treatment despite the motorist’s violation of 
the expected norm, the motorist might not feel entitled to ask for the favourable treatment.
107
 This 
example concurs with the idea propagated by Macneil about relational contract theory.
108
 
 
Due to the relational elements present in modern contracts, Macaulay doubted whether courts 
would (or could) give formal, objective meaning to highly contextual language and behaviour.
109
 
If judges limit themselves to solely dealing with parties’ formal, textual expressions (the ‘paper 
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deal’)110 they would only be able to perceive the ‘plain meaning’ of the words in the contract 
without appreciating the other factors they imply.
111
 Observing this, Macaulay advocated that 
‘paper deals’ do not reflect the ‘real’ expectations of the deal112 and he recommended courts took 
a contextual approach to protect the parties’ unwritten expectations.113 However, it is dependent 
upon the individual judges to choose whether to act in either a formal or more ‘realistic’ 
manner.
114
 
 
Proving tacit expectations are likely to be difficult and costly.
115
 The only way, according to 
Macaulay, for courts to fulfil parties’ expectations (both written and unwritten), is for a contract 
law to rest on standards instead of quantitative rules.
116
 Examples of standards might include 
reliance on good faith,
117
 a commitment to active cooperation or limitations depending on 
commercial reasonableness.
118
 
 
Macaulay discussed the problems dealt with in business practices by contract law in 1963.
119
 The 
businessmen then viewed the extra cost required to plan as unnecessary and so omitted complete 
planning for performance and non-performance.
120
 The contractual documents were often 
neglected based on the assumption that, as the transaction progressed, it would create 
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expectation,
121
 it is ‘the powerful informal norms, rather than legal rules, that govern most 
contracting behaviour’.122 
  
Macaulay’s view is useful when addressing complex and long-term contracts in this thesis, and 
when comparing the three legislations in proving the value of the mercantile, flexible open-price 
approach. As Macaulay pointed out, it is costly to prove a real deal based on the tacit 
expectations of parties, but flexible contracting is a cost-effective method when it comes to 
upholding the long-term intention of a buyer and a seller in a contract of sale. Features such as 
good faith,
123
 a duty to cooperate, or commercial reasonableness
124
 are much better at 
highlighting those tacit expectations than formally expressed, quantified terms.
125
  
 
1.4.3  Macneil: the founder of relational contract theory   
Macneil worked on arbitration and legal and political philosophy, which contributed to the 
development of his relational contract theory.
126
 Macneil admitted that the classic contract law’s 
value had been ‘enormous, and continues to be of substantial value’127 but his work was driven 
by the belief that a more attractive, rival contract theory was both possible and necessary to 
displace the classic contract law.
128
 
 
To understand contract law, one must first understand contracts, what they are, how they work, 
why people enter into them and why people use the law.
129
 In a similar fashion to Llewellyn, 
Macneil emphasised the importance of understanding contracts as a social and economic 
institution in order to grasp the role of the law and lawyer within a huge network of 
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contracting.
130
 The basic idea of a social institution is that every human is a discrete individual; 
physically, psychologically and socially. Therefore, it is necessary to sort the dual and conflicting 
existence as individuals and as members of a collective, without which individuality cannot 
exist.
131
 Contracts resulting from the relation between people-‘… in which human cooperate to 
achieve their goals and to resolve (always only temporarily) the tensions created by our dualistic 
nature-simultaneously individual and social’.132 
 
Macneil perceived that the failure of classic contract law was due to its unrealistic approach to 
the rules of acceptance, the agreement of remedies and the processes of hire and purchase. 
Macneil stated that a contract was ‘hardly a neat and logical structure of rules, but like all law a 
social instrument designed to accomplish the goals of a man’. To Macneil, the traditional contract 
law cannot efficiently govern extensive, meticulously planned, inter-firm contracts between large 
but economically interdependent firms. For example, a building contract is too complex to be 
specified during pre-contractual negotiations. In this case, parties would need to adjust price and 
time in an unspecified manner to suit their expectations and obligations both during construction 
and on the completion of the building contract.
133
 To fix the future price at the time of entering 
into the contract, or to presentiate the price, would be inconvenient for the parties. Macneil 
defines the term presentiation as ‘a way of looking at things in which a person perceives the 
effect of the future on the present, it is a recognition that the course of the future is so unalterably 
bound by present conditions that the future has been brought effectively into the present so that it 
may be dealt with just as if it were in fact present’.134 Presentiation works well with discrete 
transactions, but it is not necessarily easily applied to relational contracts. The longer a contract 
carries on, the more difficult it is to simply look at an original agreement and provide satisfactory 
answers. English law responded to the problem of presentiation by using the concept of ‘implied 
terms’. However, Macneil noted that this approach only accentuated the problems involved in 
presentiation.
135
 He suggested that a better response would be ‘…to develop an overall structure 
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of contract law of greater applicability than now exists and to merge both the details and the 
structure of transactional contract into that overall structure’. 136 
 
Instead of imposing rules intended for discrete transactions, the resolution of a problem arising 
from long-term or relational contracts becomes an underlying issue of a contract. Because of this, 
Macneil claimed that ten common contract norms should replace classic contract law theory’s 
reliance on individual, rational self-interest as governing norm. The contractual norms are as 
follows: integrity, reciprocity, implementation of planning, effectuation of consent, flexibility, 
contractual solidarity, restitution, reliance on expectation, creation and restraint of power, 
propriety of means and harmonisation with the social matrix.
137
 
 
Presentiation may work well in simple, discrete transactions but this does not necessarily imply 
that it will work in relational sales; therefore, minimising the impact of presentiation is crucial to 
every sales law. Relational theory will be used to test the capabilities of the present sales laws in 
England, the US and the CISG in enforcing open price and requirements on long-term contracts. 
The current thesis is motivated by the desire to test Macneil’s suggested norm of flexibility on 
open price practice within the three jurisdictions. Although the question of flexible contracting is 
often raised in today’s courts, planning flexibility into economic relations began in the US from 
the nineteenth century
138
 and has yet to be adopted by the SGA and the CISG. 
 
1.4.3.1 Macneil’s recommended techniques for greater contractual flexibility 
Although Macaulay has written on businesses problems faced in 1963 and generally explained 
that businesspeople have disliked formality, stating that ‘the powerful norms, rather than legal 
rules, govern most contracting behaviour’,139 Macneil expanded on the elements of contractual 
norms. Macneil enumerated the various techniques applicable for adapting the flexible, relational 
nature of a contract that, as observed by Macaulay, do not always involve thorough planning for 
performance and non-performance.
140
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Depending on the nature and type of transaction, there are five applicable techniques suggested 
by Macneil that permit a certain amount of flexibility under any sales law: the use of standards, 
direct third party determination of performance relations, one party’s control of terms, cost and 
gaps in planning, and agreements to agree. 
141
 
 
The first technique, the use of standards such as the Consumer Price Index is useful in periods of 
fluctuation, but it may cause problems if the standard is discontinued or altered. However, 
alternatively, a third party not related to the contractual relationship could establish a suitable 
standard.
142
 
 
The second technique, a direct third party determination of performance, draws on the expertise 
of an outsider to the contract. An architect from the architects’ institution could determine a 
number of aspects such as the performance of a relationship, general administration and the 
approval of a contractors’ selection of superintendent.143 Another way of using this technique is 
through arbitration, a method that is mostly known for solving existing rights arising from 
contracts.
144
 
 
The third technique, one party’s control of terms, is used instead of using external standards or 
independent third parties; one of the contract’s parties will define, directly or indirectly, parts of 
the contractual relationship.
145
 This technique entails that one party has the ability to terminate 
the relation, and is important in certain areas of enterprise including financial markets, 
commercial real estate transactions, commercial sales of goods and certain types of consumer 
transactions (such as insurance). To cope with the difficulties of the doctrine of consideration, the 
transactional legal structure produced a wide range of concepts, provisions, techniques and other 
devices limiting the doctrine’s impact. According to Macneil, the drafter who desires to achieve 
workable flexibility must be aware of the limitations the law imposes on available techniques, but 
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also the opportunities the law offers. Under the UCC, the typical practice regarding the sale of 
gasoline requires the supplier to decide the price in good faith before each delivery takes place. 
This is further discussed under Chapter Three using relevant court decisions. 
 
The fourth technique is a combined pricing method of all three of the above techniques namely, 
the use of standards, direct third-party determination and one-party control.
146
 While this method 
is possible, all case laws cited in this thesis do not involve a mixed method but rather a single 
price determination method for the purposes of discussion on whether open price works best and 
not necessarily on the issue of which of the open-price method is the most ideal. 
 
The fifth technique is the agreement to agree which allows parties to fill in gaps in their relation 
at a later date, but still defines what the contract’s completion would require at the outset.147 
Macneil affirmed that these processes often lead to a future agreement.
148
 In light of this, Macneil 
asserted that sales law should treat these gaps similarly to other gaps.
149
 While applying an 
agreement to agree can be fatal to later securing judicial gap-filling,
150
 this is avoidable by adding 
of an alternative gap-filling technique to come into operation if the parties are unable to agree.
151
 
While agreement to agree is commonly practised in relational contracts, classic contract law may 
not be able to validate this method of contracting, hindered by its presentiation character that 
requires precise determination of terms in every relational contract.
152
 
 
1.4.3.2        The acceptance of Macneil’s theory in the US 
Macneil’s relational theory gained much attention in the US for many years, and Macneil was 
described as both ‘a perceptive analyst of the American contract law scholarship and too 
modest’.153 Relational contract theory left a significant impact on the understanding and teaching 
of contract law in the US, and at a basic level of understanding, contractual relations are 
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categorised as ‘discrete’ and ‘relational’ within mainstream of scholarship and teaching 
concerning contracts in the US.
154
 The US’s classic contract law, which will be further explained 
in Chapter Three, is closely associated with Williston and the original Restatement of Contracts; 
these sources were motivated by the ‘isolated bargain between independent, self-interested 
individuals’,155 which stands in stark contrast to the ten norms of relational contracts suggested 
by Macneil.
156
 
 
Subsequently, contextualisation occurred after the enshrinement of classical contract law in 
Williston’s (1920) treatise and the Restatement (American Law Institute 1932) in the 1920s.157 
The UCC however, continues to provide elements to adapt to the needs of the relational 
contracts; this includes performance, course of dealing, and usage of trade as sources of contract 
interpretation (Section 2-208) and good faith as a baseline obligation (Sections 1-201(19), 1-203, 
2-103(1)(b)). 
 
1.4.4  Scott: the self-enforcing contract theory 
While flexibility has been extensively detailed by Macneil, Scott pioneered the theory of 
contractual ‘self-enforcement’. 
 
Although a formalist, Scott concurred with Llewellyn, Macaulay and Macneil that although the 
world’s states are infinite, contracting parties have a limited capacity to specify their future 
performance, which leaves parties to favour incomplete contracts.
158
 Leaving a contract 
incomplete is a deliberate act, and when examined, the contract often employs linguistic 
ambiguity or fails to specify provisions in numerical terms.
159
 In addition, parties have a mutual 
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desire for binding but flexible, responses to uncertain future conditions, and so intentionally limit 
the scope and precision of verifiable terms.
160
  
 
The assumption that contracts fit into a simple two-step formula of ‘offer’ and ‘acceptance’ 
encourages contractual rigidity.
161
 In reality, parties are not strangers; they are normally familiar 
with each other and prefer to interact off contract and to be ‘mediated not by visible terms 
enforceable by a court, but by a particular balance of cooperation and coercion, communication 
and strategy’.162 Scott discovered that cooperation might arise without any contracts at all, and 
that ‘contracting parties use a mix of legal and extra-legal mechanisms, as well as patterned and 
individualised responses, to ameliorate the information and enforcement deficits that threaten 
emergence patterns of cooperation’.163 
 
Scott found that one of the reasons parties, such as the merchants, write deliberately incomplete 
agreements is because these agreements are potentially self-enforcing.
164
 Scholars have 
appreciated that if the contracting parties have a good reputation, especially through repeated 
interactions, their contract is self-enforcing.
165
 Scott argued that self-enforcement not only applies 
to long-term commercial contracts, but also to contracts between strangers.
166
 A further 
explanation of self-enforcement theory will be made in the following chapters, which emphasise 
the fact that a contract between parties of good repute and repeat trade should enforce itself 
without any need for justification under the contract law. In the next chapter, gradual explanation 
will be made on the types of industries that specifically apply the theory of contractual ‘self-
enforcement’, even though this thesis focuses on open terms applied in legally enforceable 
contracts, rather than those applied in alternative or extra-legal agreements.  
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1.5  The impact of relational theory in England and international law (CISG)  
1.5.1 The acceptance of Macneil’s relational contract theory in England 
While most contract law scholars in England did not support Macneil’s relational contract theory, 
Collins seemed to concur with the view that there is a need for flexibility in UK contract law. He 
advocated that contract doctrine needs to overcome fundamental obstacles presented by classic 
law (for instance, by upholding consensual modifications made following changed 
circumstances) and that courts should consider long-term interests as a guide to cooperation 
requirements so that economic opportunities can be maximised.
167
 
 
In addition to Collins, Halson admitted that contracting parties are not omniscient, and that 
contracting for all future possibilities in an uncertain and complex world would be very costly, if 
not impossible, for them to provide.
168
 Although Halson did not suggest the use of open terms as 
an alternative to resolve the cost issue, he agreed that the costs of a contract’s terms at the initial 
stage could be reduced if the law facilitates and encourages adaptive behaviour between 
contracting parties.
169
 This is in concurrence with the earlier discussion in this thesis, which 
concluded that compliance with classic contract law demands for rigid price-fixing is ‘a 
convenient trap-door through which the imprudent or unscrupulous obligor can escape, leaving 
the innocent obligee to bar not only the loss of expected benefits but also the burden of liability to 
subpurchasers’.170 
 
Campbell and Harris stated that the explanation of long-term contracts using classic contract law 
is very problematic
171
 because ‘efficient long-term contractual behaviour must be understood as 
consciously cooperative’ as a long-term contract is an analogy to a partnership.172 Instead of 
aiming directly at utility maximisation through the performance of obligations that are specified 
in advanced, parties would indirectly aim for long-term cooperative behaviour based on trust.
173
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This cooperative mechanism, through which utility is achieved in a long-term relationship, is 
fundamentally different from a short-term, specified contract,
174
 where the precise conduct and 
the shares in the joint product required by future long-term cooperation are not specifiable in 
advance.
175
 Consequently, parties accept a general and productively vague norm of fairness to 
apply to their long-term commercial relationship.
176
 
 
Within the English judicial position, these scholars’ findings were not applied by the courts even 
though flexibility, trust and cooperation are not new ideas to English law.
177
 However, the recent 
decision of Mamidoil
178
 proved that the English court has been more receptive to the idea of 
maintaining long-term cooperation between parties. This indicated that the English law has 
indirectly accepted a long-term contract as ‘self-enforcing’ when it is made between a buyer and 
seller of repeatedly good reputation. 
 
1.5.2 The acceptance of Macneil’s relational contract theory by the CISG 
The CISG has been influenced by a variety of jurisdictions (including civil law) and incorporates 
both civil and common law methods. Beginning in 1968, the task of unifying international sales 
law was taken over by the United Nations Conference on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL), 
whose broad membership includes countries of different legal traditions and socio-economic 
conditions.
179
 The 62 nations comprised of 22 from the ‘developed’ world, 11 from socialist 
regimes and 29 from third world countries.
180
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Because states have different backgrounds and jurisdictions, during ratification a state may 
declare that it will only join the CISG in part.
181
 A state may refuse to be bound either by Part II 
(on the formation of contracts), or by Part III (on the rights and obligations of the parties).
182
 The 
only mandatory parts are Part I on the sphere of application and other general provisions, and Part 
IV on the final provisions on ratification and related matters.
183
 
 
As sales are often relational, the CISG provides two approaches to making a contract. In the first 
approach, a state may choose to contract under Article 14(1), which requires a price to be 
implicitly fixed, and preference for a classical, fixed price approach is found under this provision. 
The socialist legal systems are more inclined towards this provision, because of their needs to 
comply with the requirements of a planned, state-operated economy.
184
 This approach prioritises  
the contract’s security and guaranteed foresight over other values.185 The second approach, 
favoured by some Western legal systems, allows parties to adjust a contract without judicial 
interference.
186
 This is found under Article 55, which recognises the relational element of a sale 
even if the price is not set at the time of entering into the contract. 
 
The Honnold-Farnsworth debate provides us with two opposing views: while Honnold takes a 
similar view to Macneil, believing that a contract with an unstated price is potentially valid,
187
 
Farnsworth thinks that an open price is only valid when there is an implicit requirement to price. 
If there was an absence of an implicit standard, Farnsworth would claim there is no sufficient 
ground to make an offer or construct a valid contract.
188
 The subtle difference between the two 
opinions is that that Honnold’s view would validate open-price contracts regardless of their 
method of price determination, whereas Farnsworth’s view requires a certain standard that takes 
away the possibility of having an ‘agreement to agree’ on a price. However, the remaining price-
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determination techniques suggested by Macneil (cost, market price, third party determination and 
one party determination) are compatible with Farnsworth’s view.   
 
Nevertheless, during periods of rapid price fluctuation, a controversy may arise if Farnsworth’s 
view is applied to sales. When a CISG court is not receptive to open-price contracts, the wording 
of Article 14(1), together with a narrow construction of Article 55, could lead to the nullity of a 
contract.
189
 To maintain the enforceability of relational sales during times of price fluctuation, 
open prices leave a contract’s price flexible. Further discussions on CISG court decisions under 
both Articles 14 and 55 are made in Chapter Five of this thesis. 
 
1.6  Conclusion 
Open price is not a modern practice; it originates from the law merchant and was later integrated 
into codified sales law. Its integration into a sales law improves the facilitative effect of 
commercial law. The tendency to leave the contract incomplete by leaving the price open was 
common in the trade of the merchants, but more importantly the practice continues in today’s 
modern alliances and long-term industries.  Parties braid a contract by fixing some terms, but 
leaving others, such as the price open. While some parties may consider open price as a 
preferable option, it is a particularly necessary practice to counter the effects of price fluctuations 
in the sale of goods. The Westinghouse case showed that a fixed-price method could not 
guarantee a transaction’s convenience during times of price fluctuation.190 Leaving the price term 
to be determined at a later stage would ensure that the parties could maintain long-term 
cooperation and, more importantly rely on the completion of their contract when circumstances 
change.  In other words, price fluctuations, whilst causing difficulties, should not frustrate a 
contract. Instead of being bound by a fixed price, which could become unfairly high or low 
during changing circumstances, parties could counter the hardship by setting an open price. 
 
Ultimately, legislation should not be a trap door for a relying party when the contract’s 
performance is excused on grounds of changing circumstances. Indeed, this is what happened 
when most sales laws were formalised and separated from the practices of merchants (see section 
                                                 
189
 ibid. 
190
 Westinghouse (n 21). 
 29 
 
1.3.1 above). However, US sales law was critically transformed to adapt to changes improvised 
to adapt to the changes, after the economy shifted from agrarian to industrialised practices 
‘characterised by cosmopolitanism’ between 1870 and 1920. Llewellyn replaced classic 
formalism with principles of actual business practices, which is why the UCC carries numerous 
mercantile principles. The UCC not only acknowledges the legal obligation to perform the 
contract, but it also recognises the non-legal obligation, ie the moral duty to perform the contract 
in a rapidly changing economy. 
 
Further research from Macaulay and Macneil illustrates the theoretical aspect of the complexity 
of modern contracts. The relational contract is used to distinguish complex, ‘arm’s length’ deals, 
and is opposed to a ‘discrete contract,’ which signifies a traditional, direct, ‘face-to-face’ way of 
contracting where all the contract’s terms could be easily fixed from the outset. It was discovered 
that most businesses problems are not resolvable if classic contract law demands presentiation 
from the parties in relational transactions. Parties may have tacit expectations that are costly and 
difficult to predict, and so sales law should be more adaptable to their needs. If parties are unable 
to set a price when they enter into a new contract, sales law should be able to validate the deal 
using standards of good faith and commercial reasonableness instead of imposing a fixed-price 
requirement for valid contracts. The departure from the classic approach is particularly necessary 
when parties are so familiar with each other that they interact off contract and create an ongoing, 
self-enforcing contractual relationship. 
 
To further acknowledge the essential requirement for sales law to be adaptable and facilitative of 
open prices, Chapter Two discusses the more specific, practical examples of incomplete contracts 
employing open terms. Extensive explanation by Gergen about different types of contracts, 
including agency contracts, oil and gas leases, will be explored. Chapter Two also focuses on 
why parties opt for open price. A general discussion about relevant provisions for open-price 
contracts in the UCC, CISG and SGA will be made. These legislations will be looked at in 
further detail in subsequent chapters, which will relate relevant illustrations of case law to each of 
the scholarly ideas discussed in this chapter. 
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Chapter Two: The Benefits of Contractual Flexibility through Open Terms 
(and Open Prices) in Various Industries 
 
 
2.0  Introduction  
Chapter One encapsulated the idea of an agreement‟s „completeness or „incompleteness‟ and 
noted how merchants customarily determined the terms of an agreement during its later 
stages-as opposed to determining the terms at the time of the conclusion of the contract. 
Indeed, the idea of contractual flexibility was a foreign concept in classic contract law
1
 even 
though such flexibility was commonly practised from the early 1900s onwards.
2
 Flexible 
contract practice was sparked by the parties‟ mutual desires for flexible, yet bound, responses 
to the uncertainty of future conditions that limit the scope and precision of verifiable terms.
3
 
As explained by Scott and Macneil, parties are precluded from fixing terms due to future 
possibilities that cannot be predicted or verified by courts beforehand.
4
 In addition, the 
merchants‟ familiarity with each other5 leads to their interaction off contract, with „a 
particular balance of cooperation and coercion, communication and strategy‟.6 Halson thought 
that sales law should be more adaptive to the changing circumstances that affect a contract, 
and observed that costs could be saved by using a flexible approach to make a contract instead 
of demanding that parties provide contracts which cover all potential eventualities.
7
  
 
While Chapter One explained the law merchant‟s history and the advent of flexible, open 
prices, this chapter elaborates on the technical reasons for commercial parties to choose 
incomplete contracts over, complete ones. The nature of commercial contract requires the 
contractual gap to be filled when future conditions become clearer,
8
 and the law merchant‟s 
open-endedness provides a suitable way to facilitate this. 
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This chapter begins by defining an open term and distinguishing it from other terms, before 
explaining the reasons for having them in various contracts, including sales contracts. This 
chapter also elaborates on empirical studies of industries that apply open terms, and concludes 
that their feasibility in other contracts shows that they could be similarly applicable in sales 
contracts.  
 
2.1  An ‘open’ term versus a ‘missing’ term 
Chapter One revealed that flexibility was one of ten contractual norms recommended by 
Macneil to be implemented in relational contracts
9
 and one way of implementing flexibility 
was for parties to use open terms in their contract. An „open term‟ expresses mutual 
commitment to a contract on agreed major terms, while recognising the existence of open 
terms that remain to be negotiated.
10
 The contract is intentionally entered by parties who 
acknowledge that some terms require further negotiation,
11
 or reference to a certain market or 
a third party to set the price, as promulgated by Section 2-305(1) of the UCC. This practice 
emerged from the complexities associated with twentieth century commerce,
12
 which 
involved large-scale production and expanding markets that carried great uncertainty and 
business hazards.
13
 Open terms are commonly applied in long-term contracts where a 
workable balance exists between cooperation and coercion, and between communication and 
strategy.
14
 Occasionally, open terms are used in one-off contracts where continuous 
cooperation is unnecessary)
15
 such as in professional services or commodity businesses that 
do not necessarily rely on a reciprocal, ongoing relationship.
16
  
 
The UCC for example, secures the validity of a contract for sale even if the price of the goods 
is not settled. What if the parties could not agree on price even after a negotiation or a 
reference to a certain market or a third party to set the price? In any of this situation, Section 
2-305(1) of the UCC secures the contract by permitting the application of a reasonable price 
at the time of delivery of the goods. The thesis perceives such extent of enforceability of open 
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price as a practical way of contracting in long-term deals that requires flexibility to negotiate 
changing prices of the goods, yet maintaining the cooperative, ongoing relationships between 
the dealers.   
 
An open term is commonly confused with a „missing term‟, which denotes the unintentional 
omission of a term due to the occurrence of an urgent situation.
17
 Aside from the missing 
term, there are three other terms that are commonly confused with open terms:
18
 
 
1) The open term and the „pre-contractual‟ term 
 Whereas an open term is arguably enforceable by law, a pre-contractual term demands 
future contracts, and has an uncertain legal status.
19
 The English courts will probably 
not decide that pre-contractual terms bind parties. However, US courts are more 
willing to accept pre-contractual agreements than English courts. Furthermore, 
German jurisdiction perceives a pre-contract term (Vorvertrag) as binding because it is 
likely that parties will eventually complete the main contract (Hauptvertrag). 
2) The „umbrella‟ term 
 An umbrella term provides the framework for further contractual decisions, whereas 
open terms include most terms in a business deal.
20
 In Baird Textile Holdings Ltd v 
Marks & Spencer Plc 
21
 the implied understanding was interpreted by the court as an 
informal umbrella agreement that governed a series of discrete contracts and created 
an obligation to give fair notice before terminating the relationship.
22
 
3) General terms and conditions 
 Although general terms and conditions are applied in relatively discrete and 
anonymous transactions, an open term typically applies to contracts with a more 
complex and relational nature. 
 
The above definitions prove that there is a slight but crucial distinction between an open term 
and other types of terms. „Inadvertent‟ and „deliberate‟ are useful terms to distinguish 
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accidentally „missing‟ a term from intentionally leaving it open and are useful for discussion 
in the individual chapters dealing with the UCC, SGA and CISG. Due to this, relevant cases 
involving relational sales will be divided into these respective categories. This distinction has 
been chosen because, while all three legislations unanimously enforce missing terms under 
the inadvertent category, they differ in degrees of flexibility when enforcing open terms that 
are deliberately entered into by parties. 
 
2.2  Defining the problem: the practice of merchants versus the rigidity of the 
codified law’s rules 
Gilson, Sabel and Scott demonstrated that business parties tend to respond to future 
uncertainty by braiding their contracts,
23
 indeed, modern alliances are formed by blending the 
hard, fixed terms with more open, flexible standards.
24
 Whilst hard and explicit terms provide 
firm protections and boundaries for each firm‟s investments and obligations, an open and 
implicit term allows for greater operational flexibility to fully exploit the collaborative effort 
and maximise benefits.
25
 Therefore, braiding is a useful practice in maintaining a business‟s 
practicality.
26
 
 
Despite the many benefits of using open terms in mercantile business, it does not necessarily 
follow that traditional, simple, fixed terms have lost their relevance in commerce.
27
 Gergen 
stressed that parties should not use open terms because of the difficulty of writing a contract. 
In fact, a fixed-term contract is the most convenient to enforce 
28
 and preferable when both 
parties know the probability of all possible outcomes.
29
 For example, despite the complexity 
of the agreement, a financing contract between a bank and a major commercial borrower that 
has definite terms detailing repayment and security would benefit from a fixed-term 
approach.
30
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Nevertheless, open terms prevail over fixed terms in trades where parties cannot predict future 
eventualities; they allow a contract to adapt to changing circumstances.
31
 In Chapter One it 
was observed that the fixed-price method did not work in the relational sale of uranium in 
Westinghouse Electric Corp v Kerr-McGee Corp:
32
 the utility requiring an energy supply, 
entered into a twenty-year fuel agreement with the supplier.
33
 Although the typical practice 
was to agree on a base price, subject to periodic adjustment based on increased production 
costs, the parties fixed the price for the sale of the uranium in a traditional manner. 
Unanticipated high inflation caused a sudden increase in costs that made the fixed-price 
contract come to failure in the early 1970s. The impact affected Westinghouse, which, in 
order to honour its commitment, had to sell large quantities of uranium at the previously 
arranged fixed price even though it cost Westinghouse more to purchase it.  
 
While contractual adjustments by courts may resolve the problems of fixed prices,
34
 open 
prices would have been much more efficient (especially when considering that goods such as 
uranium are susceptible to price volatility.) Fixing a price when the contract was agreed was 
too early to predict the rapid increase in price caused by the cartel,
35
 but if the parties agreed 
on an open price hike under Section 2-305 of the UCC, the contract‟s performance would not 
have been excused by Section 2-615 of the UCC on the basis of impracticability.  
 
Because the need for open terms (specifically open prices) increases in the modern market, 
the next section will explain the position of the UCC, SGA and CISG in addressing the issue 
before discussing the extent to which these legislations permit flexibility without 
compromising a contract‟s certainty.  
 
2.3  The current judicial position of the UCC, the SGA and the CISG  
Chapter One briefly discussed Llewellyn‟s discovery regarding the mercantile practice of 
flexibility, which began in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries.
36
 By the 1940s, 
Llewellyn realised that there had to be a replacement for classic law‟s approach to contracting 
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(using terms derived from commercial dealing), which could better accommodate actual 
business practice.
37
 Flexibility is a noted trend in marketing goods between merchants, which 
assumes that long-term buyer-seller relations are more important than exact definitions of 
risks to goods‟ quantity, quality or price.38   
 
The UCC was drafted through a joint effort with the American Law Institute and the 
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Law.
39
 The UCC‟s approach is chosen by 
this thesis as a model for the adoption of similar practices of price flexibility under the SGA 
and the CISG. The UCC is designed to maintain a contract‟s certainty, yet it also functions as 
a „gap-filling‟ law when parties leave terms open, either inadvertently or deliberately.40 This 
is evident, especially in regard to price, under Section 2-305(1): 
The parties if they so intend can conclude a contract for sale even though the price is not 
settled. In such a case the price is a reasonable price…if the price is to be fixed in terms of 
some agreed market or other standard as set or recorded by a third person or agency and it is 
not so set or recorded.  
 
Although permitting open price, the UCC still approves conventional fixed prices under 
Section 2-305(4): 
Where, however, the parties intend not to be bound unless the price to be fixed or agreed and it 
is not fixed…there is no contract. In such a case the buyer must return any goods already 
received or if unable so to do must pay their reasonable value at the time of delivery and the 
seller must return any portion of the price paid on account. 
 
The UCC empowers a court to play its role in determining parties‟ primary intentions,41 if 
parties intend to be bound by a fixed price alone, the absence of an agreement on price entitles 
the relying party to restitutionary remedies as seen in Section 2-305(4).
42
 This means that 
parties may choose to fix the price 
43
 or, contrastingly, say nothing in regard to it.
44
 
Somewhere between fixed and total silence lies a range of flexible techniques validated by 
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Section 2-305(1). These include an agreement to agree
45
 and determination of terms by a third 
person, agency
46
 or, one of the parties.
47
 Under the UCC, all sales contracts that apply any of 
these three price mechanisms are valid as long as parties intend to be bound to the contract
48
 
and that the price is set in good faith.
49
 A further exploration on open price under the UCC is 
made in Chapter Three. 
 
2.3.1  The position of the SGA with regard to open prices 
 
While there is similarity between the SGA and the UCC in recognising the validity of 
inadvertently incomplete contracts,
50
 the SGA does not validate deliberately incomplete 
contracts by parties with the „intention to be bound‟ to the contract; the English court‟s focus 
has always been on whether the price term was sufficiently definite. Section 8 of the SGA, the 
primary provision on price, does not uphold a fixed-price agreement during market 
exigencies.
51
 If the parties did agree on a price mechanism, English courts would generally 
withhold enforcing the agreement if the method for price determination broke down.
52
 While 
English courts look for ways to enforce open terms,
53
 there is always the possibility of 
nullifying an open term, under the English law if the parties left the price undecided without 
agreeing on a specific fixing method.
54
  
 
2.3.2  The position of the CISG with regard to open prices 
The CISG has a dual, somewhat perplexing, approach to open prices.  Its setup has had a 
mixed-influence on the various jurisdictions of its Contracting States, ranging from the most 
liberal approach to contracting (such as the US) to some of the most restrictive methods (as 
                                                 
45
 Section 2-305(1)(b). 
46
 Section 2-305(1)(c). 
47
 Section 2-305(2). 
48
 Section 2-204(3). 
49
 Section 2-305(2). 
50
 An example under the SGA is Traditional Structures Ltd v HW Construction Ltd [2010] EWHC 1530 (TCC); 
[2010] CILL 2899 where the contract was held as valid despite the mistakenly omitted price (of cladding, for the 
purpose of the structural steelwork and roof planning) on the part of the claimant.  
51
 Acertec Construction Products Ltd (formerly BRC Ltd) v Thamesteel Ltd [2008] England and Wales High 
Court 2966 (Commercial Cases) (Queen‟s Bench Division (Commercial Cases)). 
52
 In Rafsanjan Pistachio Producers Cooperative v Kaufmanns Ltd (Independent, January 12, 1998; (Queen‟s 
Bench Division (Commercial Cases) [para 7] : the agreed price clause was to be agreed before each delivery. 
This was because the price for a new 1996 Pistachio crop had not yet been formally appraised in Iran. The court 
did not uphold the contract, although it had been a common practice for the plaintiff to agree to forward 
contracts with his major customers to new crop quantities, which left the price to be agreed subsequently.  
53
 Acertec Construction Products Ltd, and Mamidoil-Jetoil Greek Petroleum Co SA v Okta Crude Oil Refinery 
AD (No1) [2001] England and Wales Court of Appeal (Civil Division) 406. 
54
 Scott Coal Co Ltd v Danish Forestry Co Ltd [2010] Scotland Court of Session, Inner House 56. 
37 
 
witnessed in socialist countries). To compromise with the needs of various Member States,
55
 
there are two approaches provided by Articles 14 and 55. As explained in Chapter One, Part II 
of Article 14, validates a contract if it „expressly or implicitly fixes or makes provision for 
determining the quantity and price of the goods.‟ In contrast, the supplementary provision of 
Article 55, found under Part III of the CISG, states that open prices actually require a contract 
to have an „implicit‟ price fixed by law. Concerning the applicability of both articles, Member 
States have the option to choose to be bound by either or both parts.
56
 
 
Article 14 certainly suited countries with socialist legal systems as it complies with the 
requirements of a planned, state-operated economy.
57
 It prioritises the security of a contract 
and its foreseeability over all other values.
58
 Conversely, Article 55 is a more appealing 
alternative for Western legal systems, which favour flexible standards that allow parties to 
adjust a contract without judicial interference.
59
 While a more detailed explanation about the 
correlation of Articles 14 and 55 is found in Chapter Five, it should be noted that open prices 
under Article 55 are often bound by the requirements of a fixed (or implicitly fixed price) 
under Article 14(1). Article 55 may be difficult to apply when the contract is agreed on, 
because other factors make it hard to decide on a fixed price.
60
 For example, the goods 
involved could be seasonal,
61
 or market volatility might occur and make the initially agreed 
upon price detrimental to one of the parties.
62
 Article 55 is not in pari materia with Section 2-
305(1), which implements the reasonable price at the time of delivery clause to ensure that the 
fairest price is applied in unforeseeable situation.  
 
As commercial law has different broad principles to international sales,
63
 which form the 
„bifocal world of international sales law‟,64 both the SGA and CISG need to keep up with the 
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requirements of complex contracts. Recognising the reliability of the SGA and the CISG in 
both local and international sales, this thesis proposes that both sales laws adopt a more 
flexible approach to price fixing in order to maintain relational sales.  
 
2.3.3  Thesis proposal 
By using the UCC as a model, this thesis proposes a more adaptable approach to setting 
prices, and advises minimising the presentiational approach the SGA and the CISG favour. 
Based on the self-enforcing nature of a relational, long-term contract, as well as the 
commercial context 
of a trade, open prices are often a more convenient solution, provided parties are proven to 
have an intention to be contractually bound. Presentiating the future price makes a long-term, 
relational deal less viable during fluctuations, because parties are unaware of the exact risks 
they could face. A strict compliance with classic contract law, which demands in rigid price-
fixing, is „a convenient trap-door through which the imprudent or unscrupulous obligor can 
escape, which may leave the innocent obligee to suffer loss of expected benefits and also 
potentially, loss to subpurchasers‟.65    
 
To strengthen this thesis‟s proposition, the fixed-price decision in Scafom International BV v 
Lorraine Tubes S.A.S.
66
 is analysed in Chapter Six. This case involved a trade of steel 
products that faced price fluctuation prior to their delivery to the buyer; both parties intended 
to be bound by the deal, but their contract provided for a fixed price. In order to modify the 
price, the seller brought the case before the courts to obtain an order for renegotiation to 
remedy the consequences of a rigid fixed-price term. Arguably, the parties should have 
drafted the contract with an open price, but whether the relevant law (the CISG) would have 
enabled an open price is questionable. This thesis claims that if parties intend to be bound by 
a deal,
67
 using an open price is the ideal contracting method. This is particularly true in long-
term contracts that cannot completely specify all the obligations of both parties in advance.
68
 
This claim was supported by Crocker and Masten‟s finding in their study of the natural gas 
industry: „Our findings indicate that price adjustment processes tend to be more flexible the 
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longer the duration of the contract, presumably reflecting the greater uncertainty associated 
with performance at more remote dates‟.69 Both relative and general prices can change 
remarkably over extended time periods, such as in a long-term contract, causing originally 
agreed upon prices to become inappropriate.
70
  
 
Now that the judicial positions of the UCC, SGA and CISG have been briefly explained, the 
next section will strengthen this thesis proposition by exploring the technical benefits of 
having open terms in long-term industries. 
  
2.4  The specific benefits of open terms  
This section continues to elaborate on examples of open terms in the natural gas, uranium, 
coal and petroleum coke industries and discovers how open terms benefit the contracting 
parties more than fixed terms. The following subsections (2.4.1-2.4.7) show why contractual 
adaptations are so crucial in these industries.  
 
2.4.1  Prevention of contractual opportunism 
An intentional open term has to be expressly legalised in legislation that could, first and 
foremost, prevent contractual opportunism by a party during changing circumstances.  
 
Halson defines opportunism as „the attempt by one party to exploit a vulnerability of his 
contractual partner created by the contract itself‟.71 The modification of a contract is 
opportunistic when the opportunist is able to capture a greater share the contract‟s return than 
was originally on.
72
 In economic terms, an opportunistic party is primarily concerned with 
their own interests, and the opportunistic party‟s action may reduce the joint expected return 
of a contract.
73
 When the opportunistic party attempts to capture a greater share of a contract‟s 
return,
74
 the other party suffers greater losses.
75
   
 
In the UCC, Section 2-305 permits open-price contracts providing parties intend to be bound 
by the contract. While parties may be opportunistic in setting or accepting a price, potential 
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opportunism is offset by the requirement for good faith between parties under Section 2-
305(2). Both the SGA and the CISG need to reconsider their current approach of favouring 
fixed-price contracts when parties could have left the price open,
76
 and as long as good faith is 
present, there is no reason for a contract to be unenforceable.  
 
Before moving on to discuss how open price prevents opportunism in sales, an example of 
how open terms prevent opportunism in agency contracts will be observed. 
 
2.4.1.2 Prevention of opportunistic behaviour in agency contracts 
An example where open terms prevent opportunism is found in an agency contract between a 
principal and his agent. Traditionally, the principal pays the agent a fixed fee when the agent 
performs the contractual obligation,
77
 but an alternative method of paying the agent is by 
using an open payment procedure. This would mean that an agent would be induced to 
perform a contract through the promise of sharing the profit with the principal.
78
  
 
By using an open payment method to remunerate the agent, the agent would have to fulfil the 
contract without committing opportunistic behaviour or avoiding his contractual obligations.
79
 
In contrast to the fixed-fee method, the agent would have more incentive to work because his 
pay would be based directly on his performance, 
80
 and the principal would not need to incur a 
cost to monitor the agent‟s performance. Clearly, using open terms to share a profit replaces 
the need for the principal to monitor the effort of the agent, and as a result of the agent‟s 
increased incentive to maintain optimum performance, both agent and principal are able reap 
more profit from the relationship.
81
  
 
Using open terms (such as an open price) in sales minimises opportunism because the deal 
remains valid during instable market conditions, and adjustable price terms also strike a 
balance between a contract‟s buyer and seller.  
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2.4.2  Maximisation of each party’s return 
The essence of the joint maximisation rule is that parties should proceed on agreements with 
the highest net value available to each other after taking all potential risks into account.
82
 
Indeed, the ultimate aim of a contract is to maximise the parties‟ joint expected return but not 
necessarily their ex post return.
83
  
 
To discover whether fixed or open terms are better at maximising the parties‟ profits, Fehr, 
Klein and Schmidt designed an experiment using a single transaction to test the choice 
between an incomplete bonus contract which relied on cooperation, and a more complete 
incentive contract that involved performance monitoring.
84
 In this experiment, each principal 
was randomly and anonymously matched with a different agent. The principal had to choose 
between an incomplete contract, where the initial wage offer was enforceable but both effort 
and bonus were discretionary, and a more complete contract with explicit incentives for effort 
(and costly) sanctions for nonperformance. The result showed that ninety percent of the 
principals chose the bonus contract and responded generously to higher levels of effort from 
agents. The average bonus paid by the principals remarkably and proportionately increased 
with the level of effort provided by the agents.  Irrespective of whether the agents were fair or 
selfish individuals, they would put in much greater effort than the self-interest theory 
predicted. The experiment revealed that the effort induced by open-term, bonus contracts 
were 2.5 times greater than the level of effort the fixed-term contracts generated.
85
 Obviously, 
the incomplete, open-term bonus contract resulted in a much higher payoff to both parties 
than the complete, fixed-term contract.
86
 
 
In sum, incomplete sales contracts promote enforceability and continual cooperation while 
leaving less room for opportunism when market changes occur. While open fees maximise the 
profits of principal and agent, open prices in sales ensures that the contract provides equal 
profits to both buyer and seller. Furthermore, when the price of goods suddenly drops or 
increases, it should not cause the excessive gain of one party over the loss of another. Rather, 
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open terms balance the contract allowing for a reasonable price at the time of delivery to be 
applied, a feature absent in a fixed-price contract.  
 
2.4.3  A cost-effective method of contracting 
Open terms promote cost-effective contracting because when a term is left open, parties need 
not incur extra expenses haggling or speculating over potential price fluctuations in stock.
87
 
Paying lawyers to review the fine print on sellers‟ forms, such as proposals, 
acknowledgements of orders, and invoices,
88
 is costly and time-consuming. This is especially 
apparent, if a seller fills thousands of purchase orders every week and cannot afford to make 
the time to negotiate the details of each transaction.
89
 The required review is a costly but 
necessary process to negotiate fixed-term contracts, but this process is unnecessary when 
using open terms, which do not require meticulous reviewing.
90
 By avoiding haggling and 
testing planning for future price fluctuations, particularly when there are potential situations 
that affect a party‟s gain or loss, open terms present a more appealing alternative to fixed-
terms.
91
 
 
As we have seen above (in subsection (i)), open terms improve an agent‟s performance by 
sharing the return with the principal, which works best for contractual obligations that are 
difficult to enforce 
92
 such as those that require constant monitoring.
93
 Moreover, the principal 
can make savings by allowing the agent to work independently, which further highlights the 
cost-effective nature of an open term contract. This stands in contrast to a fixed-term contract, 
which primarily regulates performance through the threat of legal sanctions
94
 that are 
impractical and expensive. 
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By choosing an open-price sale, which applies a price when the goods are delivered, parties 
avoid costly mistakes by attempting to predict or presentiate the price. Unless parties intend 
otherwise, the cost of renegotiation can be avoided and parties are able to contract in a 
convenient manner. This is particularly useful in steel businesses, where there is a large gap 
between the contract‟s formation and the goods‟ delivery. The uncertain price of steel cannot 
be presentiated during the early stages of the contract, and so, in many contracts, an open 
price is more practical to cope with market price volatility.
95
 
 
2.4.4  Maintaining long-term cooperation between parties 
 
Often the mutual aim of both parties is long-term cooperative behaviour founded on trust 
instead of obligations that are fixed in advance.
96
 Open term contract‟s cooperation is 
fundamentally different from a classic and specified contract.
97
  
 
Because precise conduct is not easily specified in advance,
98
 a long-term contract tends to 
resort to an open-ended approach, which permits useful variation or renegotiation of a 
contract that no longer fits the discrete category that demands presentiation.
99
  Because of 
this, the open-ended contract maintains party cooperation during changing circumstances.
100
 
Macneil‟s analysis of contractual behaviour showed that „conduct which is predominantly so 
modelled with this element of cooperation in the minds of the parties that a contract no longer 
stands alone as in the discrete transaction, but is part of a relational web‟.101 As a contract‟s 
duration increases, it is sensible to use more flexible provisions for renegotiations,
102
 and it is 
obvious that presentiation is impractical for the needs of the unpredictable, long-term 
contracts.  
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2.4.5  A planning mechanism
103
 
Instead of a contract outlining specific, precise planning, Macneil claimed that a contract 
should function as a general planning mechanism.
104
 Such general, gradual planning ensures 
the longevity of long-term relations during changing circumstances. For example, outbreaks 
of war at unexpected places and times, terrorist attacks, the unexpected influence of OPEC 
upon energy costs and the arrival of new technologies can all affect a contract
105
 but, although 
they may impede the contract‟s execution, they do not necessarily frustrate sales 
completely.
106
 This is because „long-term contracts will be formed even when there is less 
than even readily available clarity about the terms of those contracts, clarity being rejected in 
favour of a productive ambiguity‟.107 This is common in the manufacturing industry where 
„the planning was far from complete…‟108 Palay once noted that, „looking beyond the 
[written] contract is important because parties who have, or anticipate, strong relational ties 
with their contracting opposites are not particularly worried about initial terms of 
agreement‟.109  
 
Since a contract plans, rather than dictates a commercial relationship, it should not be 
invalidated on the basis of having no fixed price or the failure of its price mechanism. For 
example: Corporation A completes a contract with Corporation B, which agrees that 
Corporation A will buy its requirement of widgets from Corporation B at the price at which  
Corporation C (a third party to the contract) publishes its widgets. However, Corporation C 
later discontinues publishing its widget prices. Under Section 2-305(1)(c) of the UCC, the 
parties, having previously designated Corporation C as a standard, can now select an 
alternative commercially reasonable standard, provided that the parties intended the 
implication of „market standard‟. Thus if Corporation D was another corporation that sold 
widgets and traded on the same market as the other corporations, the contract between 
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Corporations A and B could use Corporation D‟s published prices as an equally reasonable 
standard to replace Corporation C‟s prices as the standard for the contract.110 
 
Macneil expressed that „trouble can also come if the standard is discontinued or altered in 
some way‟.111 However, this discontinuation should not impede the enforceability of a 
contract. The goal of planning is to strive to allow sufficient flexibility for a situation, but „not 
so loose as to cause unnecessary problem to the contractual agreement‟.112 Parties need to be 
„conscious of the possibility that a court will let the relations fall apart if the standard is too 
indefinite‟.113  
 
In sum, the long-term needs of a contract require the implementation of open terms as part of 
its planning mechanism. Open terms create a privileged trading relationship between the 
parties, which is crucial „in times of difficult markets, of glut or scarcity, in the sense that it 
reinforces, by rendering unambiguous, each party‟s claim to remain in business relations with 
the other. It thus gives better, but not absolute, security to the trading position of each 
party.‟114 Section 2-305 of the UCC gives additional security to a contract because, as long as 
there is an alternative way of ascertaining the price (such as a referable standard), a contract 
could still be enforceable despite the failure of its price mechanism. 
 
2.4.6  Less risk during market price fluctuations  
If parties know all the risks, or are risk neutral when entering a contract, the traditional fixed-
price method ensures the optimal performance of a contract.
115
 On the other hand, if a contract 
involves risky market conditions, parties should use open terms to avoid these risks.
116
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Prosser exemplified a situation of unpredictable risk as follows: a prospective seller (S), who 
owns a thousand bushels of wheat, intends to sell her wheat to a prospective buyer (B).
117
 S 
will have to consider the risks before selling the wheat to B because the market price of the 
wheat might decline. If this were to happen, S would receive less for her wheat than its 
current value. Similarly, B risks that if the market price rises before he buys the wheat, he 
would have to pay more than what he would expect to pay currently. Although S and B could 
fix the price upfront, the contract is still susceptible to market volatility, and in this case a 
fixed price is unlikely to work. An ideal business arrangement would be to subject the price of 
the wheat to a certain method of price determination; this method could be the market price at 
the time of delivery, or price renegotiation.
118
 Leaving the wheat‟s price open is crucial if 
both parties intend to deal with each other for a significant period of time, and it would ensure 
that the agreement remained continuously valid without being affected by market conditions.  
 
In the Scafom International situation, the market price of steel rose by more than 70% than 
the originally agreed price, which brought great loss to the seller and unexpected gain to the 
buyer. The presiding courts assisted the seller by ordering a price renegotiation that made a 
new, fair price enforceable. The continual enforceability is feasible because risks can be 
handled as they arise, and balance can be restored to the contract.
119
 
 
2.4.7  The self-enforcing nature of agreements
120
 
With specific regard to long-term deals, Scott advocated that an open-ended agreement could 
have a self-enforcing nature. To be classed as self-enforcing, a contract needs to fulfil two 
stringent requirements: reputation and repeated interaction.
121
 Scott added that repeated, 
reputable business relationships tend to choose a deliberate open term.
122
  
 
Two examples of industries that heavily rely on the element reputation as a way to ensure 
performance of a contract are the diamond and cotton trades. In diamond trades, diamond 
dealers prefer to resort to alternative governance, namely the private legal system, where 
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agreements are concluded using extra-legal contracts.
123
 These agreements may be regularly 
subject to interpretation by the courts, particularly when involving the rights of third 
parties.
124
 As a result, these agreements often take the form of legally enforceable contracts.
125
 
However, Bernstein has emphasised that even if a fully specified legally enforceable contract 
could be used and inexpensively drafted, the diamond dealers tend to incur the pre-contract 
transaction costs of entering into extra-legal agreements.
126
 This is because a legally 
enforceable agreement, regardless of its cost and convenience of drafting, is not often 
favourable in the diamond industry, in comparison to signing the deal under a private legal 
system where secrecy is highly valued.
127
 Individual traders are often appalled by litigation 
that might reveal trade practices and tarnish their reputation.
128
 Hence, these traders resort to 
agreements that are self-enforcing, and enforceable only in the arbitration tribunals that 
handle disputes regarding diamond trades where reputation of parties is protected by making 
the existence and result of a dispute confidential. 
129
 
 
Similar to the diamond trade, reputation plays an essential role towards ensuring efficient 
performance of the contract in cotton business, as opposed to remedying a breach by way of 
awarding damages.  The damage measures under UCC for instance, are designed to protect 
the expectancy interest by putting the “aggrieved party…in as good a position as if the other 
party had fully performed.
130
 In contrast, the private legal system in cotton trades tends to 
undercompensate as the aggrieved party is entitled only to market difference damages plus a 
one-half cent per pound penalty, a considerably trivial amount given the contemporary cotton 
prices.
131
   
 
Moreover, the cotton industry does not often rely on the types of standard-like words, such as 
“reasonable,” “seasonable” and “without objection in the trade”.132 As opposed to these 
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objective standards found under the UCC, which shall be elaborated in the next chapter, 
contracts concluded in cotton business resort to the more clear and straightforward rules.
133
 
This includes the fact that the objective element of good faith is absent under the cotton trade, 
although unjust and undesirable business practices are noted by the arbitrators when giving 
opinions.
134
 The formal adjudication used in cotton industry gives little weight to elements of 
the contracting context.
135
  Rather, the parties demonstrate preference for renegotiation under 
„self-enforcing‟ contracts, maintaining the element of cooperation amongst them.136  
 
Uniquely, private legal systems under both trades work well. In cotton business for instance, 
the trade rules are revised periodically in accordance with the development of technology, 
market changes and ambiguities revealed during disputes.
137
 Arguably however, the UCC 
secures fixed-term contracts without always giving room for efficient breach by way of 
damages. Section 2-305(4) for example honours the validity of fixed term contracts without 
allowing damages to replace the performance of such contract. It is this feature of the UCC 
that the thesis focuses on, and how this legal system also allows flexibility using open price in 
a legally-enforceable contract, rather than in an extra-legal agreement, can benefit both SGA 
and the CISG. Hence, the empirical studies section in Section 2.6 will further elaborate on 
long-term contracts that apply open terms, rather than limiting the explanation within the 
industries that value secrecy by way of entering into extra-legal contracts. 
 
Arguably, both reputation and repeated interaction apply as stringent elements that could 
preserve the validity of a contract by overriding the current textual approaches of the SGA
138
 
and the CISG, which emphasise the specific wording of the SGA. In contrast with the SGA 
and CISG, Scott explained that the UCC goes beyond common law by explicitly authorising 
courts to fill open terms in otherwise incomplete agreements.
139
 Although both common law 
and the UCC
140
 honour the intent to be bound by parties,
141
 the difference between them lies 
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in the presumptions that follow agreements with open or indefinite terms; the UCC demands 
that courts infer the existence of open terms from the intention of parties, but this demand is 
absent in common law.
142
  
 
2.5  The UCC as the ideal model of a commercial law, and why its approach should 
be adopted by the SGA and the CISG 
This thesis proposes that more extensive flexibility is required in price determination for the 
sale of goods; this raises two essential questions. Firstly, to what extent has the UCC been 
successful in realising Llewellyn‟s goal? Second, if the UCC has been successful, what would 
the adoption of its improvement (specifically, its implementation of open price terms in long-
term sales) bring to the current SGA and CISG? 
 
Although an elaboration of the UCC role as a commercial code is detailed in Chapter Three, it 
is worth noting here that the UCC requires the price to be set in accordance with reasonable 
commercial standards
143
 and in good faith between the parties.
144
 If a claimant alleges unfair 
pricing has occurred, the claimant has to prove that the defendant failed to act in good faith,
145
 
and that the commercial injury is above and beyond a mere increase in price. Any allegation 
of dishonesty under Section 2-305 requires a basis in objective fact, which, at minimum, 
requires a basis in to the commercial realities of the case.
146
 Good faith is a rebuttable 
presumption under the UCC, but the fact that it is implied under the UCC means that US 
courts, providing a price is commercially reasonable under Section 2-305(1), usually favour 
enforcing open price contract. Clearly open prices are limited by good faith, and parties 
cannot opportunistically leave a contract to the detriment of a relying party. The practice of 
open price, rather than the classic requirement of a fixed price, proves workable under the 
UCC in coping with relational sales. 
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The second question addresses the potential for improvement in the SGA and CISG upon 
adopting the UCC‟s approach. The UCC has five features that could potentially benefit both 
SGA and CISG: (1) the presence of a gap-filling rule in its law, (2) the limitation of freedom 
from a contract, (3) the protection of the relying party‟s interest, (4) an adaptable sales law 
based on the nature and type of transaction in question, and (5) reduced costs during 
contracting and transaction.
147
 
 
If the SGA and CISG adopted open prices, this thesis predicts that contracting parties could 
benefit from the following points: 
 
1) Incomplete contracts can be completed if sales law provides a gap-filling rule. As a 
commercial code, the active role of the UCC assumes the need to fill gaps in price 
terms under Section 2-305. Other ways of filling gaps in incomplete contracts involve 
action regarding quantity, duration and terms of payment.
148
 Parties are less 
opportunistic as they are aware of the statutory gap filling that causes them to be liable 
for the contractual provisions they agree on, even in future negotiations; this practice 
certainly limits the freedom of parties to walk away from a contract.
149
 
2) The parties‟ right to walk away from contract will be limited.  Classic contract theory 
permits the parties‟ freedom to walk away from a contract, unburdened by contractual 
or residual liability. However, the requirement of explicit terms under the classic view 
is no longer needed due to the existence of statutory gap fillers.
150
  
3) The interest of the party who relied on a promise must be protected because contracts 
should not be dissolved once reliance costs have been incurred. This is true even if the 
other party attempts to leave a contract without intending to exploit the other 
opportunistically. An example of this is observed in Baird Textile Holdings Ltd v 
Marks & Spencer Plc
151
 In this case, Marks and Spencer chose to walk away from the 
contract without giving substantial notice (the plaintiff argued for three years) of their 
intentions. However, the court rejected the plaintiff‟s argument. Despite the good 
reputation and thirty years of repeated interactions between both parties, the court held 
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that there was no implicit contract between the parties that warranted an advanced 
notice of termination, causing the parties to lose a profit of £38.5m and a 
reimbursement for anticipated expenditure totalling £15.1m. This case clearly 
illustrates the absence of protection for a relying party from unreasonable withdrawal 
from the agreement. 
4) Contractual flexibility is well suited to the nature of contemporary business because a 
contract‟s performance cannot be excused without considering the custom of a 
particular trade.
152
 In the CISG case concerning Pitted Sour Cherries case,
153
 the 
seasonal nature of the trade required that the contract had to be entered before the 
cherries‟ price could be determined. As a result of this, the buyer was liable for the 
payment of the entire quantity ordered from the seller.  
5) Enabling parties to be contractually bound before their affirmation of intent is 
incomplete allows a reduction in transactional and contractual costs. Gergen‟s 
arguments regarding this have already been noted; haggling over prices during the 
contract‟s conclusion is unnecessary because the price is determinable when the goods 
are of delivered.
154
  
 
This thesis establishes its proposition (that the UCC‟s approach to price flexibility should be 
adopted by the SGA and the CISG) on the above five rationales. The next section highlights 
some established, long-term industries that have successfully applied open terms to their 
contracts. However, the movie industry is a noted exception to this, which is better suited to 
fixed-term and less flexible form of contracts.  
 
2.6  Empirical studies of long-term contracts that apply open terms 
Most of economic activity across all jurisdictions is in the form of complex, long-term 
contracts.
155
 Although it is possible to find open terms in one-off transactions, open terms are 
more common in transactions of longer duration, which necessitates continuous 
cooperation;
156
 the following empirical studies display this and are divided into two main 
categories: sales contracts and non-sales contracts. 
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2.6.1 Sales contracts 
2.6.1.2   Natural gas 
The typical duration of sales of natural gas between producers and pipelines lies between ten 
and fifteen years. The use of price-adjustment provisions in such contracts was common prior 
to the introduction of wellhead price regulation.
157
 The three studies on long-term contracts 
for natural gas are by Crocker and Lyon
158
 and Crocker and Masten.
159
 Crocker and Masten 
observed that price-adjustment terms do not neatly divide into those that fix prices by 
external, objective criteria and those that give parties discretion in setting price.
160
  
 
Two applicable price adjustment methods in the natural gas industry are redetermination and 
renegotiation.
161
 In redetermination, parties could choose definite or indefinite escalators. A 
definite escalator is where prices are adjusted based on an explicit, predefined schedule, 
which increases prices at a stipulated rate, but has the apparent disadvantage of failing to use 
information arising from the parties‟ relationship, which means it shares the many 
disadvantages of fixed-price contracts.
162
 In contrast, indefinite escalators relate contract 
prices to market conditions as they unfold, and price determination is taken from a general 
price index or the price of a substitute product. Using this escalator, price implementation 
remains straightforward and prices are more flexible. However, due to the relationship-
specific nature of assets used in producing, transporting or consuming a product, the indexed 
prices fail to track prices when parties are isolated from market alternatives.
163
 
 
The second price adjustment method is price renegotiation, which uses more flexible 
renegotiations provisions.
164
   
 
2.6.1.3   Petroleum coke 
Goldberg and Erickson stated that a written contract is „at best an imperfect representation of 
the underlying economic relations‟.165 As a written document is an incomplete specification 
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of the contract‟s terms and conditions, adjustments to changing conditions are frequently 
made without consulting written contracts.
166
 Parties involved in a long-term contract have a 
mutual interest to enter into a contract that maximises its value to both of them.
167
 
Nevertheless, they also have the selfish interest of acquiring a large individual share,
168
 and 
so, in the long run, both parties need the assurance of a continual relationship that maintains 
the flexibility to adapt to changing circumstances.
169
  
 
While parties could simply establish a single price, or a schedule of future prices, that could 
remain in force for contract‟s duration, they have the option of providing a mechanism for 
adjusting prices in light of changing circumstances.
170
 There was an increase in the use of 
renegotiation clauses in contracts between 1966 and 1973, but after 1973 price indexes were 
used more frequently.
171
 This was due to two significant shocks to the industry (a rise in 
energy prices and an antitrust decision)
172
 that caused price indexes to be refined, which 
provided greater short-term protection for price changes and regular price renegotiation on 
fixed dates (quarterly or annually), or at a party‟s request.173  
 
Both renegotiation clauses and price indexes were useful methods to cope with changing 
circumstances,
174
 and a hybrid method of indexing and renegotiation used an index with a 
maximum/minimum limitation.
175
 The disadvantage of indexing is that indexed prices are less 
accurate when there is lower correlation between an index and the current correct price.
176
 On 
the other hand, renegotiation carries the advantage of allowing parties to use accurate, current 
information when revising a contract.
177
 However, if a party has a much greater vulnerability, 
the prospect of renegotiation is less attractive.
178
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2.6.1.4   Coal  
Joskow
179
 studied the structure of long-term coal supply contracts and their relationship to 
price and quantity adjustment provisions, which both guard against opportunistic behaviour 
and provide flexibility to adapt to changing market conditions as the relationship plays itself 
out over time.
180
 The long-term coal supply contracts negotiated in the late 1960s and 1970s 
typically handled the problem of price determination by specifying a base price and an 
adjustment formula to calculate future prices.
181
 
 
Joskow argued that these price adjustment formulas were reasonably well adapted to adjusting 
prices to market values associated with supply changes, which increase or decrease the overall 
cost of producing coal.
182
Subsequently, the pricing provisions minimised the number of 
contractual breakdowns arising from a party‟s opportunity to breach their agreements.183 
 
Empirical analyses indicate that the transaction prices associated with old contracts are quite 
poor at tracking changes in market conditions during the current coal market decline.
184
 Prior 
to 1980, price adjustment relied on a base-price-plus-escalation formula (BPE), where the 
base price reflected prevailing market conditions when the contract was negotiated.
185
 
However, after the fall of the market price during the oil crises that occurred between 1984 
and 1985,
186
 the old contract price was high when, in reality, the average market value of coal 
was falling.
187
 Therefore, a typical pre-1980 long-term contract (in force between 1984 and 
1985) had its prices, which were set by the formula, far above current market prices. As a 
result, a buyer was bound by the rigid price of the old contract unless the long-term contract 
allowed for flexibility in price renegotiation.
188
 Voluntary renegotiations were desirable 
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because they made it possible for parties to overcome inefficient contractual rigidities.
189
 This 
was possible via the inclusion of a scheduled reopener provision that allowed parties to 
renegotiate price and/or quantity provisions on dates specified in contracts.
190
 
 
Aside from the base price and adjustment formula, as well as voluntary renegotiations, a third 
method was used to tackle the changing price in the coal market: using the quantity or taking 
provisions that typically specify minimum and maximum quantities.
191
 This happens when the 
buyer is the highest-value user of a seller‟s coal, and contract prices are above the seller‟s 
cost. In this situation, a seller may negotiate a lower price in return for increased quantities, 
but only on the provision that a buyer intends to increase the annual quantities taken, or to 
extend the term of the contract.
192
  
 
2.6.1.5   Uranium 
Until the early 1970s, the fixed-price contract was common in the uranium industry before, 
resorting to open prices based on market or spot prices.
193
 The application of open prices 
began in 1974 and became the dominant contracting mode for purchases involving future 
deliveries, or term commitments, until the first half of 1978.
194
 This was a positive change, 
because in the Westinghouse case we saw that the fixed-price method was harmed by a rapid 
rise in the price of uranium in the early 1970s. Polinsky explained that uranium sellers are 
typically private firms, and buyers are frequently public utilities that use uranium to produce 
electricity.
195
 In this situation, it seems that sellers were more at risk than buyers during price 
fluctuations (since uranium only formed a small fraction of the utilities‟ production cost, 
which they passed through to consumers).
196
  
 
2.6.1.6   Summary  
These empirical findings show that contracts for the supply of natural gas and coal tend to use 
flexible, open price terms to cope with the rapidity of the market and to maintain their 
enforceability when circumstances change (through referring to the current market price and 
renegotiation between parties) .  The gradual contracting trend evolved from a traditional 
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fixed-price method to a more open price, which uses market prices or the price at delivery to 
determine the value of the goods.  
 
In the example of the natural gas, aluminium and petroleum coke industries, the combination 
of price adjustment methods and a provision for renegotiation was strategised to cope with 
fluctuating prices in the industry. The downside to courts allowing renegotiation is the 
additional cost it generates, especially when renegotiations need to be arranged whenever 
there is a change in the market. Renegotiations undoubtedly filled a gap in a contract, but it as 
a costly step that could have been avoided by parties if they chose an open price or agreed on 
a renegotiation or adaptation clause in their contract.
197
 Cases such as Mamidoil-Jetoil
198
 
(crude oil) and Scafom International
199
(steel) proved that the fixed-price method is less 
workable than open prices, particularly in long-term deals. Ideally, the law of contract would 
support the formation of contracts with open terms as an alternative to fixed terms. 
 
The abovementioned techniques are used in different industries, and remain feasible as long 
as initial agreements are sufficiently definite
200
 and the law imposes a duty of good faith on 
parties to resolve ambiguous terms.
201
 This includes situations where a contract leaves the 
power to specify price or quantity to either or both parties. Clearly Section 2-305(1) of the 
UCC, regarding open price, is safeguarded by subsection (2) which states using good faith as 
a standard to prevent one party from setting unreasonably high (or low) prices.  
 
2.6.2 Non-sales contracts 
 
2.6.2.1 Building Construction 
Zheng, Roehrich and Lewis examined two supply arrangements between a public buyer 
(National Health Service, UK) and a private supplier.
202
 The first project involved the design, 
build, finance and operation of the new hospital, while the second was for the construction of 
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an emergency services training facility. These projects were complex, had anticipated 
durations of thirty years and were incompletely drafted. The first project involved complex 
and comprehensive set of contractual documents. Despite the importance attached to formal 
contractual measures, due to the nature of public procurement projects, the parties themselves 
thought the documents were important for minimising risk and achieving the project‟s 
outcome. Additionally, although the second project was based on a more trusting and flexible 
relationship, a complex contract was still drawn up. The trusting relationship was engendered 
between the personnel from the two sides responsible for the initial bidding and procurement 
phase of the project. When this phase ended the personnel responsible (or the trust bidding) 
were moved to other tasks. The contract ensured the feasibility of performance, although the 
detailed contract does not govern on a day-to-day relationship.
203
 Furthermore, costs of 
modern transportation, communications, interest rates, depreciation of equipment and taxes 
were not able to be calculated when the parties entered the contract.
204
  
 
Clearly, the practicality of open terms very much depends on the nature and type of a 
transaction.
205
 This indicates that not all industries could benefit from open terms. Unlike 
long-term sales of natural gas, aluminium, coke, uranium and building construction, the 
movie industry, for instance, does not benefits from a similar practice. Instead, a short-term 
contract without an open term best fits the needs of the movie industry. 
 
2.6.2.2 Exception: the movie industry
206
 
The movie industry has previously had a governance structure favouring long-term contracts 
from the Age of the Studio (1929-1948) to the most recent era.
207
 A contract between an actor 
and a studio used to be long-term (in some cases for seven years),
208
 and Chisholm likened a 
studio and an actor, to a buyer and a seller of acting services.
209
 The Age of the Studio 
invested resources to promote an actor as a particular type of character; the reasoning behind 
this was that audiences would recognise the star‟s character type and return for future 
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performances.
210
 Therefore, both actor and studio had an incentive to adopt a long-term 
agreement, and after the studio invested in training and promoting an actor it wanted the star 
to remain with the studio in order to maintain its income.
211
 
 
In the Tarzan series, the studio paid the salary of the actor playing Tarzan (Weismuller) for an 
unusually long period of ten years.
212
 The contract‟s long duration burdened MGM studios to 
persistently pay a salary to Weismuller while the studio waited for the next Tarzan 
instalment.
213
 In addition, MGM needed to incur a sunk cost (such as advertising expenditure) 
to promote Weismuller, and this cost would not necessarily apply to other actors.
214
 In return, 
Weismuller had to abstain from other acting jobs that could cause the transfer of profit to 
other studios.
215
  
 
Long-term deals decreased after the Age of the Studio due to a dramatic increase in the 
number of independent producers and the commercial introduction of television.
216
 Moreover, 
by this time, actors had a variety of employment opportunities upon the successful completion 
of a film.
217
 The decision of the Supreme Court in The Paramount case (1948) concluded that 
the major studios had violated the Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890 by restraining trade in the 
motion-pictures industry.
218
 Because of this, a studio no longer had a guarantee that its films 
would be exhibited; rather, an independent film exhibitor would show the film.
219
 Resultantly, 
the studio lost control of promoting stars and was no longer required to manufacture a certain 
number of films each month to keep their theatre chains satisfied.
220
 Additionally, 
independent producers began to favour short-term contracts.
221
 
 
The movie industry illustrates that the nature of an industry determines the duration of an 
agreement, and not vice-versa. The movie industry proves that if there are a sufficient number 
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of suppliers or buyers, there is barely any need for long-term contracts or flexible terms to 
maintain cooperation between parties. To relate this point to sales, there is clearly no need for 
long-term deals if different suppliers and buyers are able to provide supplies easily.  
Nonetheless, in long-term contracts, it is often detrimental to one party if another withdraws 
or walks away from a long-term relationship without proper notice when their contract 
specifies their intent to be bound to the long-term relationship. To walk away from a contract 
by dealing with another supplier or buyer is to act opportunistically, particularly when the 
relying party had invested on the contract. This is why a legislation of sale must protect the 
interest of the relying party by permitting price flexibility; as long as price is ascertainable, a 
contract remains effective even in the event of a failure of the agreed price mechanism.  
Indeed, the significant change brought by the UCC in 1952 replaced the Willistonian 
formalism in the preceding Uniform Sales Act (1906-1947).  
 
Now that we have witnessed the practicality of open terms in long-term industries, the next 
section deals with modern industries that apply open term contracts.   
 
2.7  Modern day contracting: different ways of using open terms 
Gabuardi explained that globalisation and change are the two major forces that shape the 
world.
222
 Transportation, communication and business record keeping became more varied, 
flexible, faster and reliable, which multiplied the number and size of commercial dealings.
223
 
Flexible methods of contracting under a single uniform law, instead of a disparate law, were 
necessary to keep up with current business patterns.  Furthermore, most contracts are 
relational rather than discrete, and this was the reason for unifying commercial law in the US, 
which began with the Uniform Sales Act and was followed by the UCC itself in 1952. 
 
In coping with complexity brought about by modernisation, examples of current business 
trends that apply open terms are provided below. 
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2.7.1 The requirements contract 
A requirements contract adjusts the price to equal the seller‟s cost of production. This 
mechanism is similar to a negligence rule 
224
 because the contract induces the buyer to set 
quantity at a level that maximises the short-run joint return to both buyer and seller.
225
 Section 
2-306 of the UCC allows quantity to be set at a later stage in two types of contracts; 
requirements and output contracts.
226
 In a requirements contract, the quantity is determined by 
a buyer‟s requirements for a commodity, whereas an output contract is determined by a 
seller‟s output or production of a commodity. For example, a requirements contract could be 
drawn up between a mine and a utility, and would include terms for adjusting the price to 
equal the mine‟s cost of production.227 Similar to the function of a negligence term, the price 
term regulates the utility‟s exercise of discretion under the open quantity term.228 The price 
term functions to divide the gain of a contract between parties, and is adjusted based on 
external criteria that define the mine‟s cost, and not on the basis of the mine‟s actual costs.  
Consequently, the price encourages the mine to minimise its production costs.
229
  
 
A cost-pricing requirements contract does not need to rely on a court to regulate its 
performance, but instead allows a seller to regulate the buyer‟s performance through a 
contract‟s price term.230 Unlike a fixed quantity contract, a cost-pricing requirements contract 
enables a buyer to adjust his demands in response to the price signal.
231
 A buyer is bound to 
perform a contract since he must either buy the input from a seller or accept a non-existent, or 
much smaller, return on their investment.
232
 Moreover, a seller is bound by a contract through 
his promise to supply whatever quantity a buyer requires. 
233
 Hence, both parties are 
discouraged from trying to hold up the other to capture a greater share of the gain.
234
 The 
price must have a certain objective criteria to induce a seller to minimise costs, but this 
objectivity may divert from the seller‟s true cost and resulting in a performance error. If the 
price lies below a seller‟s cost, then a buyer could manipulate the price by increasing the 
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quantity, which would result in a joint net loss on performance.
235
 In addition, a deviation 
between price and cost could give a party further incentive to over or under invest.
236
 
 
2.7.2 The agency contract 
An agent is typically employed by a principal to develop an asset, and the principal pays the 
agent a fixed fee for their services while retaining the right to all returns.
237
 Section 2.4.1 
above explained that this arrangement encourages an agent to underperform, 
238
 which entails 
that the principal incurs extra costs to monitor the agent‟s conduct. An alternative method 
would be to use open terms through a sharing arrangement, to give the agent incentive to 
perform the contract.
239
 Using this approach, both parties eventually share the return
240
 when 
the agent pays a royalty to the principal.
241
 The agent has to pay the royalty based on a 
negligence-like term included in the arrangement, which stipulates that the agent is liable for 
the principal‟s forgone gain if the agent failed to perform to a reasonable standard.242 This 
stands in contrast with the traditional fixed fee agreement that requires the principal to pay the 
agent „regardless of the agent‟s success‟.243 
 
2.7.3 Sale of seasonal goods or goods with volatile prices  
As well as long-term contracts, open prices are also applicable to seasonal goods. For 
example, the prices of seasonal goods are commonly determined according to the market 
price of sour cherries, and are later fixed by the seller when the product is ready to be sold. In 
the CISG decision of Pitted Sour Cherries case,
244
 the court ruled that the buyer, a German 
plaintiff, could not avoid the contract on the basis that he lacked the intention to be bound by 
it. The validity of the contract could not be disputed on the basis of parties only agreeing to 
fix the price „during the season‟, because the price of the seasonal cherries was still 
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determinable.
245
 Ultimately, the CISG did not perceive the seasonal clause to have amounted 
to an agreement to agree.
246
  
 
The focus of this thesis includes goods that are susceptible to market conditions in addition to 
seasonal goods; some of the industries constantly affected by market price fluctuations 
include, but are not limited to, steel products, gasoline, crude oil and natural gas. The 
subsequent chapters focus specifically on these goods, and will present the numerous benefits 
of open prices for industries in the US, UK and the United Nations‟ jurisdictions. 
 
2.7.4 IT outsourcing  
The IT sector is one example where an open, vague approach may provide undue discretion to 
the IT provider,
247
 which could be utilised to charge additional fees for anything not 
specifically required under the contract, and could also prevent the upgrade of equipment an 
IT company was required to service.
248
 At the same time, a contract that is overly detailed 
might breed relational rigidity and anti-collaborative behaviour.
249
 Such contracts, especially 
those coupled with detailed default or penalty clauses for poor performance, are likely to deter 
innovative problem solving or cooperation.
250
 
 
2.7.5 Independent service station 
Besides seasonal goods and goods that are susceptible to market fluctuations, this thesis also 
discusses independent service station contracts, which are commonly practised under the 
UCC. The dealers of independent service stations are vulnerable to pricing abuse from their 
suppliers because they are bound by long-term, sole-source supply agreements with open 
price terms. By using open prices, suppliers could take advantage of dealers by unnecessarily 
charging extra for petroleum. In an attempt to counter this, Section 2-305 of the UCC 
provides a primary legal defence that requires that prices set by a supplier under an open price 
term must be set in good faith, which indicates that a supplier must act honestly and in 
accordance with reasonable commercial standards.  
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An example involving an independent service station is found in Autry Petroleum Company, 
McDonald Oil Company v BP Products North America Inc
251
 In this case, the court upheld 
open price provisions because good faith was presumed, and as long as the price remained 
commercially reasonable, the price-setter, which in this case was the supplier, had the right to 
take a profit from the business. While a commercially reasonable price should not be 
discriminatory, it does not equate to a low price.
252
 
 
In sum, open price is not a unique method, as there are various types of open terms practised 
in different contracts, such as open quantity in requirements contracts, sharing arrangement in 
agency and open fee in IT outsourcing. These convenient methods of contracting should find 
support from a sound sales law through the focus on the intention of the parties and good 
faith, as seen in the UCC. This concept found in the UCC provides a common approach to all 
open terms.  
 
2.8  Conclusion 
As opposed to Chapter One which discussed the general aspects of incomplete contracts, this 
chapter has stressed that the long-term duration of a contract requires an open price. Goldberg 
and Erickson regard completely drafting a contract, as nothing more than „an imperfect 
representation of the underlying economic relations‟.253 Instead, frequent adjustments to 
changed conditions are made without consulting the written contracts.   
 
Additionally, the needs for long-term contracts to be more adaptive to the market indicate that 
less presentiation and more flexibility, should take place. The open-ended contract maintains 
cooperation between parties in changing circumstances. As Macneil‟s analysis of contractual 
behaviour showed „conduct which is predominantly so modelled with this element of co-
operation in the minds of the parties that a contract no longer stands alone as in the discrete 
transaction, but is part of a relational web‟.254 As contract duration increases, it is sensible to 
use more flexible renegotiation provisions
255
 and while rules that demand presentiation work 
                                                 
251
 334 Fed Appx 982 CA11 (Georgia), (June 26, 2009), US District Court for the Middle District of Georgia. 
252
 Shell Oil Co v HRN, Inc 144 SW 3d 429(Texas 2004). 
253
 Goldberg and Erickson, „Quantity and Price Adjustment on Long-Term Contracts‟ (n 90) 370. 
254
 Macneil, Chapter One, „Restatement (Second) of Contracts‟ (n 105) 595. 
255
 Crocker and Masten, „Pretia ex Machina (n 31) 89. 
64 
 
well for discrete, face-to-face contracts, they are not able to meet the needs of unpredictable, 
long-term contracts.  
 
The specific benefits of open prices in long-term industries are crucial for proposing changes 
to the current presentiation rules of the SGA and CISG. To maintain cooperation between 
parties during market changes, open terms minimise opportunism, or „the attempt by a party 
to a contract to exploit a vulnerability of his contractual partner which is created by the 
contract itself‟.256 A party who acts opportunistically and secures a greater share of a 
contract‟s return brings about a reduction in the joint expected return of a contract. However, 
under the UCC, potential opportunism is offset by the requirement of good faith under 
Section 2-305(2). Both the SGA and the CISG could adopt a similar safeguard in validating 
open prices.  
 
This chapter has also compared the benefit of open terms in agency contracts. In such a 
scenario, an agent‟s capacity for opportunism of the agent is reduced if a principal pays the 
agent by using an open payment method, instead of a fixed fee. Open payments motivate an 
agent to perform well throughout the contract with the incentive of sharing the profit with the 
principal. Compared to the fixed fee method, the agent has more incentive to work efficiently 
because his pay is based directly on his performance.  
 
Moreover, parties could maximise their wealth by making agreements with the intention to 
secure the highest net value for both parties, after taking risks into account. While open fees 
maximise the wealth or profit of both a principal and agent, having open prices in a sale 
ensures that the contract provides equal profit to a seller and buyer. In times of market 
volatility, open prices help balance the contract by filling the price gap with a fair and a 
commercially reasonable price for both parties. Due to this, neither party would suffer from a 
discriminatory price that causes the gain of one party and loss of another. 
 
Ben-Shahar listed reasons for adopting the UCC‟s approach as follows: firstly, the UCC 
makes a sales law more predisposed to fill gap; secondly, gap-filling rules may limit parties‟ 
rights to walk away from a contract; thirdly, the UCC protects the interests of parties relying 
on an initial promise; fourthly, adopting flexibility allows sales law to adapt to the type of 
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business the contract deals with, which means reducing costs; and finally, its adoption helps 
parties to save contracting costs. 
 
Adopting the UCC‟s approach means that open prices always have a definite objective 
standard (such as a current market price) to be referred to, which makes long-term industries 
convenient to deal with. Moreover, as explained in Section 2.6 above, industries dealing with 
natural gas, petroleum coke, coal and uranium have already departed from traditional fixed 
fee methods. Studies have shown that price indexing and regulated, voluntary negotiations are 
more efficient in adapting to price changes, which can save a contract from being needlessly 
defeated.
257
 Based on the exigencies of the market, or the unique circumstances of a sale, 
Section 2-305 of the UCC fills the gaps in a contract and enforces it in the event of a 
dispute.
258
 
 
This thesis proposes that both CISG and SGA can learn important lessons by adopting the 
UCC‟s approach. However, if this were unacceptable, at least redefining their existing rulings 
to allow for greater flexibility when enforcing open prices would be an important progression. 
The next chapter explains the major positive changes made by the UCC, which employed the 
practice of merchants and their preference for attaching value to trade usage instead of relying 
on paper documents. 
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Chapter Three: Open Price in the US under the Uniform Commercial Code 
(UCC) 
 
 
3.0  Introduction and background 
This chapter illustrates how flexible pricing under the UCC copes with the needs of relational 
sales, and how flexible pricing is particularly beneficial to the gas supply industry. During the 
time of the law merchant, open-ended contracts were commonly practised and the UCC 
maintains the application of law merchant principles in most sales and fills unstated prices, 
whether they are inadvertently or deliberately left open, by using standards of reasonable price 
and good faith, instead of fixed terms.
1
 This chapter begins by explaining the general 
development of commercial law in the US, and then details the development of open prices by 
Section 2-305 of the UCC. Finally, it discusses relevant decisions on open price and the use of 
good faith as a balancing element to regulate price setting.   
 
Chapter Two showed that contracting parties accommodate uncertainty by stipulating contingent 
claims in a contract.
2
 Instead of defining a full set of obligations at the outset, as implied by 
standard economic treatment, complex contracts leave terms and obligations open for future 
determination.
3
 According to Macneil, a contract should not be a specific written document, but a 
planning mechanism that can be updated when required.
4
 Indeed, this was how merchants viewed 
contracts, and certain trades today follow a similar practice; Chapter Two provided a brief 
account of each long-term industry that adjusts their contracts to market changes. Natural gas, 
aluminium, petroleum, coal and uranium are examples of contracts where a buyer and seller 
commit to base a sale‟s price on a price index, voluntary renegotiations or a combination of the 
two. 
 
Clearly, leaving the price unstated is crucial to sustain the longevity of a contract in long-term 
industries. Crocker and Masten stated that the longer the duration of a contract, the more flexible 
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the price term should be, which result in deliberate action by parties to leave crucial terms (such 
as price or quantity) of the contract open, until a later stage in the agreement.
5
 
 
Although having an open price was common and acceptable before its official enactment by 
uniform laws, this situation changed when the American economy was transformed by major 
investments in new transportation and communication technologies in the middle of the 
nineteenth century.
6
 This was witnessed in the development of a national transportation network 
of canals and railroads, which significantly reduced transportation costs of and increased the size 
of firms‟ potential markets.7 Resultantly, in order to take advantage of new opportunities and to 
cope with new risks and uncertainties, mass-production industries grew in response to the 
restructuring of the business sector.
8
 Scholars have referred to the changes as a second industrial 
revolution, which resulted in the US rising to be the greatest economic and military power of the 
twentieth century.
9
 
 
Changes in the social, political and economic life of the US were contributory factors to the 
changes in its legal system.
10
 Furthermore, the demand of the modern industrial economy also 
contributed to the rationalisation of the American legal system, which included the unifying 
different states‟ commercial law through the adoption of unified commercial codes.11 Although 
the codification of common law traditions (which is where the American legal system emanated 
from) did not receive much attention at first, increasing pressure to codify English and American 
common law began in the sixteenth century.
12
 The increase of commercial activity in the early 
1900s, including large-scale sales across regions and borders, further highlighted the inadequacy 
                                                 
5
 ibid. 
6
 Alfred D Chandler, The Visible Hand: The Managerial Revolution in American Business (first published 1977, 
Belknap Press 2002) 125. 
7
 Donald J Smythe, „Why was the Uniform Sales Act adopted in some states but not others‟ (March 29, 2008) 3 < 
extranet.isnie.org/uploads/isnie2008/smythe.pdf > accessed 24 May 2011. 
8
 ibid 4. 
9
 Richard R Nelson and Gavin G Wright, „The Rise and Fall of American Technological Leadership: The Postwar 
Era in Historical Perspective‟ (1992) 30 Journal of Economic Literature 1931-64. 
10
 Lawrence M Friedman, A History of American Law (first published 1973, Simon & Schuster, Inc1985) 17. 
11
 Smythe, „Why was the Uniform Sales Act adopted‟ (n 7). 
12
 Gunther A Weiss, „The Enchantment of Codification in the Common-Law World‟ (2000) 25 Yale Journal of 
International Law 435. 
68 
 
of the existing US law‟s ability to cope with change.13 By the nineteenth century, a large number 
of merchants viewed the legal profession with distrust and regarded the complexity of law as a 
way to hide the legal profession‟s monopoly on trade.14  As Chapter One explained, this was due 
to the nationalisation of law and the separation of commercial law from mercantile practice. 
 
As a result, the codification that began in the nineteenth century, which intended to promote 
accessibility to the law
15
ultimately failed because it only summarised common law instead of 
reforming it completely.
16
 Furthermore, none of the codes were made uniform in order to bring 
coherence and rationality to the states‟ laws in response to the demands of modernisation.17 
 
The American Bar Association (ABA) was founded in 1878 to support the effort of uniformity of 
legislation throughout the union before establishing the National Conference of Commissioners 
on Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL) in 1892.
18
  Without delay, the NCCUSL drafted a host of 
model uniform codes, which included the Uniform Sales Act (1906-1947).
19
 In comparison to the 
codification movement of the nineteenth and the twentieth centuries, which was drafted by legal 
practitioners, legal academics brought a remarkable difference to the new legal codes.
20
 The 
drafting and partial success of the Uniform Sales Act provided „a natural experiment on the 
causes and consequences of legal codification…and general insights into the role of legal 
institutions in American economic growth and development‟.21 The Uniform Sales Act will be 
further discussed in the next section, but will be preceded by an examination of the current 
commercial code in the US (the UCC), which replaced its predecessor in 1952. 
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3.0.1  The insertion of law merchant principles into the UCC as a codified sales law 
Llewellyn was an experienced commercial lawyer and a close observer of the behaviour of 
commercial actors in particular trades and markets, but according to Scott, he did not possess the 
conceptual tools required to address the theoretical problems of relational contract.
22
 Prior to 
drafting the UCC, Llewellyn discovered that parties often voluntarily adjusted to changing 
circumstances over the life of a contract.
23
 In addition, there were strong social norms preventing 
opportunistic behaviour from buyers and sellers, which were crucial to the continuous 
enforceability of a contract.
24
 Furthermore, it should be noted that Llewellyn‟s observation of 
these factors proved to be similar to Macaulay‟s later findings.25 
 
Believing that relational contract problems were solvable if the law identified and incorporated 
the working rules of parties,
26
 Llewellyn incorporated objectivity under Article 2 of the UCC, 
which defined the content of an agreement as including trade usage, prior dealings and parties‟ 
experience.
27
 An agreement is defined by Section 1-201(3) as „the bargain of the parties in fact as 
found in their language or by implication from other circumstances including course of dealing or 
usage of trade or course of performance as provided in this Act‟. This concept is amplified in 
Section 1-205, which specifies that the course of dealing and trade usage gives particular 
meaning to, and qualifies the terms of, an agreement. To further incorporate mercantile custom in 
the UCC, Comment 1 to Section 1-205 states that „the meaning of the agreement is to be 
determined by the language used by them and by their action, read and interpreted in the light of 
commercial practices and other surrounding circumstances‟.  
 
Llewellyn believed that the merchant tribunal mechanism was crucial in incorporating flexible, 
tailored defaults so that courts could identify mercantile norms.
28
 The concept of flexibility does 
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not indicate a subjective determination of what parties really mean in their agreements,
29
 but it 
provides rules that encourage efficient ex ante contracting.
30
 Furthermore, the incorporation of 
efficient ex ante rules correlates well with Gergen‟s concept of joint-maximisation, which claims 
that maximising the profits of both parties should be calculated on an ex ante return instead of 
parties‟ return ex post.31 
 
The open-ended practice discovered by Llewellyn proves useful in contracts that are susceptible 
to the fluctuation of oil prices.
32
 For example, crude oil price tripled when demands exceed 
supply and, along with the intervention of political events, oil exporters changed their method of 
setting prices.
33
 Similarly, downstream prices for refined gasoline have experienced similar 
drastic fluctuations, which have led to the average US retail price of one gallon of gas to increase 
by nearly 250 percent from the end of 1995 to the middle of 2005.
34
 Such price increases would 
be disastrous to a long-term supply contract between a gasoline refiner and a dealer who fixed 
their prices in the mid-1990s.
35
  
 
Typically, these types of contracts would run for years and would have bankrupted the refiner if 
the refiner did not anticipate the future change in the cost of crude oil. On the other hand, the 
dealer would have reaped an enormous profit by selling gasoline at more than twice its cost to a 
market willing to pay higher prices for gasoline. Gasoline refining markets are discussed in 
greater detail below and this chapter concludes that the UCC has been successful at preserving 
the validity of open prices in gasoline markets. 
 
Before studying the UCC in greater depths, the following section explains the sales law prior to 
the advent of the UCC. The Uniform Sales Act in the US was based on common law, was in 
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force between 1906 and 1947, but received little attention for its formalistic approach, despite its 
goal of codifying and unifying the commercial law in the US.  
 
3.1  The emergence of uniform law: the Uniform Sales Act (1906-1947) in the US 
During the late 1800s, US commercial law remained state-based, and was governed by common 
law rather than statutory law.
36
 Despite the rigidity of fixed price terms, there were judicial 
decisions made under common law that proved that deliberately leaving price term undecided did 
not necessarily vitiate a contract. In Acebal v Levy 
37
 the goods were delivered, but the 
memorandum was not required to name a price if no price were agreed, since the law impliedly 
requires payment of a reasonable price. Similarly, in McIllmoil v Frawley Motor Co,
38
 the court 
held that the price and model of a new car was determinable as the plaintiff could simply select 
one car out of three alternative models, which were all sold at set prices. Therefore, the plaintiff 
had to purchase a new car as was initially agreed with the defendant. In this case, traditional 
common law ruled the contract invalid due to its lack of specific terms; for as long as there was 
external evidence to ascertain the price, the contract remained valid.
39
 
 
The pressure to codify English common law in the US began in the sixteenth century, and prior to 
the English Civil War, codification became appealing to a growing merchant class who were 
dissatisfied with the inconsistencies in common law and old statutes.
40
 Although English law was 
not formally codified in any significant respect until much later, and even then only to a restricted 
extent, commentaries by Blackstone suggest that it facilitated greater uniformity and relieved 
some of the pressure for codification.
41
 The Enlightenment later rejuvenated the interest in 
codification
42
 when Bentham called for the rationalisation of all laws in a single utilitarian legal 
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code.
43
 Although Bentham‟s arguments failed to stand, he did succeed in influencing a movement 
of American thinking.
44
  
 
Between 1890 and 1910, there were two known methods of unifying the law; the first was by 
federalising the law through a federal statute that could be applied to interstate transactions, and 
the second required setting a series of uniform state laws.
45
 The latter method was chosen, and 
the NCCUSL, a special, independent body initiated by the ABA, was created.
46
 The NCCUSL 
composed of commissioners from every state whose duty was (and still is) to prepare and 
recommend uniform laws for commercial matters that could be enacted by state legislatures.
47
 
Additionally, the NCCUSL promulgated the Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law in 1896 and 
the Uniform Sales Act in 1906.
48
  
 
3.1.1  The rise of the Uniform Sales Act (1906-1947)  
The Uniform Sales Act (1906-1947) was a precursor to Article 2 of the UCC, and was adopted by 
thirty-four states between 1906 and 1947.
49
 Mirroring the English SGA (1893),
50
 it represented 
the first serious attempt to codify and unify American sales law.
51
 Despite being drafted by 
Samuel Williston, one of the most well-known contracts scholars of his time, the Act was only 
adopted in thirty-four 34 of the forty-eight states that were members of the union by the middle 
of the twentieth century.
52
 Mooney stated that „Williston has seized the strategic ground of 
American contract law when he drafted the Uniform Sales Act and went on to publish his 
monumental Restatement of Contracts.‟53   
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There are two basic ideas central to Willistonian formalism: first, that a contract‟s terms should 
be interpreted according to their plain meaning, and second, that written terms have priority over 
unwritten expressions of agreement.
54
 These ideas were implemented in Sections 9 and 10 of the 
Uniform Sales Act with specific regard to a sale‟s price term: 
 
Section 9 Definition and ascertainment of price 
9(1) The price may be fixed by the contract, or may be left to be fixed in such manner as 
may be agreed, or it may be determined by the course of dealing between the parties 
9(2)… 
9(3)… 
9(4) Where the price is not determined in accordance with the foregoing provisions the 
buyer must pay a reasonable price. What is a reasonable price is a question of fact 
dependent on the circumstances of each particular case. 
 
Section 10 Sale at valuation 
10 (1) Where there is a contract to sell or a sale of goods at a price or on terms to be fixed 
by a third person, and such third person without default of the seller or the buyer, cannot 
or does not fix the price or terms, the contract or the sale is thereby avoided; but if the 
goods or any part thereof have been delivered to and appropriated by the buyer he must 
pay a reasonable price therefore. 
 
Sections 9 and 10 above are identical to the current Sections 8 and 9 of the SGA in England.
55
 
Therefore, it is crucial to distinguish the benefits of the liberal changes introduced by the UCC 
(in comparison with Sections 9 and 10 above) before applying open prices to the current forms of 
the SGA and CISG. 
 
The UCC makes a significant leap from formalism to flexibility; Speidel explains as follows:  
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[T]he intention to contract is…substituted for the bargain paradigm [every term must be fully 
agreed before any relief can be granted]
56
 as the test for liability…. [I]f the seller and buyer agree 
to the future sale of described goods in a stated quantity and clearly state that they „intend to 
contract,‟ the bargain is enforceable even though no other terms have been agreed.57 
 
Clearly, the intentions of parties significantly affect classic contract law, which demands the 
presentiation of future circumstances from relational sales.
58
 When forced to choose between 
allowing one party to escape a contract when facing a price determination method failure, or 
allowing a court to make a contract for the parties, the UCC favours the latter.
59
 Hawkland 
supports this approach: 
Section 2-305 is based on the sensible assumption that the expectations of the parties are best 
satisfied by enforcing their open price agreement, even if it becomes necessary for the court „to 
make a contract for the parties‟ by supplying a reasonable price as the price term. Surely, it would 
seem that a fairer and juster result is reached by this action on the part of the court than would be 
reached by a ruling that the contract was completely unenforceable.
60
  
 
3.1.2  The Louisville case: where the approaches of the Uniform Sales Act and UCC are 
distinguished 
The opinions of Speidel and Hawkland lead to the conclusion that the intentions and expectations 
of parties are paramount when deciding the validity of a contract
61
 and the duty of a court is to fill 
any gaps in the contract in order to uphold these intentions, which is exactly what the UCC has 
brought to the US. Since this thesis proposes that the UCC, parties‟ intention to be bound to a 
contract is the ideal test for liability, this section distinguishes the UCC from the previous 
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Uniform Sales Act by testing whether the failure of price mechanism to set price vitiates a sale. 
Moreover, the price mechanism‟s failure to set the price is an unreliable defence for opportunistic 
parties who intend to escape a contract. Hence the UCC brought a positive change in the US legal 
system by changing the liability test from inquiring whether a price is fixed to ascertaining the 
parties‟ intent to be contractually bound, and this positive effect will hopefully benefit other legal 
systems too. 
 
While Section 3.5.1 of this chapter further elaborates on open prices under Section 2-305(1) of 
the UCC, the current section of the chapter briefly explains the essence of the Section and notes 
that it is the very provision that replaces both Sections 9 and 10 of the Uniform Sales Act and 
validates open prices, which is possible in three different situations: firstly, when parties are 
silent as to the price,
62
 secondly, if the parties intend to agree but fail to agree on price,
63
 and 
thirdly, when the price is to be fixed in terms of some agreed market or other standard as set or 
recorded by a third person or agency and it is not so set or recorded.
64
 Since the first situation, 
silence about the price finds resemblance under the old Uniform Sales Act (Section 9(4)), the 
difference lies in the remaining two situations under Section 2-305(1), which are agreements to 
agree and failure of agreed market, standard or a third person to set the price. Under the Uniform 
Sales Act, a contract is invalidated if falls under either category. 
 
In reality, modern sales tend to fall into these two additional categories for being incompletely 
drafted. To illustrate the contrast between the two laws, the case of Louisville Soap Co v Taylor 
65
 
is elaborated below. 
 
3.1.2.1 Louisville: facts 
In the Louisville case, the contract required the appellant to purchase rosin (at least 20,000 
barrels, and up to 40,000 round barrels) and to pay the price determined by the official daily 
closing price of the Savannah Board of Trade.
66
 The price term „[t]o be 50c. per 280lbs.over the 
official closing Savannah, Georgia, market on date order is received at Mobile, Alabama. In the 
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event of two closing prices, the average is to apply‟.67 Under the contract, the appellant ordered 
and received 12,989 round barrels of rosin, which it paid in full, to fulfil its requirements. Since 
the minimum amount to be purchased was 20,000 and no less, the seller claimed the loss of 7,011 
round barrels to make up the difference. 
 
The next section discusses the decision of the court based on the application of Section 10 of the 
Uniform Sales Act. 
 
3.1.2.2 Which price method did the parties intend to be bound by: the price set by the 
board, or the price posted by the board based on the market price? 
Because the parties chose a fixed-price term, the appellant had to pay the respondent (the seller) 
the market price based on the official closing price of the Savannah market. As long as at least 
20,000 barrels of rosin were purchased,
68
 the price did not really matter because the market price 
was used as a referable standard.
69
 The Board of Trade was under the obligation to post the 
market price, which was the official price from actual transactions and reflected the true market 
condition.
70
 However, the Board was not authorised to post an official closing price when there 
was no sale in the Savannah market for two months, and when this occurred, the board posted a 
price that did not represent the current condition of the market (the actual price the board posted 
price belonged to the last sale). Due to this, the appellant claimed that they should be released 
from the obligation to pay the respondent for 7,011 barrels of rosin because there was no agreed 
on method for fixing the price.
71
  
 
3.1.2.3 Application of the Uniform Sales Act in Louisville 
Applying Section 10 of the Uniform Sales Act (despite its inapplicability in the state of 
Kentucky),
72
 the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that when a third party is supposed 
to fix the price but fails to do so (without any fault caused by the seller or the buyer), the seller is 
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released from his obligation to sell and deliver, and the buyer is released from his promise to 
accept and pay.
73
 The Board of Trade was perceived by the court as the price setting method for 
the sale of rosin, and decided that the failure of the goods‟ valuation caused the ultimate failure of 
the contract. The court held that „this doctrine has been universally applied to contracts of sale 
and other forms of contracts, and has been written into the Uniform Sales Act…‟74 
 
An important question remains to be asked: what was the exact intent of the parties when 
entering the contract? In reality, the parties did not intend the Board of Trade to be their price 
valuer/price determination method. Instead, they intended that a market price indicator should 
determine the value of the goods, and that the Board of Trade‟s role was only to post the 
available market price. In light of this, Prosser argued that the court misinterpreted the contract.
75
 
As the Board of Trade was not intended to be a valuer, but rather a market reporter, the only 
reasonable conclusion the court should have come to was that „the obvious intent was to close a 
deal at the market, and if there should be no market, then at a reasonable price.‟76 Since the 
parties intended the market price to be the standard to set prices by, and not the price evaluated 
by the Board of Trade, the correct and applicable section of the Uniform Sales Act was Section 9, 
and not Section 10. 
 
Nevertheless, the author predicts that the court would have arrived at the same conclusion, even if 
Section 9 had been correctly applied in this case. This conclusion is reached because the court 
would have applied the same reasoning (of there being „no market price in Savannah‟ available to 
price the rosin), and so there was no existing standard the board could refer to in order to price 
the rosin. 
 
3.1.2.4    How Louisville would be decided under the UCC 
Conversely, a UCC court would have upheld the deal.  Instead of taking the approach of the 
Uniform Sales Act, which released the appellant from paying the agreed quantity of rosin, 
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Section 2-305(1) of the UCC would have protected the right of the respondent. First and 
foremost, Section 2-305(1) prioritises the original intent of the parties when the contract was 
signed, and the parties in Louisville did intend to be bound by the contract because they 
appointed the Board of Trade to provide the price of the Savannah market. The intention to be 
bound, under Section 2-305(1), ought to be understood in light of the Official Code Comment 4 
to Section 2-305: 
…there may be cases in which a particular person‟s judgment is not chosen merely as a barometer 
or index of a fair price but is an essential condition to the parties‟ intent to make any contract at all. 
For example, the case where a known and trusted expert is to “value” a particular painting for 
which there is no market standard differs sharply from the situation where a named expert is to 
determine the grade of cotton, and the difference would support a finding that in the one the parties 
did not intend to make a binding agreement if that expert were unavailable whereas in the other 
they did so intend… 
 
In the Louisville case, the parties‟ intentions did not rely on the board as a trusted method to set 
the price of the rosin; the board was just a third party that recorded the price, which means the 
contract falls under Section 2-305(1)(c) of the UCC. This subsection validates the contract even if 
a third party fails to set a price, which the board failed to do.  
 
In addition to the criticism posed by Prosser, Hawkland also criticised the decision of the Court 
of Appeal. The court could have constructed a market price that would be fairer to the parties, so 
that long-term contracts could utilise open-price contracts without the risk of being held 
unenforceable, and that the business could be done „in conformity with the economics of the 
situation‟.77 In Louisville the contract was simply invalidated in toto because the designated 
market failed to provide the anticipated data. The parties certainly did not desire the contract to 
end due to the absence of the Savannah market price, and the contract would have proved so if 
that was what the parties intended.  
 
Unlike the Court of Appeal in Louisville, a UCC court would have approached the case by first 
determining whether the parties intended the contract to be bound by the Savannah price. Since 
the appellant had agreed to buy at least 20,000 barrels of rosin, then the absence of a market price 
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in Savannah could have been solved by referring to the market price of rosin in a different county 
or state. Again, if the parties intended the contract to be bound by reference to the Savannah price 
and no other equally reasonable standard,
78
 a UCC court would have opined that the parties 
should have stated this in the contract.  
 
In sum, it appears to be more probable for a contract of this type to be valid under Section 2-
305(1) of the UCC than under Sections 9 and 10 of the Uniform Sales Act. While Section 2-305 
of the UCC is not a reversal of Sections 9 and 10 of the Uniform Sales Act, it does reverse the 
decision on the question of the failure of external price standards.
79
 This is supported by the 
Comment on Section 2-305, which rejects the idea of invalidating an agreement because of 
indefiniteness. As long as parties intend to make a binding agreement by using an open price,
80
 
the intentions of parties may be upheld by applying a commercially reasonable price to the 
products. 
 
Louisville shows that Section 10 (and perhaps even Section 9) tends to overlook the parties‟ 
intentions and the relational context of a sale. Ultimately, the inflexibility of the Uniform Sales 
Act leads to its downfall. 
 
3.1.3  The downfall of the Uniform Sales Act (1906-1947) 
The Uniform Sales Act received a mixed reception in the US, and was initially adopted in just 
over half of its states.
81
 The Act ultimately failed to achieve complete legal uniformity in the 
southern states of the US, but was influential upon other states due to several factors. First, its 
influence was catalysed by the „neighbourhood effect‟,82 whereby states were encouraged to 
adopt the Act when their neighbouring states did so.
83
 The neighbourhood effect had less impact 
upon the southern states,
84
 but was more influential in the western region, which made the latter 
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six times more likely to adopt the Act than their southern counterparts.
85
 Gradually, the adoption 
of the Act took place in the most of the west, which included all the states on the Pacific Coast 
and their immediate neighbours.
86
 
 
Clearly, manufacturing factors accelerated the adoption of the Act into core manufacturing states 
such as Connecticut, Massachusetts, New Jersey, Ohio, and Rhode Island in the early 1900s.
87
 
Additionally, the acceptance of the Act was probably due to the change in the general attitude of 
the legal profession between the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.
88
 The ABA and other 
state bar associations, as well as progressive law professors brought about the codification 
movement, and formed significant allies within the legal academy.
89
  
 
As previously explained, the Act was recommended by the NCCUSL for enactment in several 
states. In 1917 the NCCUSL advocated a Federal Sales Act and received support from the ABA 
and The Merchants‟ Association of New York,90 but by the early 1940s, they recognised that the 
Act needed substantial revision to keep up with modern commercial practice.
91
 Subsequently, the 
UCC‟s preparation was initiated when the American Law Institute (ALI) and the NCCUSL 
joined forces in 1942,
92
 despite the strong opposition in three-fourths of the states that had been 
implementing the Act.
93
  
 
The UCC was the product of the combination of the ALI and the NCCUSL, and was constructed 
with rules to fit specific situations based on trade usage and mercantile customs. However, these 
rules were only applicable to those who regularly dealt in a sphere where such customs were well 
known.
94
 The traditional approach of the Uniform Sales Act, which made rules depending on 
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each case on the terms of the contract and circumstances, or on the contract, expressed or 
implied, was abandoned by the UCC. 
95
 This constituted a basic but significant change in US law 
as it moved away from a law that was only applicable depending upon the existence of 
documented facts, towards a law that prioritises the mercantile identity of parties.
96
  
 
3.2  The UCC: the application of Llewellyn’s trade usage rule  
Llewellyn identified two major flaws in the Uniform Sales Act, which were attributed to 
Willistonian formalism: first, the rules were inefficient because they were grounded in legal 
doctrine rather than actual practice; second, the rules were too general and insensitive to 
particular circumstances, which lead parties in some industries to allocate risks differently than 
parties in other commercial contexts.
97
 To counter these flaws, Llewellyn introduced two 
approaches into the UCC. The first is the „contextual approach‟ (as opposed to Willistonian‟s 
textual approach), and the second is employing trade usage as a tailored rule (as opposed to 
Willistonian‟s general rules, which applied a one size fits all approach). 
 
Regarding the first approach, Llewellyn chose context as the sole factor for instructing courts to 
focus on what the particular trade understood the contract to mean. He departed from the view of 
Corbin who regarded context as an opportunity to uncover the subjective intent of contracting 
parties.
98
 In Corbin‟s view, the courts were left to fill gaps in the contract by focusing on what the 
parties subjectively intended.
99
  
 
The second change Llewellyn brought about was determining the efficiency of the contract 
within a particular trade or industry. This change, ensuring that the terms in question were 
equally decided upon and could not be dictated by a stronger party to a weaker one.
100
 This 
approach is indicative of contractual freedom for each party, as discovered by Llewellyn through 
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his observation of contractual arrangement in litigated cases.
101
 Subsequently, Llewellyn formed 
a strategy of filling contractual by using objective methods that maximised the ex ante value of a 
contract, which is viewed by both parties when contracting.
102
 This approach assumes that the 
law should simply identify and incorporate working rules which are already being successfully 
used by the parties, instead of imposing abstract and general rules, particularly in complex 
contracts.
103
  
 
Scott observes that Llewellyn was in turn influenced by Commons, who rejected the economic 
models that perceive individuals as selfish and individualistic.
104
 In fact, Llewellyn perceived a 
group of merchants in a particular trade or practice is a group of people that cooperate with each 
other, yet capable of and would engage in self-policing their own contractual terms.
105
 Therefore, 
the UCC is obliged to provide room for mercantile flexibility according to trade usage when 
setting out contractual terms.
106
  
 
In its finished form, Llewellyn regarded the UCC as „worth adopting being the better body of law 
on the subject matter involved than the existing law of any one of the states. It would be worth 
adopting without reference to uniformity‟.107 The next section explains the setup of the UCC 
before proceeding to discuss the open prices specifically. 
 
3.3  The collaboration leading to the creation of the UCC 
As mentioned above, the NCCUSL and the ALI joined forces to set up the UCC.
108
 The 
NCCUSL was composed of commissioners from each of the fifty states of the US, the District of 
Columbia and Puerto Rico,
109
 who were experienced lawyers, judges and teachers of law from 
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leading law schools.
110
 The ALI was a voluntary organisation established in 1923, which 
comprised of approximately 1,500 judges, law professors and leading members of the Bar.
111
 ALI 
was organised for improving the law, and is primarily noted for its series of restatements on 
various subjects including, but not limited to, contracts, torts, agencies and trusts.
112
 
 
By 1944, the NCCUSL had been collaborating with ALI to expand the revised sales act project to 
include the drafting of the comprehensive UCC,
113
 which was successfully drafted under the 
direction of Llewellyn as its Chief Reporter.
114
 Mentschikoff regarded the UCC was „the most 
ambitious codification ever undertaken in the Anglo-American legal world and is the product of 
twenty years of effort by literally hundreds of American lawyers and businessmen‟.115 
 
3.3.1  The background to the setup of the UCC (1938-1952) 
In 1938, there was a proposal sponsored by the Merchants‟ Association of New York City for a 
federal sales Act to govern all interstate transactions.
116
 As a response to the inadequacies in the 
Uniform Sales Act, the NCCUSL attempted to revise the former, which it had initially prepared 
in 1906.
117
  
 
In 1940, the NCCUSL adopted a proposal to prepare a uniform commercial code that embraced 
the modernisation and co-ordination of the Uniform Sales Act, the Uniform Negotiable 
Instruments Law, the Uniform Bills of Lading Act, the Uniform Warehouse Receipts Act, and all 
other Uniform Acts in the field of commercial law, but added new provisions where no uniform 
Acts addressed important and closely related commercial problems.
118
 ALI joined in the 
undertaking the following year, and participated in the 1942 discussion about the draft Revised 
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Sales Act, which was a proposed chapter related to sales, for the prospective code.
119
 In 1945, the 
project was financed by a grant of approximately $100,000 from the Maurice and Laura Falk 
Foundation, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania and other contributions by the Beaumont Foundation of 
Cleveland, Ohio and ninety-eight other business and law firms.
120
  
 
Between 1945 and 1952, there were a huge number of drafts and re-drafts of parts of the 
proposed code, which prepared by reportorial staff supervised by an editorial board.
121
 These 
redrafts were carefully considered by advisory groups of judges, lawyers and law teachers before 
being shown to the Council of ALI, special Sections of the NCCUSL, and general members of 
the two organisations.
122
 The reporting and advisory groups also consulted with individuals and 
organisations in business and banking circles which later came forward with criticisms.
123
 
 
Subsequently, the first complete draft of the UCC was released in May 1949.
124
  During the 
preparatory stage of the UCC, the successive drafts were made available to the public and were 
extensively commented on in legal periodicals. As a result of this, subsequent drafts took much 
of this criticism into account.
125
 Many of the drafts and problems that arose during the drafting 
process were studied by bar associations and other groups in different parts of the country.
126
 By 
1946, a committee on the UCC of the Section of Corporation, Banking and Business Law of the 
American Bar Association was organised and followed the development of the UCC from that 
time onwards.
127
  
 
The final text of the proposed UCC was completed in September 1951 and was approved by both 
the NCCUSL and ALI, and also by the House of Delegates of the American Bar Association.
128
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Ultimately, the publication of an official edition of the UCC, with explanatory comments, took 
place in October 1952 and was released as the 1952 Official Text and Comments Edition.
129
  
 
3.3.2  The gradual acceptance of the UCC by different states (1952-1962) 
The period between 1952 and 1958 was a testing period for the UCC.
130
 Pennsylvania, being one 
of the largest commercial and industrial states in the US, with a huge volume of commercial 
activity in all of its phases, was the first state to officially adopt the UCC.
131
 To ensure the 
uniformity of the law with the most current (1958) version of the UCC, Pennsylvania re-enacted 
the 1958 version and implemented all of the amendments included in that version that were 
suggested during the testing period (of 1952 to 1958).
132
 The complete acceptance and approval 
of the UCC was given by the Assembly of Pennsylvania with a vote of 195 to one, and this led to 
the UCC‟s final, unanimous approval by the Senate (both votes finally occurred on September 
23, 1959).
133
  
 
The second state to enact the UCC was Massachusetts, and from October 1 1958, the enactment 
included all of the amendments included in the 1958 version of the UCC within its provisions.
134
 
In conjunction with the completion of the extensive testing period from 1952 to 1958, and the 
adoption by an important commercial state (Massachusetts), rapid enactments in the sixteen other 
states took place after 1958, which resulted in the UCC‟s enactment in a total of eighteen 
different states.
135
 The states that adopted the UCC were Kentucky (July 1, 1960), New 
Hampshire (July 1, 1961), Connecticut (October 1, 1961), Rhode Island, Arkansas, Wyoming and 
New Mexico, (January 1 and 2, 1962), Ohio and Illinois (July 1, 1962), Oklahoma, Alaska and 
New Jersey (January 1, 1963), Georgia (April 1, 1963), Oregon (September 1, 1963), Michigan 
(January 1, 1964) and New York (September 27, 1964).
136
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There was a fairly extensive educational program provided within these states to familiarise the 
members of the bar and business community with the provisions of the UCC.
137
 In summary, the 
transition period from law before the UCC, to the full incorporation of the UCC, went smoothly, 
and the UCC has worked very satisfactorily since then.
138
  
 
3.3.3  The effect of adopting the UCC   
As explained above, the UCC abandoned traditional approaches of enforcing contracts based on 
the terms of the contract and circumstances of the case or on the contract, express or implied.
139
 
This was a significant shift in US sales law, which now enforces a sale based on the nature of the 
facts apparent to the trading identity of the parties.
140
 The UCC further modified the idea that 
parties can choose to conclude contracts without setting a price.
141
 Nonetheless, these agreements 
still need to fulfil the test of good faith to be enforceable under the UCC.
142
 
 
Regarded as the Bible for the sale of goods in the US, the UCC was „conceived, drafted, and 
enacted into statutory law as a code and not a mere collection of statutory rules.‟143 It applies to 
the transactions of goods as defined under Section 2-103. Indeed the UCC comprises of nine 
articles, including the law of sales, negotiable instruments, bank deposits and collections, letters 
of credit, bulk sales, documents of title, transfer and registration of investment securities, and 
secured transactions involving all kinds of movables.
144
 The UCC replaced seven uniform acts, a 
model collection of the American Bankers‟ Association and a host of individual state statutes that 
deal with various security devices.
145
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Despite its many features, the UCC is referred to as a commercial transactions document.
146
 
Ultimately, the unification of modern commercial law, through the UCC, has been made by 
breaking away from the English model, which the Uniform Sales Act was based on.
147
 
 
3.4  The policy and purpose of the UCC 
The UCC is dedicated to clarity and good business sense in commercial law, and also the 
unification of the best laws and practices in the US.
148
 Llewellyn stated that „if a statute is to 
make sense, it must be read in the light of some assumed purpose. A statute merely declaring 
rule, with no purpose or objective, is nonsense.‟149 Llewellyn formed most of his ideas about 
contract law before beginning to draft the UCC,
150
 and working towards the comprehensive 
codification of commercial law.
151
  
 
The UCC is to be liberally construed and applied,
152
 and among its underlying purposes and 
policies are the following important points: 
 
1) To simplify, clarify and modernise the law governing commercial transactions 
2) To permit the continued expansion of commercial practices153 through custom, usage and 
agreement of the parties 
3) To make uniform the law among various jurisdictions154 
 
Interestingly, the second purpose (b) proves that the UCC not only unified the law and provides 
rules of commercial practices, but that it also promotes the continuous expansion of commercial 
practices using custom, usage and the agreement of parties. This purpose provides the rationale as 
to why an agreement may be flexibly drafted in an open-ended manner, and why it leaves 
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adequate room for courts to move in and readjust contracts over time. Stone relates this purpose 
with Comment 1 of Section 1-102, which states: 
This Act is drawn to provide flexibility so that, since it is intended to be a semi-permanent piece of 
legislation, it will provide its own machinery for expansion of commercial practices. The Code 
intends to make the law embodied in it to be developed by the courts in the light of unforeseen and 
new circumstances and practices, provided that the proper construction of the Act requires that its 
interpretation and application be limited to its reason.
155
  
 
The next section covers the salient features of the UCC, namely its open-endedness and freedom 
of contracting which support its function as a flexible code that ensures that all of its purposes 
and policies are fulfilled. 
 
3.4.1  The salient features of the UCC: open-endedness and freedom of contracting 
When drafting a contract, the relative certainty and uniformity of its construction depends on the 
court‟s perception of the situation represented by the contract,156 and proper construction follows 
the reason and is limited or extended by it.
157
 For instance, all definition sections under the UCC 
state that „in this Act (Article) unless the context otherwise requires‟ allows a court to limit or 
extend definitions in accordance with the reason of the rule in which they appear. Clearly, open-
endedness and the reliance on reason as the foundation for the contract‟s construction are made 
explicit, but the idea remains general to the code. In fact, the first canon of construction states 
that „[t]his is why Section 1-202(1) states that Act shall be liberally construed and applied to 
promote its underlying purposes and policies‟. 
 
3.4.2  The open-ended nature of a contract 
The UCC was not drafted in the same manner that conveyancers would have drafted it, who 
Llewellyn regards „the metes and bounds boys.‟158 Rather, Llewellyn directed the courts to 
address legal issues in a practical way by using the UCC‟s open-ended methods,159 which include 
whether the parties have acted reasonably and in accordance with the standard customs and 
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usages of trade. He gained inspiration from the open-ended nature of the German „immanent law‟ 
tradition, which is found in Handelsgesetzbuch.
160
 This German code is open-ended because if 
there is an absence of commercial custom, the general civil law will be applied.
161
 Moreover, the 
German legal tradition stipulates that any given case should be decided according to Natur der 
Sache (the nature of the matter) rather than complex set of rules or gesetzliche Beweisregeln.
162
 
Commercial law was created by the merchant community, and had its own conscience and 
customary law based on good faith and honest dealing.
163
 This feature of Handelsgesetzbuch was 
adopted by Llewellyn, resulting in the UCC‟s emergence as an open-ended and non-exhaustive 
commercial code.  
 
Whitman compares the UCC and Handelsgesetzbuch
164
 by referring to Article 1 of the German 
code, which states that „Insofar as this Code does not determine an issue, commercial custom is 
to be applied. In the absence of commercial custom, the general civil law is to be applied.‟165 
However, Llewellyn was aware of the potential unsuitability of applying old customs to modern 
commercial transactions, and so he drafted Section 1-103 of UCC taking this issue into account: 
„unless displaced by the particular provisions of this Act, the principles of law and equity, 
including the law merchant…shall supplement its provisions.‟166 
 
3.4.3  Freedom to contract 
Aside from employing open-ended features, the UCC also adopts the principle of freedom to 
contract which allows parties to vary UCC provisions through their mutual agreement. This 
principle is the reason for which the UCC has so many gap-filling rules that apply unless parties 
agree otherwise.  
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However, there are four exceptions to this freedom to contract:
167
 
 
1) The obligations of good faith, diligence, reasonableness and care prescribed by the code 
may not be disclaimed by agreement.
168
 
2) All sections that explicitly preclude variance cannot be varied.169 
3) Some terms are implicit rather than explicit, and they cannot be varied.170  
4) Certain contracts and clauses may not be enforceable due to unconscionability.171 
 
These exceptions act as safeguards to having a freedom to contract, and if a contract falls under 
any one of the above exceptions, it is deemed unenforceable. This correlates with the emphasis 
made by Ben-Shahar in Chapter Two: if parties sign an agreement on the basis of contractual 
freedom, they are in agreement not to walk away from the contractual obligations by which they 
intend themselves to be bound.
172
 
 
An example of a practice that utilises the freedom to contract and use open-ended contractual 
terms is found in having an open price (under Article 2, regarding sales); the next section further 
explores Article 2. 
 
3.5  Article 2 of the UCC: sales 
Prevented by the courts‟ inflexible attitude towards the classic law doctrine, business interests 
and legal scholars were unsuccessful in their attempt to accommodate open price contracts under 
the Uniform Sales Act (1906-1947).
173
 Accordingly, advocates for a more liberal approach to 
contract law found their solution in Article 2 of the UCC.
174
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Every state, with the exception of Louisiana, has adopted Article 2, including Section 2-305 of 
the UCC as the main body of law regulating transactions for goods. The state of Louisiana has 
not enacted Article 2 (sales) because it has chosen to maintain „its own civil code, unique to its 
own heritage‟.175 Under the civil code, every sale needs to have a fixed price in order to be 
valid,
176
 and if a contract fails for lack of a determinate price, but the seller still performs their 
contractual obligations, the solution is to apply the theory of quantum meruit, which entitles the 
seller to receive a fair and equitable price.
177
  
 
The next section of the chapter focuses on Section 2-305 where, except in Louisiana, open prices 
are widely applicable in all US states. 
  
3.5.1  Open prices under the UCC 
Although recognising the importance of open prices, Llewellyn nevertheless acknowledged that 
price was at the heart of all sales contracts.
178
 After all, the economy proves that businesses 
centre on profit, and profit certainly centres on price.
179
 Therefore, the price, paid or promised, 
constitutes a consideration for the goods to transfer in a contract of sale.
180
  
 
However, the goods themselves, or external matters that affect marketing conditions, may be 
uncertain, which causes difficulty in fixing a price term in advance.
181
 Chapter One explained 
that in response to uncertainty, Gilson, Sabel and Scott described the method of braiding a 
contract, which entails parties write an agreement by intertwining formal and informal 
mechanisms that allow each other to assess the disposition and capacity of the other to respond 
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cooperatively and effectively to unpredictable circumstances.
182
 DiMatteo supports the idea, 
stating that many modern alliance agreements blend both hard, fixed terms with more open, 
flexible terms or standards.
183
 Whilst the fixed terms provide protections and boundaries for each 
firm‟s investments and obligations, the open and implicit terms allow for greater operational 
flexibility, which is required to fully exploit the collaborative effort and to generate the most 
innovation-related benefits.
184
  
 
By intertwining informal and formal elements into the contract, a buyer and seller can fix some of 
the contract‟s terms while leaving others future adjustment, which might include leaving the 
price, time or quantity arrangements open to ensure that the business is more practical in case 
circumstances change.
185
 Section 2-305 validates the braiding of a contract through its validation 
of open price,
186
 and this remains valid as long as both parties intend to be bound to the contract 
by having an open price that is determined in good faith.
187
 
 
Article 2 governs contracts involving the sale of goods worth more than $500;
188
 with the 
exception of Louisiana, all US states have adopted some version of UCC Article 2 with minor 
variations.
189
 Section 2-305 provides several ways to determine the price term in the event of a 
missing or deliberately undecided price:
190
 
 
Section 2-305 
(1) The parties if they so intend may conclude a contract for sale even if the price is not 
settled. In such a situation the price is a reasonable price at the time for delivery if 
(a) nothing is said as to price;  
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(b) the price is left to be agreed by the parties and they fail to agree; or 
(c) the price is to be fixed in terms of some agreed market or other standard as set 
or recorded by a third person or agency and it is not so set or recorded. 
(2) A price to be fixed by the seller or by the buyer means a price to be fixed in good 
faith. 
(3) If a price left to be fixed otherwise than by agreement of the parties fails to be fixed 
through fault of one party the other may at the party‟s option treat the contract as 
cancelled or the party may fix a reasonable price. 
(4) If, however, the parties intend not to be bound unless the price is fixed or agreed and it 
is not fixed or agreed there is no contract. In such a case the buyer must return any 
goods already received or if unable to do so must pay their reasonable value at the 
time of delivery and the seller must return any portion of the price paid on account.  
 
The UCC drafters reframed the problem of open prices by linking it to the intentions of parties.
191
 
A well-drafted open price term will indicate whether or not the parties intend to be bound and an 
expression of intent to be bound, in the absence of a fixed-price term, usually does not appear in 
the contract. Therefore, to determine parties‟ intentions, all available, relevant evidence should be 
considered. When parties decide to set the price in the future, the presumption under Section 2-
305(1) assumes that both parties (seller and buyer) intend to be bound to the contract even if they 
are unable to come to a subsequent agreement on the price.  
 
Section 2-305 (above) provided courts with a method (taking the parties‟ original intentions into 
account), to rely on an agreement that lacks a price term.
192
 Additionally, this provision embraced 
the practical reality, generally ignored by courts, that agreeing to an open-price contract strongly 
implies that parties intended to fulfil their obligations.
193
 If the parties do not want the court to set 
the price, but would rather the contract failed if they were unable to agree on a price, it is the 
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parties‟ obligation to explicitly state this in the contract itself, or else to show by other convincing 
evidence that such a result was intended.  
 
Apart requiring an intention to be contractually bound, a valid open price requires both parties to 
operate in good faith.
194
 However, if the price is agreed to derive from reference to a third party 
or agency (for example, a posted price from another seller) and the price is not set due to the fault 
of one party, then the other party has the option to set a reasonable price or cancel the contract.
195
 
Nevertheless, intention remains the key element: if the parties agree that they will only be bound 
by a fixed price, and the price was not set when making the contract, then the contract is not 
valid.
196
 
 
3.5.2  Decisions under Section 2-305 regarding open or missing price terms in a contract 
A supporting provision to Section 2-305 is found in Section 2-204(3), which claims that „even 
though one or more terms are left open a contract for sale does not fail for indefiniteness if the 
parties have intended to make a contract and there is a reasonably certain basis for giving an 
appropriate remedy.‟ In Paluokos v Intermountain Chevrolet Co,197 the court ruled that the UCC 
„does not require a document itemising all the specific terms of the agreement… that some terms 
are undetermined does not defeat the existence of a contract provided the parties „intended to 
make a contract and there is a reasonably certain basis for giving an appropriate remedy.‟198  
 
Although the UCC refers to open and not missing terms, Comment to Section 2-204(3) explains 
that the provision applies to both deliberate open terms and missing terms: 
If the parties intend to enter into a binding agreement, this subsection [(3)] recognizes that 
agreement as valid in law, despite missing terms, if there is any reasonably certain basis for 
granting a remedy…. Nor is the fact that one or more terms are left to be agreed upon enough of 
itself to defeat an otherwise adequate agreement.
199
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Acknowledging Section 2-305 to cover both open and missing terms, the following section 
distinguishes the two by explaining decisions made under missing or inadvertently incomplete 
price terms, and decisions made under open or deliberately incomplete price terms. 
 
3.5.3  Missing price terms 
In a similar manner to open price, parties must have intended to form a contract in a missing price 
situation,
200
 and the intention to be contractually bound is typically derived from the parties‟ 
conduct.
201
 A shipment of goods, where the seller believes a contract exists, provides an example 
of conduct.
202
 In addition, the buyer‟s acceptance and use of the shipped goods is indicative of 
the buyer‟s belief that a contract has been formed.203  
 
However, the mere exchange of goods is not categorised as a missing-price contract because the 
exchange may be too indefinite to prove the contract‟s terms under the UCC.204 Quaker State 
Mushroom Company, Inc v Dominick’s Finer Foods, Inc of Illinois205 illustrates this point: the 
parties exchanged proposed prices, but the one-year contract had already expired, without 
renewal eight months before the ordering dates. The buyer (Dominick‟s) had ordered four 
shipments of mushrooms and presumed that the old (and already expired) price still applied. 
However, the seller (Quaker) sent a notice of price increase to Dominick‟s before shipping the 
mushrooms. Dominick‟s did not expressly agree to the price increase and the court ruled that, 
although both parties proved by their conduct that they intended to make new, individual deals
206
 
from the four orders and deliveries, Section 2-305(1) was not applicable because the parties did 
not mention anything about the price, leave it open, or leave it to be determined by an outside 
agent. The court found that there was no contract, and the previously expired contract had no 
relevance to the four individual orders. Through the application of Section 2-305(4), Dominick‟s 
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was bound to return the mushrooms and receive a refund, or, if it could not do so, „pay the 
reasonable value of the mushrooms at the time of delivery.‟207 
 
Although the UCC does not enforce price exchange, a contract with a missing price term is 
enforceable because the abovementioned Comment to Section 2-204(3) states the „agreement as 
valid in law, despite missing terms‟.208 A missing price differs from a price exchange because the 
parties have unintentionally missed stating the price term due to an unpredicted event.
209
  
 
An emergency situation is an example of an unpredicted event, and is observed in Alter & Sons, 
Inc v United Engineers & Constructors, Inc 
210
 In this case, the defendant previously made repeat 
purchases of substantial quantities of equipment from a plaintiff for the construction of a nuclear 
plant. On July 6, 1972, with the exception of the price term, both parties agreed on a contract, 
which included the specifications and identity of equipment to be supplied by plaintiff to 
defendant, the conditions relating to a sale, the date and manner of delivery, and the scope and 
extent of the plaintiff‟s flexibility in regard to the defendant‟s specifications. The defendant gave 
the plaintiff a purchase order number and directed him to order the equipment for delivery on 
July 10 but the plaintiff was not informed about the specific purpose of the equipment or the 
reasons behind the July 10 delivery. However, the court discovered that the plant operation 
required substantial quantities of water to cool its nuclear reactors.  
 
In June 1972, a part of machinery linked to nuclear plant‟s permanent water supply system broke, 
and because the cooling process was critical to the plant‟s operation, the Atomic Energy 
Commission closed the plant until a support pumping system was available for future emergency 
use. The reason the contract‟s delivery date was set as a condition for purchase was because the 
defendant scheduled a shakedown of the plant immediately after July 10.   
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The court resolved that the intention of parties must be made in the light of facts and conduct of 
the parties;
211
 previously, setting a purchase order verbally, with a specific delivery date, before 
producing a written purchase order was customary in transactions between the plaintiff and 
defendant. A sales agreement was concluded between the parties on July 6, 1972 when the 
defendant handed to the plaintiff a purchase order and directed him to deliver the equipment by 
July 10. The defendants wanted the equipment to be obtained and delivered no later than July 10, 
1972, and the defendant presented their request to plaintiff as an emergency atmosphere that the 
plaintiff was obliged to address in an almost impossible time frame. 
 
If we compare the Quaker State case which involved a mere exchange of prices, it is apparent 
that there was no exchange of price or cross-offers involved in Alter & Sons. The Alter & Sons 
case had a missing price because the plant urgently required the construction equipment to cool 
down the nuclear reactors before a price was decided on.  The other terms the parties in the Alter 
& Sons had decided on included the specification of goods, the delivery date, the manner of 
delivery and the seller‟s flexibility in catering to the buyer‟s specification. 
 
The UCC, SGA and CISG
212
 are in unanimous agreement about the enforceability of contracts 
that omit the price term, but they differ in their enforcement of deliberate open-price practice. 
The UCC takes the more liberal approach validating deliberate open prices in order to adjust to 
unpredictability of the market and other changing circumstances, which demand deliberate 
incompleteness in sales. Using some contemporary examples of court decisions under Section 2-
305, the following section shows that the UCC preserves the enforceability of a sale, as long as 
there is evidence of each party‟s intention to be bound to the contract, and that the price is set in 
good faith.  
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3.5.4  Open or deliberate price terms 
Chapter Two discussed the wide range between open term contracts and contracts that apply open 
prices, which include contracts related to the sale of seasonal goods of raw products, IT 
outsourcing and independent service stations.
213
 While open prices for typical seasonal goods are 
further elaborated on in Chapters Four and Five, this section focuses on open-price contracts 
between suppliers and dealers of independent service stations. As one of the most common 
industries that applies open price in the US, the supplier-dealer cases will illustrate how the UCC 
enforces open prices, but at the same time prevent opportunistic behaviour from parties.  
 
Considering that the UCC does not specify that open price apply to long-term commercial 
relationships, there are a number of short-term contracts that apply open prices, such as Autry 
Petroleum Company, McDonald Oil Company v BP Products North America Inc.
214
 The jobbers 
(Autry) were required to purchase a minimum amount of fuel from BP over a three-year contract. 
The price term provided that
215
: 
[t]he price which Jobber will pay for each product sold under this contract will be Company‟s 
jobber buying price, as recorded at the applicable Company business unit, regional office or such 
other office as Company may designate from time to time, in effect on the date and the time of sale 
from the respective terminals designated by Company. 
 
The phrase „from time to time‟ shows that the deal is categorised as an agreement to agree, and if 
parties fail to agree, the UCC would apply a reasonable price at the time of delivery as the 
effective price. In this case, BP had the exclusive right to determine the price of the contract, and 
there was no clause that controlled how BP should set it. Moreover, BP was under no obligation 
under the contract to discuss how it sets the jobber buying price, and therefore did not need to be 
transparent in its pricing. BP then offered the jobbers a prompt-pay discount of one percent off 
the jobber buying price for purchases paid by electronic fund transfer (EFT) within ten days of 
lift. The promise was duly executed by BP when invoicing the jobbers the one percent ten-day 
prompt-day discount. 
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However, the jobbers later claimed that BP inflated its calculation by including the costs 
associated with offering the prompt-pay discount, and the jobbers alleged that this constituted an 
indirect denial of the promised prompt-pay discount, which amounted to a hidden recapture that 
frustrated their expectations. This led to a breach of BP‟s obligation to the open price in good 
faith. The jobbers cited Sections 1-203
216
 and 2-305(2), which states that the supplier should 
perform their obligation in good faith, because good faith is implied in every contract.  
 
In the next section, we will see how good faith safeguards the rights of both parties when a court 
decides to enforce an open price. 
 
3.6  Good faith as a safeguard under the UCC 
Typically, open prices cases under the UCC revolve around the post-formation issue of whether 
the price was set in good faith. Contrastingly, the SGA and CISG focus on whether an open-price 
contract was formed in the first place. The availability of a body of case law on good faith and 
open prices provides some evidence on the capacity of courts to resolve disputes over prices that 
arise under this type of contracts. 
 
Good faith and fair dealing play crucial roles in the UCC; as an implicit component in an open-
price contract,
217
 the parties are responsible to observe reasonable commercial standards of fair 
dealing.
218
 Even a contractual provision that merely establishes minimum and maximum prices 
for goods requires price negotiations based on good faith negotiations between parties.
219
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In Autry Petroleum Company, as a supplier, BP was sued for unfairly pricing its fuel, but in their 
defence they have acted honestly and in accordance with reasonable commercial standards. 
Rejecting the jobbers‟ arguments, the federal district court agreed with BP and granted its motion 
for summary judgment. Section 2-305 implies the good-faith performance of explicit contractual 
provisions, and does not impose any additional obligations on the contracting parties that are not 
explicitly stated in their contract. Indeed, the court found that the one percent prompt-pay 
discount term offered by BP, and reflected on BP invoices had been integrated into the contract 
over the course of trade.  
 
The court found nothing within the standard BP supply contract that prohibited BP from 
recouping the promised discount by increasing its sales price, and subsequently rejected the 
jobbers‟ contention that the defendant breached their contractual duty by recouping the cost of 
the discount as part of the jobber buying price. To impose an obligation on the defendant to 
ignore any prompt-payment discount costs when it determines the price of its product would 
mean re-writing the parties‟ contract. Clearly, this policy is not in line with the generalised good-
faith requirement of the UCC.  
 
Autry Petroleum Company acts as an illustration of enforceable open prices under the UCC that 
do not rewrite the parties‟ original contract. BP granted the discounted price, which fulfilled the 
good-faith requirement upon their contractual obligations. To discharge a contract, a claimant 
needs to prove bad faith, which the jobbers were unable to do in this case.  
 
3.6.1  Proving objective bad faith in open-price contracts: evidence of commercial injury 
must be present in order to discharge an open price 
The liberal approach of the UCC to open prices leads to the following questions: to what extent is 
an open price enforceable? What evidence is required from the claimant in order to discharge the 
contract? 
 
Based on Autry Petroleum Company, good faith is only challengeable if the claimant produces 
evidence of bad faith. Furthermore, the pricing of goods may only be regarded as unfair when 
bad faith is proven, which means that a court would not allow a contract to continue and 
commercially injure the relying party.  
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In contrast to Autry Petroleum Company, in the case of Allapattah Services, Inc v Exxon 
Corporation
220
 an open price was nullified by evidence of bad faith; this is detailed in the 
following section. 
 
3.6.2 Evidence of bad faith: double-charging dealers with the intent of driving them out of 
business 
Considering that the contract contained no explicit limitation on the dealer to fix the price, the 
Allapattah case contained similar facts to the Autry Petroleum Company case. As the dealer, 
Exxon had the unilateral right to set pricing, similar to the discounted offer in Autry Petroleum 
Company whereby the dealer offered a discount for cash payments. Exxon then imposed a three 
percent processing fee on all credit card transactions, and also expressed that it would reduce the 
price of the open-term contract by an amount that on average, would offset the three percent 
credit card processing fee. This arrangement continued for 6 months until Exxon stopped 
providing the promised offset, and instead began to double-charge the dealers for costs associated 
with credit card processing.  
 
The main problem did not concern the actual amount Exxon charged for its wholesale gasoline to 
its dealers, but the manner in which the wholesale price was calculated. There was sufficient 
evidence to prove that Exxon‟s discount for cash program double-charged the dealers for credit 
card processing, and that Exxon concealed this systematic and intentional practice from the 
dealers. Furthermore, Exxon implemented these overcharges with hope of driving some of its 
dealers out of business.  
 
To case of Allapattah is distinguished from Autry Petroleum Company because Exxon, as a 
supplier, specifically promised to adjust its prices, but broke the promise. However, in Autry 
Petroleum Company, the standard BP supply contract did not prohibit BP from recouping the 
promised discount by increasing its sales price, and the jobbers failed to prove a breach of 
contract on BP‟s behalf when the latter recouped the cost of the discount as part of the jobber 
buying price. 
                                                 
220
 61 Federal Supplement, Second Series 1308 (Southern District of Florida 1999). 
102 
 
Without evidence, a dealer cannot subjectively invoke bad faith; the Texas Supreme Court 
emphasised this point in Shell Oil Co v HRN, Inc
221
 The Dealer Agreement stipulated that each 
dealer agreed to buy Shell-branded gasoline from Shell at the dealer tank wagon (DTW) price, 
which included delivery to the dealer‟s (HRN) station by a Shell tanker truck (a common practice 
to counter price volatility in the gasoline refining and marketing industry). Furthermore, Section 
2-305(b) of the Texas Business and Commerce Code governed the contract (in pari materia with 
Section 2-305(2) of the UCC).  
 
Apart from HRN, Shell also sells branded and unbranded gasoline to other jobbers, who operate 
fleets of trucks collecting gasoline from refiners‟ terminals and distributing it to their own or 
independent stations. Indeed, the price charged to the jobbers was the rack price, which was 
available for gasoline bought from and picked up at Shell‟s terminals. The rack price was lower 
because it did not include a delivery service, but the DTW price included a delivery charge and 
so carried a higher price. The dealer, alleging that the DTW price was an opportunistic attempt by 
Shell to replace the dealers with more profitable company-operated outlets, failed to state 
whether the DTW price could be considered as commercially reasonable. Instead, the dealers 
alleged that Shell acted in bad faith by setting its DTW price with the intention of running the 
dealers out of business.  
 
In the Shell case, the court ruled that as long as the DTW price fell within the range of DTW 
prices charged by other refiners within relevant geographic markets, the price should be 
considered commercially reasonable. Since the DTW price Shell charged was uniform among 
similarly situated dealers, it clearly did not have a discriminatory motivation; a relatively high, 
yet commercially reasonable price is not evidence of bad faith. Since price set in good faith price 
is not synonymous with lowest price available, to claim that the price was set in bad faith would 
require the dealer to suffer damages above and beyond a mere increase in price. 
 
In conclusion, good faith under the UCC is a safeguard put in place by Llewellyn to regulate 
discretion when setting prices. If a claimant failed to prove bad faith objectively, then, as seen in 
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Autry Petroleum Company, the defendant is presumed to have priced the goods in good faith. 
Good faith is a workable standard to maximise the enforceability of open price, unless bad faith is 
proven by the claimant. 
 
In contrast with the Autry Petroleum Company and Shell Oil cases, bad faith was successfully 
proven in Allapattah when Exxon‟s discount-for-cash program double-charged its dealers for 
credit card processing and drove them out of business. In this case, the open price was 
unenforceable. Other potential evidence of bad faith includes evading the spirit of the bargain, a 
lack of diligence and the abuse of power when specifying terms.
222
   
 
3.7  Conclusion 
The UCC has a greater function than a standard uniform law; it unifies the law between the 
states, as the CISG does with its Member States, and it codifies the law, as the SGA does with 
English sales law preceding 1893; but, most importantly, it caters to the needs of relational 
contracts.  
 
Influenced by open-ended contracts under the German Civil Code of Handelsgesetzbuch, and 
Commons‟ conclusion that a group of people often act for the collective good rather than 
individual gain, Llewellyn combined open-ended contracts and mercantile custom so that 
contemporary businesses that involve relational sales can benefit from price flexibility and the 
law merchant. As merchants are viewed as a collective entity that works cooperatively, contracts 
are used as planning mechanism rather than as specified documents since business corporations 
are collections of people, and in such collective entities it is rare that their activities are tightly 
co-ordinated.
223
 Palay supported this point, stating that „looking beyond the [written] contract is 
important because parties who have, or anticipate, strong relational ties with their contracting 
opposites are not particularly worried about initial terms of agreement‟.224 Business people 
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perceive excessive contract planning as a way of undermining the trust between parties, inflexible 
and counterproductive for developing good business relationships.
225
  
 
Llewellyn concluded that, in comparison with the 1906 Uniform Sales Act, the three vital 
changes brought about by the UCC lie in its value to the public, its value to lawyers and the bar, 
and its practicality: 
Obscurity we have in the Uniform Commercial Code too, but the obscurity there, compared to the 
obscurity of the present law, is clarity itself… if there were no question of uniformity in the 
picture, the Code still represents from the standpoint of the business and of the commercial lawyer, 
and from the standpoint of the general community much of the better body of law on the subject 
matter involved than the existing law of any one of the states. It would be worth adopting without 
reference to uniformity.
226
 
 
Indeed, the success of the UCC as a commercial law was validated when it succeeded at unifying 
commercial law across all states, which was something the Uniform Sales Act (1906-1947) failed 
to achieve. The flexibility and open-ended nature of an agreement, however liberal it may sound, 
actually limits a party‟s potential for opportunistic behaviour because it gives them less freedom 
from to walk away from a contract they originally intended to be bound by. If a contract 
stipulates that the price is to be agreed later or to be set by a mutually agreed upon pricing 
mechanism, the failure of the price agreement or pricing mechanism does not automatically 
invalidate the contract.
227
 As shown above, the courts are able to take a principled approach to 
resolving post-formation disputes over open price clauses. 
 
The Uniform Sales Act would not have produced similar results; in the Louisville case, the 
contract was invalidated because the court assumed that the agreement required valuation under 
Section 10, when the parties intended for an existing market standard to determine the price 
under Section 9. Even if the court had correctly applied Section 9, the fact that there was no 
current price available in the Savannah market (due to the absence of a sale of rosin for two 
months) did not make any difference in the court‟s final judgment. Nevertheless, the court 
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insisted on the contract‟s failure because its price mechanism broke down, and the relying party 
did not receive any compensation for damages because the court concluded that the price was not 
determinable using another equally reasonable standard. Moreover, there was no effort by the 
court to construct a market price based on other available prices. Conversely, a UCC court would 
have determined whether the parties intended that the Savannah market should act as the sole 
factor for the contract‟s validity. Obviously, the parties never specified that only the Savannah 
market should govern the sale, and so the court could have filled the price gap by referring to the 
price of rosin sold in other locations. 
 
Extensive gap filling in open-price contracts is recommended by this thesis as a practice that 
should apply under the current SGA and CISG. By providing extensive flexibility in sales, many 
relational contracts, particularly long-term sales, would greatly benefit from this feature. 
Furthermore, the rights of a weaker party are protected from the opportunistic behaviour of a 
more dominant party. If the relevant provisions of the SGA and the CISG have negatively 
impacted contracting parties, as seen in Louisville, the parties‟ intent to be bound by the contract 
should be used as the test for liability instead. This thesis author believes that a breakdown in the 
price mechanism should not be an excuse for a party to refuse to perform, nor a hindrance to both 
parties in the completion of their contract.   
 
The price mechanism‟s failure is fixable if there is an alternative way of ascertaining objective 
price. For example, using the current market price and direct reference to trade usage could be 
ways of ascertaining an objective price.
228
 As in the Shell Oil case, if there is a price in relevant 
geographic markets, then it can be used as an objective alternative price. 
 
This thesis proposes that the SGA and the CISG should adopt the objective approach of 
Llewellyn. Prosser affirmed that open prices should be a more acceptable practice because of the 
presence of a current market price, which acts as an objective standard to which the contract may 
refer. In this manner, a price term can be determined objectively, unlike other terms of the 
contract such as quantity and time of delivery, where standard market quantity and standard time 
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of delivery do not exist. As long as parties intend to make a deal, the price term is a subsidiary 
matter, and the original purpose of the transaction should not be defeated.
229
  
 
The next chapter illustrates how English courts are currently experiencing weaknesses similar to 
the Uniform Sales Act, which was originally based on the SGA itself. Usually, courts would 
refuse to enforce deliberate open prices because „to do that would be to contradict the express 
terms of the document which they (ie the parties) have signed‟,230 and also because supplying a 
price term results amounts to making a contract for the parties.
231
 Conversely, in Autry Petroleum 
Company case, the UCC enforced an open price without rewriting or remaking the contract for 
the parties.
232
 The difference lies in the UCC‟s use of the parties‟ intention to enforce the 
contract, which is absent in Sections 8 and 9 of the SGA. As a result, current English decisions, 
such as Rafsanjan Pistachio Producers Cooperative v Kaufmanns Ltd,
233
 suffer from the 
„Louisville effect‟, which occurs when a court denies the existence of market price standards.234 
Therefore, the current form of the SGA not only contains completely similar wordings to the 
1906 Uniform Sales Act, but it also shares its negative impact. 
 
The situation is more perplexing for the CISG because there is an effort to strike a balance 
between formalism and flexibility under Articles 14 and 55. In Chapter Five the thesis will 
present the contrasting view seen in the Honnold-Farnsworth debate. In the debate, one opinion 
shows preference for formality and the plain meaning of contractual wordings,
235
 and the other 
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proposes a contextual view that claims that as long as a contract is validly agreed on, deliberate 
open prices should be allowed.
236
 
 
This thesis will continue to test Llewellyn‟s criticisms of the Uniform Sales Act against both the 
SGA and CISG. It will also claim that, while presentiation may be beneficial to straightforward, 
simple contracts, both legislations should learn to accommodate price flexibility. Therefore, both 
legislations should statutorily uphold the importance of enforcing open prices as long as the 
parties intend to be bound to the contract and the price is fairly set. 
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Chapter Four: Open Price in England under the English Sale of Goods Act 
1979 (SGA) 
 
 
4.0  Introduction 
This chapter elucidates the extent of an open price‟s flexibility when coping with relational 
sales under this thesis‟s second comparative legislation: the English Sale of Goods Act 1979 
(SGA). This chapter begins by recounting the history of the laws governing the sale of goods 
in England and the development of the SGA, thereby highlighting the relevant provisions 
regarding price. The later sections of the chapter elaborate on the current flexibility granted by 
the SGA to open prices under Sections 8 and 9 of the SGA from validating inadvertently 
incomplete contracts (using a reasonable price in order to determine the price) to approving 
parties‟ mutually agreed price determination mechanisms and overseeing their course of 
dealing between parties. This chapter will show that departing from presentiation and moving 
towards flexibility is a crucial step in adapting the SGA to relational contracts that involve 
potential changing circumstances. 
 
The SGA was the product of Chalmers‟ careful reading of nineteenth century cases regarding 
small-scale commodity sales. This chapter addresses the issue of whether the price term 
presentiation required by Chalmers is still relevant in modern business, which generally 
favours complex, long-term contracts. Both small and large-scale contracts equally require a 
high degree of certainty concerning a final price, and flexibility could certainly benefit trades 
that frequently use open prices under the SGA (such as the supply of seasonal goods or good 
with volatile prices). In specific trades, the parties‟ intention to be bound must prevail over 
any breakdown of price mechanism.  
 
The previous chapter revealed that modernisation was the force behind the shift from 
presentiation, or the straightforward, discrete rule of complete contracts, to a more flexible, 
relational practice for dealing with incomplete contracts. This shift was apparent in the US 
when the Uniform Sales Act (1906-1947) was replaced by the UCC. In the Louisville case, 
the court could have constructed a market price that gives more justice to the parties than 
what was actually achieved. This would have been possible under the UCC, but the Uniform 
Sales Act lacked the ability to construct a fair market price. Effectively, the Uniform Sales 
Act was criticised for limiting its application of a reasonable price. The court arrived at its 
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decision due to the influence of Willistonian formalism, which emphasised formality in 
determining the validity of a contract. Although contractual formalism may have suited a 
discrete, simple deal, it is not necessarily best suited to dealing with relational, long-term 
contracts, which are often highly complex in nature.   
 
The two main weaknesses of the Uniform Sales Act lay in the inefficiency of using a textual 
approach to interpret contracts, and the generalisation of sales, which failed to consider the 
specific nature of certain commercial transactions. In response to this, the UCC was drafted to 
significantly change the state of sales law by using objective criteria to derive the parties‟ 
intention. Rather than relying on the facts and circumstances of the contract, criteria such as 
trade usage or established practice are referred to when deriving the parties‟ intention to be 
bound in a contract. Beginning with Pennsylvania, the adoption of the UCC by other states 
eventually replaced the then Uniform Sales Act. At present, all US states except Louisiana, 
implement open prices under Section 2-305 of Article 2. 
 
This chapter also tests whether the two weaknesses of the Uniform Sales Act are present in 
Sections 8 and 9 of the English SGA. A more flexible interpretation of both provisions allows 
contractual freedom whilst minimising opportunistic behaviour from parties.  
 
The following section explains the history of the English legislation relating to the sale of 
goods and its development prior to 1893. After this, the next section proceeds to discuss 
relevant court decisions concerning missing and deliberately open prices. 
 
4.1  The historical background of the English Sale of Goods Act 1979 
For various reasons, some of them historical, English law is the governing law for 
international commodity sales.
1
 The major commodities traders were long ago absorbed by 
multinational traders, but judging by the parties‟ names in cases reported, it was rare that the 
parties were English.
2
 Historically, English law played a leading role in cotton sales and 
homogenous commodities, and foreign parties frequently made contracts that took place 
outside of the United Kingdom but were still governed by the English law.
3
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Prior to the English Sale of Goods Act 1979, the sales law in England was governed by the 
English Sale of Goods Act 1893. Other sources that contributed to regulating the sale of 
goods in England include the statutory provisions of the Factors Act 1889, the Unfair 
Contract Terms Act 1977 and the Unfair Contract Terms Regulations 1999. The case law of 
the 1979 Act, and those that pre-date the 1893 Act also form part of the sources.
4
 The case 
law which pre-dates the 1893 Act is specifically referred to in three different situations: where 
there is ambiguity in the SGA, where there is a technical meaning to a term that the old cases 
may assist to explain, and where a point is not covered by the Act which then defers to the old 
decisions.
5
 Nevertheless, reference to pre-1893 cases is not always necessary, although in 
reality it often provides the accepted meaning of sections in the 1893 Act.
6
 
 
The consolidation provided a simpler version of the law, as explained by Lord Herschell in 
Bank of England v Vagliano Brothers:
7
 
…the purpose of such a statute surely was that on any point specifically dealt with by it, the 
law should be ascertained by interpreting the language used instead of, as before, by roaming 
over a vast number of authorities in order to discover what the law was, extracting it by a 
minute critical examination of prior decisions. 
 
Chalmers‟ intention was for the SGA to encompass all special rules about the sale of goods, 
but not to codify the general principles of contract law.
8
 This is clear under Section 62(2): 
The rules of the common law, including the law merchant 
9
except in so far as they are 
inconsistent with the provisions of this Act, and in particular the rules relating to the law of 
principal and agent and the effect of fraud, misrepresentation, duress or coercion, mistake, or 
other invalidating course, apply to contracts for the sale of goods. 
 
The 1979 Act is a consolidation of amendments that took place between 1893 and 1979, but 
apart from a couple of sections, the section numbers of the 1893 and 1979 laws are identical.
10
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It is clear that the SGA includes the principles of the law merchant in addition to common law 
principles of the law merchant. The SGA often governs international sales either because it is 
closely connected with the transaction, or simply because its reputation leads most contracting 
parties to accept it as their governing law.
11
 It is common to find parties who want English 
law to govern their contracts or to resolve their disputes.
12
 Trade between parties can be 
subjected to the SGA, even if the seller, the buyer and the goods are not involved with 
England at all.
13
  
 
The next section explores decisions made on cases with deliberately incomplete contracts 
decided prior to 1893. This gives some background to the drafting of Sections 8 and 9, and 
helps to explain the evolution of open price under English courts, from the traditional 
approach of Sections 8 and 9 of SGA 1979 (with no amendment from the 1893 version) to its 
recent adaptability to relational flexibility when circumstances changed. 
 
4.1.1  Price terms in English contracts concluded prior to 1893 
Traditionally, English courts would not enforce a sale if the agreed price mechanism failed. In 
Darbey v Whitaker & Another,
14
 the court declared that it had no power to decree specific 
performance of a contract (sale or purchase) that required its price to be fixed by arbitration. 
The only exception to this rule was if the arbitrators had previously fixed the price.
15
 The 
ruling was subsequently followed by Sir William Grant in Milnes v Gery,
16
 who held that 
there could be no specific performance of an agreement for sale.
17
 Because the arbitrators 
failed to agree on the estimated price and no third person was appointed to make the final 
determination on the price of the estate, the court refused to enforce specific performance of 
the contract.
18
 Furthermore, the court did not award any damages to the plaintiff, because a 
valid contract must have existed in order to award damages for its breach.
19
 Considering that 
there was no previously fixed price for the contract, the court refused to create an alternative 
arrangement for the parties.
20
 However, a more liberal view was taken in Wilks v Davis:
21
 the 
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court was willing to intervene and ascertain the price in order to uphold the contract, but only 
on the condition that the parties agreed to a valuation and did not name which third party was 
able to make the valuation.
22
 Additionally, if one of the parties prevented a valuation to be 
made by the third party, then the contract would be invalidated.
23
 In Vickers v Vickers
24
 the 
plaintiff did not allow the valuer to proceed with the valuation of stock, and thus the contract 
was invalidated because of its lack of set price.  
 
Now that we have briefly covered the pre-1893 decisions, the following section explains and 
gives examples of the current sections of the SGA 1979 and the methods of fixing prices 
under the SGA. 
 
4.2  The SGA 1979  
As a body of commercial law, the SGA consists of seven parts and four schedules.
25
 Below 
are the relevant sections under the SGA relating to price: 
 
Section 2 
 (1) A contract by which the seller transfers or agrees to transfer the property in goods 
to the buyer for a money consideration, called the price. 
      
Price, either paid or promised, constitutes a promise for the transaction to take place.
26
 This is 
visible under Section 2(1), which implies that a transaction entails that one party promises to 
transfer the ownership of goods and the other pays its value in money. Therefore, contracts 
that have no monetary price, or where the object of sale is not goods but land or intangible 
property (ie interests which cannot be physically possessed such as shares, patents and 
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copyrights), are not governed by the SGA.
27
 Moreover, barter, or exchange and contract of 
service do not fall under the SGA either.
28
 
 
Sections 8 and 9 of the SGA are the more specific sections regarding methods of fixing (or 
non-fixing) prices: 
 
Section 8 
(1) The price in a contract of sale may be fixed by the contract, or may be left to be fixed 
in a manner agreed by the contract, or may be determined by the course of dealings 
between the parties. 
(2) Where the price is not determined as mentioned in sub-section (1) above, the buyer 
must pay a reasonable price. 
(3) What is a reasonable price is a question of fact dependent on the circumstances of each 
particular case. 
 
Section 9 
(1) Where there is an agreement to sell goods on the terms that the price is to be fixed by 
valuation of a third party, and he cannot or does not make the valuation, the agreement 
is avoided; but if the goods or any part of them have been delivered to and 
appropriated by the buyer, he must pay a reasonable price for them. 
(2) Where the third party is prevented from making the valuation by the fault of the seller 
or buyer, the party not at fault may maintain an action for damages against the party at 
fault. 
 
Based on the above provisions, there are several ways of determining the price of the goods 
other than the classic fixed price method that are allowed under the SGA: 
  
1) Silence 
 In Chapter Two, two types of open price were distinguished: „inadvertent‟ and 
deliberate.
29
 Choi defined inadvertent open prices as „missing‟ prices because of their 
unintentional omission of a contractual term. On the other hand, deliberate open prices 
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acknowledge the terms that still require negotiation (for example, rental prices) and 
intentionally leave them to be determined at a later time.
30
 An example of 
unintentional silence concerning a price term is as follows: a customer, who had no 
previous course of dealing with a supplier, telephones the supplier for the first time to 
order certain goods to be delivered. However, the customer fails to ask the supplier for 
the price of the goods.
31
 
 
 Having similarity with Section 2-305(1)(a) of the UCC, Section 8(2) applies a 
reasonable price to validate sales where parties are silent regarding the price. Based on 
Section 8(3), the reasonable price depends on the circumstances of each case. If the 
seller is in business, evidence of the seller‟s usual prices will be a good indicator as to 
what amounts to a reasonable price, and a court will take into account the size, 
location and expense of the seller‟s premises, reputation (for instance, Harrods Food 
Hall will be more reputable than ordinary supermarkets), and quality of service offered 
to determine a reasonable price.  
 
 In the absence of a standard price (for example, when the seller has ceased trading), 
the court needs to rely on other evidence to decide on a reasonable price. As long as 
there are clear indications of the going rate, and of acceptable policy within particular 
industries, both Section 8(2) and 8(3) validate contracts without a price term that 
would otherwise be perceived as „vague‟ or „incomplete‟.32  
 
2) Fixing the price in the manner agreed by the parties 
 When parties are not silent about the price but neither have fixed it in the clearest 
terms, they may deliberately choose a particular standard or mechanism in order to 
ascertain the price later in the contract.  The following clause, taken from the leading 
case of May and Butcher Limited v The King,
33
 is an example of this: „the price to be 
paid for …shall be the fair amount of the value thereof, such amount to be settled, in 
case the parties shall differ as to the same, by arbitration… ‟Alternatively, as in Re 
Brand Estates, Ltd.,
34
 the price may also be agreed to be fixed by at the discretion of 
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one of the parties. Their discretion is neither absolute nor arbitrary, and the price must 
be set in reasonable and honest opinion.
35
  
 
3) Fixing the price based on the course of dealing 
 Open prices work best in relational sales when parties have dealt with each other 
previously; when this is the case, the applicable price can be determined on their 
course of dealing. However, most relational sales involve pricing volatile goods that 
require constant updating, and due to this, old set prices often do not apply to repeated 
future transactions between parties. This is seen in Mamidoil,
36
 where the reasonable 
fee for handling crude oil changes from time to time over the course of a ten-year deal. 
In fact, even a short-term deal over a period of one year could require a renegotiation; 
the Quaker Mushroom case provides an example of this,
37
 and shows that a previous 
course of dealing is not always a reliable price determination mechanism in volatile 
price industries. The natural gas, coal, petroleum coke and uranium industries 
typically opt choose either, or a combination of both a price index and regular 
voluntary renegotiations to maintain their long-term cooperative relationship.  
 
4) Using a third party to fix the price 
 Another possible way to set the price term is by appointing a third party to evaluate 
the price. Section 9 validates a contract that requires its price to be fixed by a third 
party. However, the contract may be avoided if valuers fail to fix the price (or if a 
party disagrees with the valuer‟s conclusion).38 Unlike UCC courts,39 English courts 
refuse to act as valuers for a contract.
40
 Rather, if the goods or any part of them have 
been delivered to and appropriated by the buyer, the buyer must pay a reasonable 
price. If one party prevents the valuation, that party will be held liable and the other 
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party, who is not at fault, may maintain an action for damages against the party at 
fault.
41
 
 
4.2.1  The limited application of reasonable price under the SGA to deliberate open-
price contracts 
The SGA applies reasonable price only to contracts where the parties are silent regarding 
price. It does not apply when parties deliberately leave the price term open, even if there is a 
reasonable market price available that could be applied to the goods. Conversely, under the 
UCC a court applies a reasonable price to a contract in three different situations: when parties 
are silent about the price,
42
 if parties fail to agree on a price,
43
 and if a third party or an 
applicable standard fails to determine a price.
44
  
 
Instead of extending the application of reasonable price, the majority of judges prefer to rely 
on a traditional approach, which invalidates a deal when a price mechanism fails to set the 
price. English courts maintain the traditional approach based on the similarity between 
Sections 8 and 9:
45
 under Section 9, a contract is avoided if a third party fails to state the 
price, and similarly a contract is canceled, under Section8, if the parties to the contract fail to 
set the price.  
 
This similarity originates from the ruling of May & Butcher, and further detail of its textual 
approach is explained in the next section. 
 
4.3  Reinforcing the limits of reasonable price: application of a purely textual 
approach in relational sales 
A general presumption of English law is that parties are to provide every essential term of a 
deal,
46
 and if there are gaps in a contract, courts will fill the gaps in two possible ways. A 
court may use the incidences or particular circumstances to give efficacy to contract.
47
 
Alternatively, a court may imply a term based on the entirety of the document or its 
unexpressed terms.
48
 Nevertheless, case law proves that English courts tend to enforce terms 
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that fall into the „it goes without saying‟ category.49 On this point, Macaulay doubted whether 
courts should disregard the contextual meaning of a contract by focusing solely on the words 
of a document
50
 (the textual matter).
51
 Clearly, English judges prioritise the plain meaning of 
the contract‟s wording,52 but the paper document does not always reflect the implied deal or 
the parties‟ actual expectations.53  
 
The application of a reasonable price under Section 8(2) could have been extended to fill price 
terms deliberately left open by the parties, but it seems that current English courts prioritise 
the requirement of a fixed price over the overall aim, or business efficacy of a trade that 
requires an open price in order to allow a higher degree of flexibility. A certain degree of 
presentiation in a sale under the SGA may have worked well in the simple, discrete sales of 
the past, but it does not necessarily apply to contemporary relational sales. The analogy made 
by the House of Lords in May & Butcher, and applied by the current courts, is likely to 
invalidate deliberate open-price contracts in volatile trades. 
 
4.3.1  The May and Butcher case: where presentiation prevails over flexibility  
The May & Butcher deal involved the payment of a deposit, although parties had yet to agree 
on price, delivery date and the quantity of the old tentage. The deal stipulated that the 
suppliants had to purchase all of the tentage. The parties had two separate correspondences by 
post, which were dated June 29, 1921 and January 7, 1922 respectively. The first letter stated 
that the deposit of £1000 paid by the suppliants, secured the purchase of all old tentage, which 
would become by December 31, 1921. The parties also agreed that all disputes with reference 
to, or arising out of, the agreement would be referred to arbitration in accordance with the 
Arbitration Act 1889.  
 
The second letter retained similar terms, except that it included a variation stating that „the 
prices to be agreed upon between the Commission and the purchasers in accordance with the 
terms of clause 3 of the said earlier contract shall include delivery free on rail…nearest to the 
depots at which the said tentage may be lying…‟.54 In addition, the letter stated that the 
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Commission may also at any time in their uncontrolled discretion and before it has been 
dispatched to or collected by or resold by the purchasers, certify that any portion of the said 
tentage is required by the British Government and the Commission shall be at liberty to 
withhold delivery of such portion.
55
 
 
While the Commission claimed that there was no valid contract, the suppliants 
counterclaimed that the non-agreement of the tentage‟s price should be settled by a reasonable 
price under Section 8(2). The suppliants added that, even if the court rejected both the 
reasonable price and the validity of the arbitration process, the bargain ended in 1922 and was 
unfair, as they were entitled to the opportunity of entering further agreements for future 
goods, which was referred to in the contract‟s terms. 
  
4.3.2  The decision of the House of Lords 
Rejecting the suppliants‟ contention, the court insisted that the entire matter depended on the 
construction of the actual words of the contract.
56
 Additionally, Lord Buckmaster held that 
there was no valid contract because there was no textual agreement to the prices. An 
arbitration clause would only be effective if parties have a binding contract, which meant that 
contractual terms such as quantity, price and delivery date had to be agreed upon in the 
clearest manner.
57
  
 
According to Lord Buckmaster, failure to agree on price means that the contract should fail 
for indefiniteness. Lord Buckmaster made an analogy by extending the effect of Section 9 
upon Section 8: under Section 9, if a valuer fails to evaluate a price, the contract is avoided.
58
 
Based on the analogy, Lord Buckmaster held that a similar effect is apparent under Section 8 
when parties agree to set a price but eventually fail to do so.  
 
While fixing the price term may „enhance legitimacy and facilitate sense making‟,59 its 
application in May & Butcher does not always accommodate relational sales sufficiently.
60
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May & Butcher was not a case of impossibility of performance, and there was no reason for 
the Commission to withhold delivery of the tentage.
61
 Although the price was subject to an 
agreement to agree, tentage is a non-specialised commodity that has a referable market 
price,
62
 and arguably a reasonable price was determinable by the court.   
 
Had Section 8(2) been interpreted as flexibly as Section 2-305(1)(b)
63
 of the UCC, the 
contract in May & Butcher could have been enforceable. It was a case of both parties needing 
to find an agreement to agree, and a reasonable price might have filled the gap in the event of 
the parties‟ failure to agree on price.  
 
4.3.3  Flexibility: a useful extra-legal norm to substitute presentiation under the SGA 
In his 1974 article of „Restatement (Second) of Contracts and Presentiation,‟ Macneil argued 
that on the one hand, a sales law that based on presentiation may mold a relational sale into 
the presentiation character;
64
 on the other hand, a sales law may also be changed in its overall 
structure by merging both presentiation and relational elements, such as the manner in which 
Llewellyn drafted the UCC. Chapter Three observed that the UCC falls under the second 
category. The major shift brought by the UCC was introducing price flexibility in lieu of price 
rigidity caused by the Willistonian formalism since 1906. This change was precipitated by 
modernisation and the complexity of contemporary contracts that requires sales law to adapt 
to secure the validity of relational sales. 
 
English law could potentially adopt a similar approach to price flexibility to cater to the needs 
of commercial contracts. While the SGA maintains classic principles, English courts admit 
that, depending on the nature of a trade, departing from the rigidity of classic fixed prices is 
possible; as seen in the case of Scammell (G) & Nephew, Ltd v Ouston, 
65
 Viscount Maugham 
held that in certain types of contract, the court was willing to imply terms from commercial 
documents of dealings where the parties were familiar with each other and were under the 
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impression that they had made a binding contract.
66
 Laymen who are familiar with each other 
typically enter into a contract „unassisted by persons with a legal training…to use words or 
phrases with a precise or definite meaning‟.67 Indeed, not every trade demands a fixed price in 
order to validate a contract.
68
  
 
While Scammell (G) is an English decision that approves price flexibility based on the nature 
of a trade, relational contracts are often invalidated by May & Butcher, which is cited 
favourably by English courts, as the next section shows. Current decisions, particularly with 
regard to deliberate open prices illustrate the complex position of relational sales in England. 
 
4.4  Decisions under Sections 8 and 9 of the SGA 1979 
Research discloses that there are nineteen court decisions that relate to Section 8, and only 
one case that cites Section 9 as an exception, rather than an applicable rule.
69
 Four of these 
decisions are discussed in this thesis to test the practicality of open prices under each 
provision. Although Sections 8 and 9 do not specifically govern unintentional or intentional 
open prices,
70
 listed decisions prove that the provisions govern both situations of 
unintentional and intentional open price. To test how effectively Section 8 copes with 
relational sales, the discussion is separated into two categories; the „missing price‟ category 
(when parties unintentionally leave the price open) and the „open price‟ category (when 
parties leave the price open intentionally).  
 
Nevertheless, since the earlier decisions in the Hillas and Foley cases did not involve direct 
reference to Section 8, a summary of both cases is made before moving to the discussion of 
the more recent decisions in the next section of this chapter, which looks at deliberate open 
price. 
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4.4.1 Inadvertently open price: two examples from the English jurisdiction on 
‘missing price’ 
This section provides two recent decisions where the English courts applied „reasonable price‟ 
as gap filler when parties were silent on the price term.  
 
4.4.1.1 Traditional Structures Ltd v HW Construction Ltd
71
   
In this case, a claimant mistakenly omitted the price of cladding in a tender. The claimant 
quoted £42,000 for the steelwork and £38,000 for the cladding in the original document, but 
the quotation copy sent to the defendant omitted the pricing for the cladding situated on the 
last line of the document. The claimant then sent a revised copy but the defendant rejected the 
revision.  
 
As a result of the two versions of tender, the defendant alleged that the claimant had quoted 
£38,000 to cover both the steelwork and cladding. The claimant then sought a reasonable 
price for the cladding element of the works and/or rectification of the sub-contract on the 
grounds of unilateral mistake.
72
 Judge David Grant accepted the view that „even failure to 
agree the price is not necessarily fatal in such a case‟.73 Section 8(2) provides that if no price 
is determined by the contract, a reasonable price must be paid. This judgment was given to the 
claimant, and a reasonable price for the cladding work as completed was at £34, 754.17.
74
  
 
4.4.1.2 McCandless Aircraft LC v Andrew Mark Payne, Eminence Aviation Limited
75
 
The plaintiff had been an aircraft broker for 30 years in the state of Iowa, US, specialising in 
fixed wing aircraft and without experience dealing in helicopters. The sale involved a 
Robinson R44 Clipper helicopter, reached orally in 2006 in Iowa, USA for $265,000. The 
plaintiff claimed that the sale was conditional; the plaintiff was to retain title until the buyer 
resells it to a third party within six months of delivery, failing which the defendant was to pay 
$265,000 for the helicopter to the plaintiff. Later, there was confusion regarding whether this 
price was a wholesale or a retail price.
76
 The defendant suspected that the seller overcharged 
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on the price after being advised by the Robinson manufacturer that the market price of the 
Clipper model was $240,000. 
 
The helicopter arrived in England on 15 February 2007. The parties did not agree on the final 
price, but the defendant accepted the delivery and used the helicopter. There helicopter was 
not resold in the UK. Later the defendants delivered the helicopter to the plaintiff. The 
plaintiff had managed to sell the helicopter in the US on 10 May 2012 with the resale price of 
$180,000, yet had incurred substantial interest charges through the bank loan by which it 
funded the purchase of the helicopter. The courts held that a binding contract existed once the 
buyer accepted the delivery, which implies validation of the contract.
77
 Despite the absence of 
a market price in a second hand helicopter,
78
 the absence of agreement as to price after the 
delivery took place in England was resolved by Section 8(2) using expert advice and other 
contemporaneous evidence to evaluate a reasonable price for the helicopter. The price 
evaluation found that although the helicopter had been flown (for a relatively low number of 
hours), the evidence showed that the marketability nevertheless increased by an amount that 
depended on the current market conditions, and its value was certainly not diminished.
79
 
Therefore, since the parties had orally agreed $265,000 as the price in Iowa, the court held 
that the plaintiff was entitled to damages of $85,000, a result of the difference between the 
original sale price of $265,000 and the resale price of $180,000. 
 
Clearly acceptance of the delivery constitutes a sufficient proof that the contract exists. 
Indisputably, reasonable price applies in such „inadvertently missing price‟ contracts. 
 
4.4.2 Deliberate open price 
In the second category, the chapter tests whether open price under English law is enforceable 
in relational sales in a similar manner to the UCC. On the one hand, the UCC enforces a deal 
where the price is silent, where parties fail to agree on price, or where a third party or a 
standard agree fails to set the price. Yet on the other hand, the SGA requires presentiation the 
future price rather than price flexibility. As a result, the application of a reasonable price 
under Section 8(2) is limited only to cases of silence, rather than cases where parties 
intentionally omit the price.  
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The first two decisions in the Hillas v Arcos Ltd and Foley v Classique Coaches cases had no 
clear relation to Section 8, although both involved a determinable price term. Both courts 
referred to and distinguished the May & Butcher principle of „an agreement to agree is not a 
contract‟, from the circumstances found in Hillas and Foley. 
 
4.4.2.1 Hillas & Co v Arcos Ltd
80
 
The over-dependence on classic contract formalities was first criticised in the Hillas case.
81
 
Presentiating price was regarded unnecessary by the House of Lords, thus departing from the 
traditional fixed-price method. Based on the nature of the trade, the phrase of fair 
specification was sufficient to constitute an objective standard for assessing the quality and 
price of timber contracted, thereby approving flexibility without compromising certainty of 
price.  
 
Previously the seller, Arcos and the buyer, Hillas, had performed a contract for the supply of 
Russian timber for the year 1930. A year later, Hillas took up an option for Arcos to supply 
100,000 further timber „of fair specification‟ for delivery. There were no particulars as to the 
type of timber, the terms of shipment or any of the other matters stated in the contract. Since 
the seller had sold the timber to a third party, the seller argued that the option was avoided 
due to uncertainty. The buyer disagreed, arguing that the words ‘fair specification’ within the 
timber industry could be construed with sufficient precision to establish a binding agreement 
between the parties.  
 
The House of Lords accepted the argument of the buyer, holding that each case must be 
decided on the construction of the particular contract and on whether the parties believed that 
they had a contract. Enforcing the contract, the court prevented the seller from 
opportunistically selling the additional timber to a different buyer when in fact the seller had 
agreed to provide further timber of fair specification for the buyer. Based on the nature of the 
timber trade, „of fair specification‟ was sufficient to mean „goods distributed over kinds, 
qualities, and sizes in the fair proportions having regard to the output of the season…That is 
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something which if the parties fail to agree can be ascertained just as much as the fair value of 
a property.‟82 
 
Therefore, the 100,000 standards were to be of Russian softwood goods of fair specification. 
The parties needed to work out the necessary adjustments by a process of give-and-take in 
order to arrive at an equitable or reasonable apportionment on the basis of the capacity of the 
respondent to produce and deliver. If they failed to do so, the law could be invoked to 
determine what was reasonable in the way of specification.  
 
4.4.2.2 Foley v Classique Coaches
83
 – sale of petrol on a long-term basis  
Foley v Classique Coaches is a remarkable case where the English Court of Appeal 
successfully upheld the intentions of the parties. The price term was deliberately left open and 
subject to an „agreement to agree‟. The agreement stipulated that the respondent agreed to sell 
to the appellant a piece of land next to the former‟s land, but the sale of land was subject to a 
supplementary agreement. In the supplementary agreement, the appellant was to purchase 
from the respondent all the petrol required for the appellant‟s business as motor coach 
proprietors. The petrol was to be sold „at a price to be agreed by the parties in writing and 
from time to time‟.84 In addition, Clause 8 of the supplemental agreement provided that „any 
dispute or difference arising regarding the subject matter or construction of the agreement 
would be submitted to arbitration in the usual way, in accordance with provisions of the 
Arbitration Act, 1889‟. 
 
The land was duly conveyed to the appellants, and for three years the appellants had obtained 
their petrol from the respondent. However, a dispute occurred with regard to price (and 
quality) of the petrol, and the appellants attempted to repudiate the sale of petrol on the basis 
of „no agreement in writing as to price‟.85  
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Acknowledging the fact that the contract was meant to be a long-term deal,
86
 the Court of 
Appeal held that the agreement was terminable only in the event of winding-up of the 
appellants‟ company. Although the price was subject to agreement to agree „from time to 
time‟, the price was determinable in the three years prior to the dispute. Scrutton LJ pointed 
out that without intention to be bound, the transactions would not have taken place in the 
previous three years.
87
  
 
Moreover, Maugham LJ recognised that the agreement was binding, considering its form to 
be „duly stamped and bears the signs of a legal contract‟, as opposed to May & Butcher, 
whereby the terms of the contract were written in an informal letter.
88
 The highlight of the 
decision was that Maugham LJ distinguished Foley from May & Butcher in that the petrol 
could not be supplied by suppliers elsewhere,
89
 since it was the main factor that induced the 
respondent to sell part of his land. Based on the principle of The Moorcock,
90
 the law must 
promote „business efficacy…intended at all event by both parties who are business men‟.91 
Maugham LJ held that the deal was valid as long as the price was not set above the 
commercial price which the appellants could pay.
92
 In the event of failure to determine the 
price, the arbitration clause could be used to determine a reasonable price. The arbitration 
clause is useful to save the contract from becoming invalid, because verba intentioni, non e 
contra, debent inservire: „words ought to be made subservient to the intent, and not the other 
way about.‟93  
 
Taking advantage of the open price of the petrol by repudiating the contract was considered 
opportunistic because the appellant exploited the vulnerability of his contractual partner (the 
respondent).
94
 Chapter Two explained that such modification of the contract is considered 
opportunistic when the opportunist is able to capture a greater share of the returns of the 
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contract,
95
 potentially reducing the joint expected return on a contract.
96
 In this case, there was 
not any opportunistic behaviour on the part of the respondent, for example in the seen in the 
price of the petrol, as the price set by the respondent was reasonable and in fact lower than the 
price payable by the public.
97
 There was no overcharging that amounted to „bad faith‟ or that 
caused commercial injury to the appellants.  
 
Had the case been decided under the UCC, the contract would have been similarly valid, 
unless the appellants proved that the respondent did not meet the requirement of good faith 
under Section 2-305(2) in setting the petrol price. The difference lies in the reliance upon a 
clear provision that open price is valid, as opposed to Section 8 of the SGA that relies on the 
verba intentioni legal maxim and a principle of a non-sale decision as seen in The Moorcock 
to cater to be flexible with price setting in relational contracts. In other words, unlike the 
UCC, price flexibility under the SGA is not as readily available in the hands of the parties as 
the UCC. Under the UCC, parties could opt for price flexibility when concluding the contract; 
but under the SGA, the parties obtain the benefit of flexible pricing only by discretion of the 
English courts.  
 
4.4.2.3 Summary of the decisions in the Hillas and Foley cases 
Both Hillas and Foley proved that there can be exceptions to the general rule of presentiation. 
Indeed, the English courts acknowledged the relational nature of contracts in both cases. 
However, the SGA has not been granting flexible pricing as an alternative method when 
concluding the contract. Rather, the parties benefit from flexible pricing only through the 
discretion of the English courts. This means that it is upon the courts to decide whether to 
flexibly interpret Section 8 using external sources to validate the relational elements in a deal. 
To flexibly interpret Section 8, the courts considered two crucial factors, namely the nature of 
the trade itself and the state of mind of the parties in determining the validity of the sale. With 
regard to the nature of the trade, the court held in the Hillas case that the quality and price of 
the Russian timber were determinable even though the parties merely stated that the Russian 
timber was to be purchased based on „fair specification‟. In the Foley case, the agreement to 
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sell the land was subject to the sale of the petrol, and therefore there was no reason not to 
effectuate the business intended by parties.
98
 
 
The courts also evaluated the state of mind of the parties. The court inferred the intention of 
the parties based on the early years of the contract. In the Foley case, the court stated that as 
long as the prices were fair and reasonable, the appellants should continue to purchase petrol 
from the respondent.
99
 Clearly presentiation was not required in either case; instead open 
price proved workable, depending on the nature of the trade and the prevailing intent of both 
parties. 
 
The presentiation factor in May & Butcher was not followed by the courts in both cases. The 
analogy drawn by Lord Buckmaster in May & Butcher was between the workability of 
Section 8 and that of Section 9. The analogy is that if a contract is avoided based on failure of 
a third party to set the price as required under Section 9, then a contract is similarly avoided if 
the parties did not agree on a price term under Section 8. 
 
In Hillas, the court found that the seller was unable to supply the additional timbers as they 
had sold them to a third party. The court agreed with the buyer, stating that the words „of fair 
specification‟ were sufficient to constitute a contract. Clearly the court disapproved of the 
opportunistic act of the seller in selling the additional timber to a different buyer in full 
awareness of the option taken up by the buyer in the year 1931. Therefore, a reasonable price 
was applicable because the parties had not agreed on a specific price. Even with an agreement 
to agree on the petrol price, the price was determinable and therefore the contract remained 
valid.  
 
Although of contrasting decisions, Foley and May & Butcher were similar in that both cases 
involved agreements that contained an arbitration clause in case of a dispute between the 
parties. The writer of the thesis considers that the price of the tentage in May & Butcher was 
determinable from the market price, just as it was for the petrol price in Foley. The only 
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difference was that Foley involved a long-term deal and the court validated the contract even 
though the petrol price was to be renegotiated from time to time.  
 
While the English courts were able to distinguish straightforward cases such as Foley and 
Hillas from May & Butcher, recent cases showed that the courts struggle in distinguishing 
whether a case falls in the May & Butcher category, or whether a case involves a relational 
sale that brings it under the Foley and Hillas exception to the classic general rule of 
presentiation. As a result, a relational case is often confused with the application of May & 
Butcher, and there has not been any consistency with regard to flexible interpretation of 
Sections 8 and 9 of the SGA, even when parties proved to be bound by the contract. 
 
4.4.3  How the current English courts determine the validity of an open price in 
relational sales 
This subsection illustrates the rigid interpretation of Sections 8 and 9 in preserving the 
validity of open price in relational sales. In addition, it also covers the issue of whether the 
presentiation concept found in May & Butcher, influenced the perspective of the courts in 
validating an open price in long-term contracts. As opposed to the previous decisions that did 
not involve direct reference to Section 8, more recent current have resorted to Section 8. 
Similarly, the current English courts have had to resort to external authorities or principles in 
order to enforce an open price. Examples are discussed below. 
 
4.4.3.1 Mamidoil-Jetoil Greek Petroleum Co SA v Okta Crude Oil Refinery AD (No 1)
100
 – 
trade of crude oil 
 In 1993, the appellant, Mamidoil, entered into a contract with the respondent, Okta regarding 
the purchases of crude oil, with the handling fee for 500,000 tonnes of crude oil purchases per 
year. While the respondent claimed that the maximum period of the contract was ten years, 
the appellant appealed that the contract was to continue beyond ten years as the contract had 
never exactly specified a ten-year term as the maximum period of the contract.
101
  
 
Affirming the claim of the appellant, Rix LJ held that the case was not open-term based on an 
agreement to agree and that the handling fee could easily be determined by implication of a 
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reasonable fee „without a difficulty‟;102 although there was no available market or list price 
for the handling service, it was possible to derive the price based on price increases over the 
years that constituted the objective criteria for working out a reasonable fee.
103
 Hence the 
court decided that $4 per tonne was a reasonable price, for the 500,000 tonnes of crude oil 
purchased per year.
104
 As the trade of crude oil usually specified a minimum, rather than a 
maximum, term, it would be unreasonable for the court to limit the parties‟ commercial 
relationship to ten years.
105
 Given the commercial history of the parties,
106
 the presence of an 
arbitration clause and the fact that the contract had continued with successive agreements over 
a considerable period of time, it was appropriate to perceive the contract as extending longer 
than ten years. The court decided that if no agreement was reached as to reasonable fees, the 
fees should be determined from the specified dates.  
 
Rix LJ held the following:
107
  
…in a commercial contract that deals with the future and sometimes the long-term future of 
necessity leaves certain matters such a price to be worked over time, an arbitration clause 
assists the court to find sufficient certainty by means of the implication of what is reasonable. 
Which is not to say, that the court will not itself provide the dispute resolution machinery, even 
in the absence of an arbitration clause. 
 
The above paragraph indicates that, depending on the commercial nature of the contract, the 
English courts are prepared to flexibly interpret open price, even in the absence of an 
arbitration clause. This approach has resemblance with the open-ended feature of the UCC in 
preserving intended long-term contracts without depending on the presence of an arbitration 
clause. The UCC departed from the traditional approach of the contract rule that often 
depends „on the terms of the contract and circumstances of the case‟ or „on the contract, 
express or implied‟,108 rather than the relational nature of the trade.109 As a result, the priority 
of commercial rules that had often depended on the facts of the case shifts to the identity of 
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the parties.
110
 Thus parties‟ course of dealing, usage of trade, or the circumstances of their 
contract are several useful factors
111
 for the courts to consider when validating relational 
sales. 
 
Based on Mamidoil, there is a likelihood of validating open price in relational sale within the 
English jurisdiction, even when parties deliberately leave the term open, or fail to provide the 
exact duration of the continuity of the contract. Gradually, English sales law has recognised 
the relational characteristics of long-term sales, as opposed to the presentiation of every term 
of the contract propounded by classic theory. However, the courts may not be unanimous in 
allowing such flexibility. The subsequent case illustrates that the court followed May & 
Butcher, even if the open price term was used in long-term business relationship which was 
intended by the parties to be binding. 
  
4.4.3.2 Rafsanjan Pistachio Producers Cooperative v Kaufmanns Ltd
112
 – trade of seasonal 
goods 
In this case, the parties had a commercial relationship of eight years. The plaintiffs were an 
agricultural cooperative company formed in Iran and whose agent had been based in London 
since 1987. The company agreed to sell raw pistachio nuts to the defendants, who were 
manufacturers of dried fruit and nut products, including roasted pistachio nuts. The parties 
entered into the deal on 14 November 1996. Terms other than price, such as quantity (fixed as 
200 metric tonnes), type of pistachio nuts, time of delivery, payment method and date were 
fixed in the contract. The delivery of the pistachio nuts was to be made in instalments from 
„January to end June 1997‟.113 
 
A change in circumstance occurred on 12 April 1997, however, when a severe spring frost 
occurred in the growing area in Iran, causing difficulty in estimating a price for the 1997 
Iranian crop.
114
 While the defendants demanded a fixed price for the ordered pistachios, the 
plaintiffs were unable to do so. Therefore, the plaintiffs adopted the common practice of 
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agreeing forward contracts with their major customers, regarding new crop quantities and 
leaving the price open and to be agreed subsequently.  
 
The main issue was whether the 14 November 1996 agreement constituted a binding contract 
or an agreement to agree under the SGA. There were three evidences of a valid contract in 
this case. Firstly, the parties had a clear intention of entering into legal relations, as indicated 
by the fact that document of 14 November 1996 was labelled as a contract,  with a stated 
contract number of C-0999/96. The document required a counter-signature from the 
defendants, which was provided, and the plaintiffs immediately notified its head office, which 
is the usual way in which contracts between parties are carried out. Secondly, the plaintiffs 
knew that the defendants were manufacturers and not mere traders, and would therefore have 
appreciated the security of continued supply after having been doing business with one 
another for eight years.
115
 Thirdly, all terms other than price were determined by the 
agreement. Determining the price was unlikely to present any difficulty, as both sides agreed 
that the price would be the market price.   
 
Conversely, the plaintiffs claimed the agreement as non-binding. Relying on May & Butcher, 
they argued that an agreement to agree, particularly when wholly executory, is of no 
contractual force. According to the plaintiffs, there are three exceptions under English sales 
law where an agreement to agree is valid: firstly, if the contract has been wholly or partly 
performed; secondly, if the contract indicates that it is to be binding despite the absence of an 
agreement and provided machinery for the resolution of disputes, such as an arbitration 
clause; thirdly, if the matter left to be agreed is subsidiary to the main purpose of the contract 
and the criteria to be applied in reaching an agreement, or if the gaps are filled by reference to 
the course of dealing between the parties. The plaintiffs argued that none of these exceptions 
was applicable. As price is a crucial term in a contract of sale of goods, the plaintiffs claimed 
that the price should be fixed, as stipulated by Section 2(1) of the SGA. Without a price term, 
they stated that the agreement was indefinite on this basis. 
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4.4.3.2.1 Relational elements of the contract in Rafsanjan highlighted by the High 
Court of Justice, Queen’s Bench Division Commercial Court: 
determinable price, long-term cooperation and good business reputation 
between the parties  
Although the presentiation concept in May & Butcher was applied in the Rafsanjan case, Rix 
LJ admitted the presence of the relational nature of the contract in question. Firstly, the 
uncertain price of the pistachios was in fact determinable based on market price available 
from other sources of supply. Therefore, instead of ordering the defendants to purchase from 
other suppliers, the court could have recognised the validity of the deal.
116
 The court clearly 
had the opportunity to decide the price based on what the trade took the contract to mean.
117
 
 
Secondly, not only did the open price maintain good cooperative relations
118
 between both 
parties, but the plaintiffs also knew that, since the defendants were manufacturers and not 
mere traders, the deal was not entered into on a one-off basis. Rather, it was a long-term deal 
which ensured the continued security of supply after years of business with one another.
119
 To 
switch supplier meant that the defendants would have had to pay somewhat over the odds for 
supply. Applying Scott‟s self-enforcing contract theory, the repeated commercial transactions 
between the parties in the previous eight years
120
 proved that they did intend to be bound by 
the contract, even though they failed to fix the price. If the parties had set the price and the 
spring frost had greatly affected it to the detriment of either party, the court could certainly 
have ordered price renegotiation to ensure that the deal remained enforceable under the 
circumstances.
121
 
 
In this case, considering the relational nature of the trade that demands more flexibility and 
less presentiation in order to work, the court could have interpreted Section 8 in a more 
flexible manner. Indeed, Macneil stated that while presentiation may be integrated in a sales 
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law, the law may be interpreted to cater to the needs of the relational contract.
122
 Hence, the 
least that the court could do was to flexibly interpret the law in order to cater for the needs of 
relational sales so that total presentiation is not the ultimate goal, but only a theoretical 
goal.
123
 Flexible interpretation of „reasonable price‟ certainly reduces, although does not 
diminish the unnecessary abrasion between the classic SGA and the nature of relational 
sales.
124
  
 
4.5  Conclusion 
This chapter has discussed the scope of open price allowed under the current SGA and the 
shortcoming of the presentiation character in coping with relational sales. Clearly, the current 
SGA suffers from similar drawbacks experienced by the US Uniform Sales Act, a sales law 
preceding the UCC. Both of these laws made presentiation central to rules on the formation of 
contract, and failed to give due attention to the relational aspect of many agreements. In 
Chapter Three, a decision under the Uniform Sales Act, in the Louisville Soap Co. v Taylor 
case,
125
 showed that when the price mechanism broke down, Section 10 of the Uniform Sales 
Act did not permit the application of a market price even though the Savannah market price 
did exist. While Louisville did intend to be bound by the contract by appointing a board of 
trade which was to provide the posted price based on the Savannah market, the contract was 
held as unenforceable. Yet, a contrasting result would have occurred under the UCC, as 
Section 2-305(1)(c) applies reasonable price when a third party such as the board of trade, 
fails to set the price. However, the current SGA could not produce a similar result, since 
Section 9 states that the contract is avoided if a third party failed to set price. This was the 
analogy made by Lord Buckmaster in order to invalidate an agreement to agree in May & 
Butcher. In contrast, the UCC states that an „equally reasonable price‟126 and „uniform price 
among the suppliers within relevant geographic market‟ are reliable price indicators for the 
validation of an open price.
127
 
 
If parties do intend to have an open price, then clearly the sales law should validate the 
contract. Fortunately for the US, the UCC has been the governing commercial law in the last 
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sixty years, ensuring that relational contracts involving gasoline and other volatile goods are 
well-catered for by its open-ended character.  
 
This thesis considers that, to be as effective a commercial code as the UCC, the missing 
element of „intention to be bound‟ ought to be included in Sections 8 and 9, and indeed it 
ought to govern formation, so that a contract would be valid even if the price is intentionally 
left open by the parties. Alternatively, Sections 8 and 9 could be flexibly interpreted when 
preserving the validity of relational sales. 
 
There are two additional circumstances, absent under the SGA, in which the UCC validates an 
open price by applying a reasonable price. They are firstly where parties fail to agree on price 
and secondly where a third party or a particular price standard fails to set the price‟. To 
address these situations, the English courts have often had to apply the analogy drawn by 
Lord Buckmaster: under Section 9, a contract is avoided if the valuer fails to evaluate the 
price.
128
 A contract is regarded by Lord Buckmaster as invalid under Section 8 if parties agree 
to set the price or set a mere agreement to agree.  
 
The May & Butcher principle has been a useful defence for a party wishing to 
opportunistically step out of a contract. While the English courts departed from May & 
Butcher in Foley and Hillas, recent decisions demonstrate that presentiation may affect the 
validity of a relational sale. In Mamidoil the court was successful in distinguishing its 
situation from that of May & Butcher but, conversely, the court failed to maintain the 
enforceability of a long-term contract in Rafsanjan, even though a market price was available.  
 
In a nutshell, there is scope for flexibility as set out in Sections 8 and 9, but this could work 
better if the SGA were amended to counter the problem of breakdown of price mechanisms. A 
viable way of resolving this conflict is by adopting two valuable points derived from Section 
2-305 of the UCC. The first and primary factor of a valid contract is intention to be bound, 
and the second is the application of reasonable price in cases of failed price mechanism. 
These are the two valuable points of the UCC as a commercial code that the SGA could learn 
from and adopt in the English legal system, in order to improve the workability of open price 
in modern contracts.  
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In the next chapter, we will see that, unlike the decisions in Rafsanjan, the CISG has been 
successful in dealing with relational sale on seasonal goods when dealing with open price. We 
will discuss one problem with the application of Article 55, caused by the limiting and 
conflicting approach of Article 14(1), which requires express or implicit provision on price. 
Although contracting states of the CISG may choose to ratify either one or both of the 
article(s), the conflicting approach between the two provisions were well debated in the 
Honnold-Farnsworth debate and applied by the courts in the relevant decisions. Chapter Five 
explains the conflicting provisions and discusses whether Article 55 could be flexibly 
interpreted as with Section 2-305(1) of the UCC. 
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Chapter Five: Open Price in the United Nations Convention on Contracts 
for the International Sale of Goods 1980 (CISG) 
 
5.0  Introduction: the idea of uniformity and harmonisation of the law 
Chapter Three showed that the UCC shifted from formalism to flexibility by validating 
relational sales based on the intention of parties to be bound rather than on a fixed-price term. 
Since Section 2-305(1) validates intentional open price, presentiation is minimised, and 
consequently, relational contracts that apply open price are more secure in their validity. 
While presentiation element exists under Section 2-305(4) that validates fixed-price contracts, 
Section 2-305(1) minimises presentiation by empowering the court to apply a reasonable price 
based on the ‘market price at the time of delivery’.1 Thus, a contract of sale of goods is 
effectively capable of fair performance without being restricted by a fixed-price term.
2
  
 
Conversely, the SGA in England maintains the formalistic approach of 1893, leading the 
courts to look at the other surrounding circumstances of the case in order to validate a sale. 
Section 4.4.1 of Chapter Four showed that despite the seasonal nature of the pistachio nut 
trade, which requires flexible pricing at a later stage of the contract, the decision in Rafsanjan 
demonstrated the tendency of the English court to invalidate relational sales on the basis of 
absence of a determinable price, leaving the buyer uncompensated. Presentiation was 
demanded despite the seasonal nature of the business of pistachio nuts that required flexible 
pricing at a later stage of the contract. This was evident when the court refused to apply 
reasonable price, even though there was an availability of market price for the pistachios. 
Instead, the court concurred with the limited scope of reasonable price under Section 8(2) of 
the SGA to cover only the situation of silence as to price, and not in a situation of relational 
sale such as in the case of Rafsanjan, even if the parties were proven to have intended to be 
bound by their contract.  
 
This chapter continues the comparative analysis between open price under the CISG 1980, 
and that of the UCC in the US. While open price is expressly legalised by the UCC, and has 
gradually become acceptable (although less favoured by English judges) under the SGA, the 
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CISG has a compromising feature between the two spectrums; it allows its contracting parties 
to choose to fix the price, or to leave the price open under two distinguished provisions. The 
CISG provides both presentiation and relational approaches as options under Articles 14(1) 
and 55. Under the CISG, contracting parties may choose to be bound either by a fixed 
(express or implicit) price term or by an open-price term under Articles 14(1) and 55 
respectively. This chapter proposes for a flexible approach to price terms, and Section 5.2 will 
further elaborate on open price under the CISG. The main argument in this chapter lies in the 
fact that open price under Article 55 of the CISG suffers from the effect of presentiation 
through the requirement of at least an implicitly fixed price, under Article 14(1). 
 
Many years before the advent of the CISG, efforts to harmonise and unify commercial law 
began in the US, Scandinavia and Europe, which then called for a more global and 
comprehensive response.
3
 Unifying international sales law, however, was not a simple task, 
due to the perceived risk of incompatibility with national laws, which are naturally territorial.
4
 
Despite the difficulty, the inter-reliant structure of the world economy led to the idea that a 
harmonious, if not unified, set of legal rules should govern transactions all over the world
5
 in 
order to reduce barriers to international trade.
6
 Initial efforts were made by the United Nations 
Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL), with the mission statement ‘the 
development on international trade on the basis of equality and mutual benefit is important in 
promoting friendly relations among States’.7 Consequently, the CISG was established, setting 
out rules to govern certain aspects of the formation and performance of everyday commercial 
contracts between sellers and buyers whose places of business are in different countries.
8
  
 
Before discussing in greater depth on open price practice under Section 5.2, the Section below 
elucidates the history and some of the key features of the CISG as an international sales law 
that successfully unifies the national laws of various countries.  
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5.1  The birth of the CISG 1980 
The distinction between both Articles 14 and 55 could be traced back to the compromise 
nature of the CISG that resulted from the participation of various member states. Hence, 
understanding the history of the drafting of the CISG is crucial when tracing the origin of the 
compromise nature of the CISG.  The CISG is a product of compromise, and that the 
provisions on certainty of price are themselves a product of compromise. Interpreting 
provisions of open price is not a simple task considering that some contracting states have and 
prefer fixed-price policies, as opposed to others that prefer open price. The CISG harmonises 
the national laws of the contracting states by providing both fixed and open prices provisions 
to meet both preferences. 
 
The unification of the national laws of the contracting states by the CISG was precipitated by 
the demands of economic and political realities.
9
 In the earlier continental European tradition, 
legal unification was perceived as beneficial and desirable that it should be actively 
promoted.
10
 Modernisation in transportation, communications, and technology are 
contributory factors to the increase in the legal order supporting worldwide commerce.
11
  
 
Prior to the Second World War, the International Institute for the Unification of Private Law 
(UNIDROIT) under the auspices of the League of Nations attempted to prepare a uniform law 
on the international sale of goods.
12
 Subsequently, the considerable effort of unifying 
international sales law came under the 1964 Hague Conventions, where two uniform laws 
were adopted.
13
 They were the Uniform Law of International Sale of Goods (ULIS) and the 
Uniform Law on the Formation of Contract for the International Sale of Goods (ULF).
14
  
 
Nevertheless, the lack of worldwide participation in the drafting of the Hague Conventions 
made most of the concepts embodied in these drafts ‘could not be translated into words and 
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ideas that were intelligible in other parts of the world.’15 The root of the problem was that 
most of the world was not ‘present at the creation’.16 Many countries in Africa and Asia did 
not exist as independent states when the uniform laws were made.
17
 Indeed there was a 
psychological barrier to world-wide adoption in Africa and Asia while the draft was made.
18
 
For other parts of the world-nearly all of the common law world, Eastern Europe and Latin 
America-for a ‘variety of reasons’, also did not participate.19   
 
Despite the failure of wholesale acceptance of the 1962 Hague Conventions, there was a rapid 
growth in international trade in the years. This led to the adoption of ULIS and ULF, and the 
United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) proceeded with an 
effort to promote adoption of uniform international rules in various areas such as sales, 
arbitration, negotiable instruments and transport.
20
 By 1968, the UNICTRAL took over the 
task of unifying the law of international sales consisting of different legal traditions and socio-
economic conditions.
21
 After ten years of work by UNCITRAL, there was a unanimous 
agreement by participating states on a convention, which was submitted for signature in 
Vienna.
22
 Effectively, the CISG was created to facilitate the world trade and to remove 
uncertainty created by conflicting states’ national laws.23  
 
The CISG is a product of more than two generations of international negotiation, and was 
unanimously approved by delegations representing 62 national legal systems at a diplomatic 
conference convened by the United Nations General Assembly in Vienna in 1980.
24
 Its final 
text was approved at a diplomatic conference convened by the United Nations General 
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Assembly in Vienna in 1980.
25
 The 62 nations comprised of 22 from the ‘Western developed’ 
countries, 11 ‘socialist regimes’ and 29 third world countries.26 The US delegates participated 
actively in the discussions of the CISG, voting in favour of the final text of the CISG.
27
 The 
US signed the CISG on August 31, 1981, and subsequently on September 21, 1983, the US 
President requested for the advice and consent of the Senate to the ratification of the CISG.
28
 
Consequently, the unanimous ratification of the Senate took place in October 1986.
29
 By 
December 11, 1986, officials from the mission to the United Nations of the United States 
deposited the instrument of ratification at United Nations Headquarters in New York.
30
 
 
There was never a consensus reached among the 62 participating nations on the CISG final 
text, considering their huge differences of views.
31
 After thirty years of hard technical 
negotiations, the fact that the delegates were able to agree on a uniform law that displaced 
familiar national concepts and policies could only be explained as a compromise.
32
 The 
completion of the text and its opening for signature were the primary steps, followed by the 
stage of integrating the CISG as part of international trade practice.
33
 Consequently, many 
CISG articles are compromise in nature that they do not represent the individual preferences 
of the delegates; rather they were drafted to live up to the expectations of all participating 
countries.
34
 In a particular example of open price provisions, the need to reach a consensus 
has created difficult questions of interpretations. 
 
5.1.1  The sphere of application of the CISG  
The CISG was not meant to be an all-encompassing law of sales, but was designed to promote 
simplicity, practicality and clarity and to be ‘free from the legal ‘short-hand’ and complicated 
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legal theory familiar to many legal practitioners’.35 It was drafted in businessmen’s language, 
with practical details.
36
 Unlike the ULIS and the ULF, which were drafted in an abstract way 
so as to cover all possible situations, the CISG is modest in its approach. It admits those 
matters that are not covered and are left to be resolved by the applicable law, under the 
traditional rules of private international law.
37
  
 
The CISG applies to contracts of sales of goods between parties whose places of business are 
in different states.
38
 Either both states are parties to the CISG, or the rules of private 
international law of one contracting state lead to the application of the law of another 
contracting state.
39
 Each contracting state has two sets of rules for sales: a domestic law of 
sales for general application, and a set of rules applicable to a particular subgroup of sales, 
namely the international sales law.
40
 
 
If parties have no choice-of-law provision in an international sales contract, they cannot be 
certain which law a national tribunal will apply to resolve any dispute arising from the 
contract.
41
 Under the CISG, a contracting state's court need not apply foreign sales law 
indicated by choice-of-law rules. Instead, a court in a contracting state will apply the CISG by 
virtue of Article 1,
42
 unless the parties to the contract have agreed to exclude some or all of 
the rules in the CISG.
43
 
 
The provisions of the CISG govern the formation of international sales contracts, and the 
rights and obligations of the buyers and sellers arising from such contracts.
44
 At the time of 
ratification, a state may declare that it will join the CISG only in part: Article 92(1) of the 
CISG provides an option for a state to refuse to be bound either by Part II, on the formation of 
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contracts, or by Part III, on the rights and obligations of the parties of the CISG. The only 
mandatory parts are Part I on the sphere of application and other general provisions, and Part 
IV on the final provisions on ratification and related matters.
45
 
 
To apply the CISG, there are three distinct criteria to be satisfied:
46
 firstly, the contract must 
be a contract for the sale of goods;
47
 secondly, the parties to the contract must have their 
places of business in different states; and finally, the CISG applies only when (a) both parties 
are contracting states, or (b) the rules of private international law lead to the application of the 
law of one of the contracting states.
48
 Hence, if a seller whose place of business in England, 
contracts to sell goods to the buyer B, whose place of business is in Ruritania, CISG will 
apply if both England and Ruritania are contracting states, or if the law applicable to the 
contract is that of one of the contracting states.
49
 
 
5.1.2  Transactions excluded by the CISG 
The CISG does not apply to consumer sales,
50
 to sales by auction or under execution, or sales 
of securities, negotiable instruments, money, ships, vessels, hovercraft, aircraft
51
 or 
electricity.
52
 It also does not apply to the liability of the seller for death or personal injury 
caused by the goods to any person.
53
 There is a comprehensive set of rules governing the 
formation, performance, remedies for failure of contracts for the sale of goods within its 
jurisdictional scope.
54
 When CISG applies, it displaces national and local rules.
55
 These 
exclusions however, do not apply to cases of relational sales discussed under Section 5.4 of 
the current thesis. 
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In addition to the abovementioned exclusions, the CISG maintains a simple character by 
reserving an uncertain number of issues for national law, which preserves the private 
autonomy of contracting parties and permits them to exclude by agreement the application of 
the CISG or any of its provisions. The derogation is by Article 6, whereby ‘the parties may 
exclude the application of this Convention or, subject to Article 12, derogate from or vary the 
effect of any of its provisions.’ 
 
5.1.3  Interpreting the CISG as a uniform law 
To maintain its uniform characteristics, there are several interpretive approaches that could be 
used to avoid the tendency to construe the CISG under the light of a national law. Honnold 
prescribed four ways of interpretive approaches: the first is to see how other legal systems 
have read and characterised the text through scholarly writings of these systems;
56
 the second 
is to rely on the legislative history of the CISG, which may reveal the specific provision’s 
objective;
57
 the third is to rely on the general principles of the CISG as a form of gap filling 
by analogical application of the statute to effectuate its purpose;
58
 and the fourth is to seek 
recourse to either domestic or foreign case law to aid the interpretation of the CISG.
59
 
 
Open price is one of the relevant issues within the CISG that requires an interpretive 
approach.
60
 This is particularly due to the two existing ways in which a price term may be 
dealt with under the CISG. The first of these is Article 14(1), which requires at least an 
implicit method to fix the price of the goods, and the second is Article 55, which does not 
require a price term at all in a contract, so long as the price is determinable using ‘the price 
generally charged at the time of the conclusion of the contract, under the general comparable 
circumstances’.61  
 
The next section gives further explanation of both provisions, before comparing the legal 
stance of the CISG on open price with that of the UCC in the US, and the SGA in England. 
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5.2  Open price practice 
We have seen the workability of open price in the decisions of the UCC and the SGA. The 
CISG jurisdiction is of no exception, but its compromising nature means its rules have more 
potential for diversity in order to suit the needs of various states.  
 
The states that approved the CISG hold varying views on the definiteness of a price term. 
Rosett, for example, explained that socialist countries object to the idea of an open price 
because they need to ensure that their contracts adhere to the predetermined macroeconomic 
governmental plan.
62
 In such a planned economy, open-price contracts are invalid.
63
 Other 
states also perceive open-price contracts with hostility, particularly when the unilateral fixing 
of the price causes disadvantage to the weaker party.
64
 Within developing countries, the 
argument has been that an open price does not serve their interests due to the unfavourable 
terms of trade for raw materials, in contrast with the ever increasing price of manufactured 
goods.
65
 Conversely, the US takes a far more liberal approach; it validates open price and 
quantity under Sections 2-305 and 2-306 respectively, to allow price and quantity to be 
adjusted in the light of sellers’ output and buyers’ requirements.  
 
As a result of the diverging view of the member states, the CISG has a two-part rule on open 
price for them to choose from, as explained in the following section. 
 
5.2.1  Article 14(1) of Part II versus Article 55 of Part III of the CISG 
 The contracting states may opt for the traditional fixed-price method under Article 14(1), or 
for an open price under Article 55. Article 14 serves well for the policy of member states that 
do not favour open price, while Article 55 is purposeful for parties that are receptive to open 
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price. These two articles fall into two different parts of the CISG: Article 14(1) is under Part 
II, on the formation of contracts, while Article 55 falls under Part III, on the sale of goods.  
 
Both of these parts have their own, particular history. The work on the formation of contracts 
for the international sale of goods began in 1934 when the International Institute for the 
Unification of Private Law in Rome (UNIDROIT) separated out formation of contracts,
66
 
from the Institute’s general work on the international sale of goods.67 By year 1936, a draft 
Uniform Law on International Contracts by Correspondence was prepared;
68
 although 
progress on international sales was affected by World War II, and the work was not resumed 
until 1956,
69
 at which point the Governing Council of UNIDROIT completed a new draft for 
the formation section, and the general work on sales was completed in a Draft Uniform Law 
on the International Sale of Goods, revised by a special committee named at a conference at 
The Hague.
70
  
 
When UNIDROIT transmitted its draft on the formation of contracts to the Dutch 
government, it was submitted to the diplomatic conference at The Hague, where the 
international sales draft was also submitted.
71
 Hence there were two separate conventions, one 
dealing with the formation of sales contracts and the other on the substantive law of sales.
72
 
Before both sections became effective, the UNCITRAL was also revising the law of 
international sales and had considered incorporating the provisions on formation in a ‘Part II’ 
of the CISG, similarly to the way in which provisions on formation form part of Article 2 of 
the UCC.
73
  
 
As some of the provisions of Part II were controversial, it was decided that a contracting state 
would be granted the option to ratify the entire CISG but leave out Part II.
74
 Having 
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undergone minor changes at the Diplomatic Conference in Vienna in 1980,
75
 Part II of the 
CISG on the formation of contracts contains 11 articles based on the traditional premise that a 
contract is formed by means of an offer and an acceptance.
76
 The first four articles (Articles 
14-17) deal with offer, the following five (Articles 18-22) deal with acceptance and the last 
two (Articles 23-24) deal with the time at which a contract is concluded.   
 
Part III of the CISG on the sale of goods, contains 64 articles across five separate chapters 
(Articles 25-88).  
 
5.2.2  Article 14(1): meaning and purpose 
Article 14(1) of Part II of the CISG requires a valid contract to have a fixed price, or at least 
an implicit provision that fixes the price. Subsection (1) is outlined below: 
 
Article 14(1) 
A proposal for concluding a contract addressed to one or more specific persons 
constitutes an offer if it is sufficiently definite and indicates the intention of the offeror 
to be bound 
77
in case of acceptance. A proposal is sufficiently definite if it indicates 
the goods and expressly or implicitly fixes or makes provision for determining the 
quantity and the price.  
 
In the above provision, the three criteria of a valid offer are: a) that the offer is addressed to a 
specific person, b) that the offer is sufficiently definite, and c) that it indicates the offeror’s 
intention to be bound. Two crucial points for the purpose of the thesis discussion in this thesis 
are the requirement of a sufficiently definite price and the phrase intention of the offeror to be 
bound.  
 
The unfortunate implication of Article 14(1) is that not only must the goods be indicated, but 
there should also be an express or at least implicit provision to determine the quantity and 
price of the goods. In other words, a proposal is not sufficiently definite unless it does this.
78
 
The US consistently opposed this language during the drafting process, but was unsuccessful 
                                                 
75
 Farnsworth (n 67) [3-4]. 
76
 ibid [3-5]. 
77
 Emphasis added. 
78
 Farnsworth (n 67). 
147 
 
in its attempt to have it deleted in Vienna.
79
 Recalling the points from Chapter Three, the 
UCC in the US relies on flexibility as an extra-legal norm of a relational contract that 
originates from the practice of the merchants that has relevance in today’s relational sales. 
The ‘working rules’ of the merchants neither depends on express nor implicit price provisions 
in order to have a valid contract. This minimises the presentiation element that easily 
invalidates a sale on the basis of absence of a determinable price, a clear opposite from what 
propagated from Article 14(1). 
 
While Article 14(1) may not be able to cope with relational sales, it works efficiently for less 
relational transactions. For example, parties may expressly agree on a price of video recorders 
through an exchange of calculation charts, and the buyer may agree to the invoicing of the 
seller.
80
 In an implicit price
81
 situation, a buyer sends an order for goods listed in the seller’s 
catalogue or where he orders spare parts, he may decide to make no specification regarding 
price at the time of placing the order. He may not have the seller’s price list, or he may not 
know whether the price list he has is current. Nevertheless, the buyer is implicitly offering to 
pay the price currently being charged by the seller for such goods. Article 14(1) provides that 
if this is the case, the buyer has implicitly made provision for the determination of price and 
his order for the goods would constitute an offer.
82
  
 
Despite allowing an implicit price, it appears that Article 14 renders unenforceable those 
contracts that deliberately leave price and quantity open, 
83
although it does include intention 
to be bound as a prerequisite of a valid offer. This resembles Section 2-305(1) of the UCC, 
although the latter extends the intention to be bound to cover cases of absence of a price term 
due to silence, agreement to agree and failure of a third party or an agreed standard to fix the 
price. An American attorney would therefore be familiar with the phrase intention of the 
offeror to be bound in the case of acceptance under Article 14(1).
84
 The only, but crucial, 
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difference from the CISG is that Article 14(1) still requires the price to be determinable, at 
least implicitly, regardless of whether the contract is discrete or relational.  
 
The implicit price requirement is favoured by countries that hold a more restrictive view of 
contracting, such as the former USSR and France.
85
 Conversely, it is less appealing to the 
sales practice of states with a more flexible view of formation, such as the United States and 
Scandinavian states such as Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden, and therefore these 
states have opted for reservation from the rules of Part II on contract formation,
86
 as permitted 
by Article 92 of the CISG.
87
 Effectively, the Scandinavian states are in favour of open price, 
leading to the adoption of Article 55 in Part III of the CISG. This provision is explained in the 
following section: 
 
5.2.3  Article 55: meaning and purpose 
Article 55 
Where a contract has been validly concluded but does not expressly or implicitly fix or 
make provision for determining the price, the parties are considered, in the absence of 
any indication to the contrary, to have impliedly made reference to the price generally 
charged at the time of the conclusion of the contract for such goods sold under 
comparable circumstances in the trade concerned. 
 
Article 55 is drafted in contrast with Article 14(1), whereby a contract may be valid even 
without an implicit price. At first glance, it seems that Article 55 approves the realities of 
relational contracts that demand flexibility in the price term. The history of Article 55 dates 
back to Article 67 of the 1956 Draft of the ULIS wherein the buyer is required to pay the 
usual price charged by the seller at the time that the contract is concluded, or instead a 
reasonable price based on the current market price.
88
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In the absence of an express or implicit price, the effective price will be the price generally 
charged at the time of the conclusion of the contract for such goods, sold under comparable 
circumstances in the trade concerned. This is the price which would presumably have been 
agreed upon by the parties at the time of contracting had they agreed upon one at that time. 
The Commentary states that the seller should not later be able to claim for the price that 
prevailed at the time of the delivery of the goods, if that price was higher than the one the 
seller was charging at the time of the conclusion of the contract.
89
   
 
5.3  The Honnold-Farnsworth debate on Article 14 and Article 55 
Generally, both articles deal with two different matters, yet the interpretation of the two is 
inter-related. Article 14 is concerned with offers and the formation of a contract, and Article 
55 with the obligations and performance of the contract. The debate is explained in the two 
sections that follow: 
 
5.3.1  The view of Farnsworth 
The American legal scholars who participated in the diplomatic negotiations disagree about 
the interpretation of Article 55.
90
 According to Farnsworth, Article 55 only operates if a 
contract has been validly concluded under Article 14(1).
91
 Thus if the US were to ratify the 
CISG but not take Part II,
92
 a contract with an unstated price would be able to be validly 
concluded because UCC 2-305 would then apply.  The problem arises if a state is to ratify the 
entire CISG, including Part II, making it arguable that Article 14 prevents a contract with an 
unstated price from being validly concluded.
93
 This suggests the impossibility of Article 55 to 
take effect.
94
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In addition, Farnsworth pointed out that if a contract with an unstated price is validly 
concluded, the CISG differs from the UCC as to how that price is to be determined. Clearly, 
Article 55 refers to ‘the price generally charged in the trade at the time of the conclusion of the 
contract’, while Section 2-305 refers to a reasonable price at the time for delivery.95 Before 
concluding the current chapter, the writer will discuss whether or not the UCC’s approach of 
applying the price at the time of delivery is a more workable alternative in open-price contract 
than the price generally charged at the time of the conclusion of the contract under the present 
Article 55.    
 
5.3.2  The view of Honnold 
In contrast with the view of Farnsworth, Honnold viewed both elements of Article 14(1), 
namely ‘definiteness’ and the ‘offeror’s intention to be bound’, as key elements, but the latter 
as the chief element of a valid contract. Honnold nonetheless admitted that as a price term 
was crucial to economic success, parties would rarely enter into a binding contract without at 
least an implicit understanding of the price, or a means of determining the price.
96
 A lack of 
clarity regarding price may occur in emergency situations, such as urgent orders for the 
manufacture of minor replacement parts, or requests to rush a shipment of goods where the 
buyer may not have access to the seller’s price list. Such situations may be common also due 
to the ever-increasing spread of standardised goods that have standardised prices, along with 
modern means of communication that facilitates ordering without bargaining.
97
 
 
In 1977, a review on the element of validity in the opening phrase of Article 55 was made to 
restrict the scope of the article ‘to agreements that were valid by the applicable law’, namely 
the domestic law applicable under rules of private international law.
98
 If the law of the state 
provides that open price agreements are not binding contracts, Article 55 is inapplicable. If, 
however, the law of the state recognises open price contracts, then it must be ascertained that 
no other grounds for invalidity exists under the applicable law. From this fact, it is deducible 
that there is no reason for a deal to be invalidated under Article 55 merely because it does not 
comply with the implicit requirement of Article 14(1). 
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To strengthen his proposition, Honnold provided an example in which open price under 
Article 55 should be independent from Article 14(1). In this case, following negotiations, the 
seller and the buyer signed a contract of sale that called for the seller to manufacture and ship 
goods according to the specifications and quantity stated in the agreement. The agreement did 
not fix a price, and instead stated that it derogates from any implication of Article 14(1). The 
seller manufactured and delivered the goods, which the buyer accepted and used, but no price 
could be agreed between the parties.  
 
In the above situation, there was not an exchange of offer and acceptance. However, the 
parties intended to be bound by the contract even though the price had not been fixed.
99
 
Potentially, an opportunistic buyer could defend himself using Article 14(1) as an excuse to 
have a non-binding agreement, as there was not express or implicit way to fix the contract. 
 
Honnold concluded that it was unreasonable for Article 14 to be a prerequisite of Article 55. 
Article 14(1) clarifies that a communication that does not state or make provision for the price 
is not an offer, that a reply stating ‘I accept’ does not necessarily create a valid contract. 
However, if there is no clear offer and acceptance, Article 55 resolves the issue, stating that a 
contract may be validly concluded even if it does not expressly or implicitly fix or make 
provision for determining the price. Honnold thinks that the phrase ‘where a contract has been 
validly concluded’ is indicative of a valid contract to be independent from the need for 
express or implied provision for determining the price, yet enforceable under the CISG.
100
 
 
The trend of the CISG courts, however, is to automatically categorise a case under Article 
14(1) when a contract includes an ‘implicit’ method of determining the price. Yet there is no 
resolution for the conflict between Articles 14(1) and 55. Whether open price under Article 55 
is subject to implicit requirement or is independent from Article 14(1) as intended by parties 
is an issue rarely discussed in most court decisions.
101
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 5.3.3  Honnold’s opinion as the prevailing view 
In resolving the tension between Articles 14 and 55, the writer of the current thesis believes 
that the reasoning given by Honnold in the debate is the more cogent opinion, forming a 
sensible interpretation of the seemingly incompatible provisions of the CISG in order to 
maintain their sensibility.
102
  
 
Garro likewise supported the reconcilability of both provisions, since Article 14(1) requires 
that the price be at least implicitly fixed, while Article 55 validates open price using an 
implicit price fixed by operation of law, namely, the price generally charged at the time of 
conclusion of the contract.
103
 Both provisions require an objective standard to determine 
price, and hence should not conflict with each other when dealing with certainty of price. 
Moreover, their reconcilability is also supported by both Articles 7(1) and 8 of the CISG (in 
Part I, which is a mandatory section for all contracting states). Article 7(1) states that the 
international character and uniformity of the CISG, and good faith are to be upheld when 
interpreting the provisions of the CISG; Article 8 emphasises the intent of a party as a tool of 
interpreting the party’s statements and conduct,104 wherein such interpretation is ‘according to 
the understanding that a reasonable person of the same kind as the other party would have had 
in the circumstances.’105 In determining the intent of a party or the understanding a reasonable 
person would have had, due consideration is given to all relevant circumstances of the case, 
including negotiations, any practices which the parties have established between themselves, 
usages and any subsequent conduct of the parties.
106
 These provisions indicate that there 
should not be any conflict between Articles 14(1) and 55 in order to maintain the international 
character of the CISG as a whole. 
                                                                                                                                                        
parties agreed on furs of average or good quality, and that on a price range of 35 to 65 German Marks per item.
 
The buyer argued that a quantity of the pelts delivered were of low quality and paid no more than 10 Marks per 
fur to the seller. The Supreme Court made a direct reference to Article 14(1), finding that the criteria of 
definiteness of an offer are met if the parties have implicitly fixed both the quantity and the price in a way that 
makes it possible to identify the parties' intention. There was no resolution for the inconsistency of Articles 14 
and 55 CISG and what open price really meant within the context of Article 55. Rather, the court directly 
addressed the range between 35 and 65 German marks for each piece as a ‘sufficiently definite’ indicator under 
Article 14(1) to determine the price in respect of the quantity and quality of the furs that the German breeder had 
delivered. 
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In addition to the sensibility and reconcilability of the CISG, the writer also supports the view 
of Lookofsky that the absence of a price term should not render the agreement unenforceable, 
particularly when the intention of the parties was to enter into a binding agreement.
107
 If a 
reasonable person regards the deal as binding, the agreement must be recognised as binding. 
The emphasis of the CISG on the reasonable understanding of the parties and their 
predominant intention could overcome any notion that the language of Article 14(1) 
concerning an explicit or implicit fixing of the price should be construed to permit technical 
gaps regarding that understanding and intention. 
 
The interpretation made by Honnold best serves the best interests of both buyer and seller in 
relational sales during rapid price fluctuations. Reliance upon the restrictive wording of 
Article 14(1) and a narrow construction of Article 55 lead to the nullity of the contract, 
particularly if parties are of contracting states that are less receptive to open price contracts. 
Honnold’s approach would help to ensure the validity of the relational contracts, concurring 
with Macneil in terms of lessening presentiation and focusing more on the relational spectrum 
of a contract.  
 
The next section, Section 5.3.4 compares the impact of Article 55 on open price under the 
CISG, with that of Section 2-305 of the UCC. 
 
5.3.4  Impact of open price under Article 55 of the CISG in comparison with Section 
2-305 of the UCC  
According to the Commentary, Article 55 has effect only if one of the parties has his place of 
business in a state which has ratified or accepted Part III but not Part II of the CISG, and if the 
law of the state provides that a contract can be validly concluded even though it does not 
expressly or impliedly fix or make provisions for determining the price.
108
 Lookofsky 
explained that Article 55 had relevance for the Scandinavian States who all declared 
themselves ‘not bound’ by Article 14.109 The perception of open price under Article 55 as 
dependent on ‘implicit price’ under Article 14 reflects that Article 55 is only significant in 
cases where one of the parties reside in a Scandinavian state.   
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The UCC complies with the concept suggested by Lookofsky, in that Section 2-305 provides 
the courts with an excuse to impose, to the extent of the parties’ original intentions, a price 
term not found in the agreement.
110
 Section 2-305 embraces the fact that agreeing to an open 
price means that the parties intend to accomplish profit out of a contract, a practical reality 
ignored by most courts.
111
 If parties do not wish the court to set the price but would rather the 
contract failed in the absence of their ability to agree on a price, it is obligatory upon them to 
make an express statement to that effect in the contract itself, or to show by other convincing 
evidence that such result was intended.
112
  
 
Despite the independence of Article 55 in validating intentional open price, relevant decisions 
demonstrate that open price is valid only if it fulfils Article 14(1). As explained earlier, the 
court may be able to discern parties’ true intention based on Article 8, whereby if parties 
appear to be intended to be bound without a price clause, then the parties’ intention to leave 
the price open is to prevail.
113
 This is particularly essential if the parties have dealt with each 
other and having prior course of dealing and course of performance or in cases where trade 
usage allows a price to be implied. Similar to the law merchant under the UCC, the parties’ 
experiences as well as their trade usage are useful in supplying open terms.
114
 The CISG 
provides that open terms may be supplied by recourse to usage (Article 9(2)), by practices 
established between the parties (Article 9(1)) or by general interpretation of the parties' 
conduct (Article 8). 
 
The next section discusses the interdependency of both Articles using examples from the 
relevant court decisions. 
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5.4  Decisions relating to Articles 14 and 55 
 
5.4.1    Cases where parties inadvertently leave the price open  
As in previous chapters, the cases discussed in this section are divided into two categories, the 
‘inadvertent’ category and the ‘deliberate’ category. 
Below are two examples of decisions of the inadvertent category, namely the Oven case and 
the Malev case. 
 
5.4.1.1 Oven case
115
 – silence as to price 
In this case, the seller was managing a business covering the manufacturing, repairing, 
acquiring and selling of kitchen equipment, while the buyer was managing a hotel in 
Switzerland. The contract was for the purchase of an oven to replace an existing oven that 
broke down before a particular weekend- a situation of urgency for most hotel businesses.  
 
On Friday, 8 March 2002, the oven in the kitchen of Public Utility E broke down and in the 
same afternoon, its executive chef asked the seller to repair or replace the defective equipment 
or to replace it. Nevertheless, under undocumented circumstances, the executive chef rejected 
the repair of the oven. K, the representative of the seller, contacted its oven supplier, 
Company L, indicating the reasons for urgent delivery of the replacement oven to Switzerland 
the next day. Company L had only one oven available, and K accepted this oven, of the brand 
and type Lainox ME 110 P, but did not mention the oven’s price to the executive chef. The 
seller alleged to have sold the oven to the buyer, for which the issued bill remained unpaid. 
The seller thus based its action on the conclusion of a contract with the buyer for the 
international sale of goods.  
 
The court enforced the inadvertently missing price by deriving the intention of the parties 
through the behaviour of the buyer after the delivery. When the buyer asked for a copy of the 
bill, she never contested the price. In addition, the buyer requested the seller to send her a 
letter of guarantee for the oven. This behaviour, which took place over several months, 
implied that the sale was concluded even though the seller had not initially indicated the price.  
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The conduct of the buyer was only a part of the reason used by the court to derive intention. 
Article 55 resolved the issue, for a contract may be validly concluded without any (express or 
implicit) reference to price, since the price may be objectively determined according to the 
price generally charged at the time of conclusion of the contract. In this case, the contract 
gave no indication as to the price of the oven, it was deemed to be the price currently 
practised for such goods, and the buyer thus bore the risk of paying more than foreseen if he 
accepted the delivered goods. Applying Article 55, the court applied the price currently 
practised, which amounted to 6,972.17 €. 
 
Article 55 fills the gap of a price when parties have indeed validly concluded the contract, 
even in emergency situations where there was no proper offer and acceptance. Naturally in 
this case, the delivery took place almost instantly after the time of formation of the contract. 
The ‘price generally charged at the time of the conclusion of the contract’ under Article 55 
was accurately applied for the sale of the oven in this case, which did not involve volatile 
market as far as the oven is concerned.  
 
This leads to the question of whether the application of Article 55 would be similarly 
effective for products such as steel and oil, where the relational nature of those contracts 
creates a large gap between the time the contract is formed and the time of delivery. At any 
point of time within this gap the product’s price may fluctuate, meaning that the price at the 
time of delivery far deviates from the price generally charged at the time of conclusion of the 
contract.  
 
5.4.1.2 Pratt and Whitney v Malev Hungarian Airlines
116
 
The case involved a proposal for the sale of two jet engines, with an additional engine option. 
The selection of the engine would depend on whether Malev purchased aircraft of Airbus, or 
of Boeing. The writer proposal included prices for both engines, but later, when the proposal 
was amended to include the additional engine, there was no price stated for this additional 
engine option. Malev telexed a letter that it had chosen Pratt & Whitney engines for Boeing 
aircraft. This option took place after various exchanges with Pratt & Whitney on engine 
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maintenance and building a spare parts pool in Hungary. However, three month after signing 
the acceptance letter, Malev informed that it would not purchase the engines.   
 
The primary concern was whether the missing price term of the additional engine caused 
uncertainty in contract. While Malev claimed that there was uncertainty in price as Pratt & 
Whitney did not indicate its own price index in order to calculate the base price of the 
additional engine, Pratt & Whitney claimed that the price was determinable in a precise 
manner. The proposal stated the product, quantity and data on how the price calculation could 
be made. The Budapest Metropolitan Court held that there was a valid contract between the 
parties for ‘an offer may be valid even without a fixed price or number of goods, if it contains 
provisions for the definition of the price and quantity’. 
 
The Supreme Court reversed the decision and reached the opposite conclusion; it found that 
no valid contract had been formed. The court relied primarily on Article 14(1), stating that in 
order to constitute an offer, a proposal is sufficiently definite if it indicates the product, the 
quantity and the price or contains directions as to how these terms can be defined. Since a 
price was not stated for the additional Boeing engine option that Pratt & Whitney had added 
to the contract, the proposal lacked a sufficient price term that cannot constitute an offer under 
the CISG. Recognising the approach of Farnsworth, the Supreme Court held that the 
divergence of Article 14 and 55 implies that both of them cannot be construed together, and 
that Article 55 applies only if there is a valid contract under Article 14.
117
  
 
As a result, not only did the Supreme Court denied Pratt & Whitney any recovery, but it 
ordered them to reimburse Malev HUF 15,150,000 for the costs of the litigation, and that Pratt 
& Whitney was to bear its costs itself. Article 55 did not have any impact on the Supreme 
Court’s analysis.118 In fact, Article 14(1) ‘implicit price’ requirement has somewhat 
constituted a prerequisite to a valid contract under Article 55. The perturbing factor was that 
the Supreme Court avoided addressing the issue of whether there was an element of intention 
to be bound between the parties when applying Article 14(1),
119
 and that the price of the 
additional engine was determinable based on the data provided by Pratt & Whitney. Although 
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an aircraft engine is specialised goods, there could have been an acceptable method to 
determine its price. Koneru suggested that ‘an independent appraiser familiar with the aircraft 
engine industry’ is one possible method of price determination in this case.120 Hence, there 
was a possibility of a valid contract not only under Article 55 but also under Article 14(1) as 
the price of the additional engine were determinable. Koneru also commented that the court 
could have derived the parties’ intent based on their conduct, under Article 8, and failure of 
the Supreme Court to address Article 8 reflected the fact that ‘not only Malev, but also the 
Court failed to observe good faith under the Convention’.121 
 
The decision would have resulted otherwise under Section 2-305 of the UCC. The contract 
would have been valid based on the evidence of intention of the parties and thus the UCC 
courts would not approve of Malev’s bad faith in repudiating in agreement that Malev itself 
almost certainly assumed was binding. This is detrimental to Pratt & Whitney, who have 
incurred on reliance costs based on the agreement made. Flechtner added that ‘[i]magine if the 
tables were turned, and it was Pratt & Whitney who refused to sell the engines after Malev 
had committed to purchase Boeing aircraft’.122 Arguably, the Supreme Court’s decision 
ignored the international character of the CISG by straining for an interpretation favourable to 
the party of the same nationality as the court.
123
  
 
The next section discusses deliberate open-price contracts and demonstrates how Article 55 
itself deals with open price in relational sales. 
 
5.4.2  A case where parties deliberately left the price open  
Based on the Pace Law website,
124
 there are 42 reported cases under Article 55 on deliberate 
open price, but only one involved goods of changing price based on the market, where the 
price was determinable only when the product was in its season. In this category, the parties 
deliberately opt for an open price, with a price mechanism to allow calculation of the price.  
The case is explained below. 
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5.4.2.1 Pitted Sour Cherries case
125
 
The German plaintiff (the buyer), a trader of fruits and vegetables, maintained supply 
contracts with a trade chain which operates a branch, while the Belgian defendant (the seller) 
was a company processing foods and vegetables. Upon completion of an oral discussion 
regarding the delivery of pitted sour cherries, the seller sent the buyer a letter on 13 June 
2003, stating that the quantity of pitted sour cherries would be 400,000 jars, with their price to 
be fixed during the season. The deliveries were to take place between July 2003 and May 
2004, and payments were to be made within 30 days of each invoice. The buyer then ordered 
50,000 jars of sour cherries from the seller at a price of EUR 0.95 per jar, which the seller 
delivered directly.  
 
On 15 October 2003, the seller sent the buyer a second letter to confirm the purchase of 
400,000 jars, this time at a price of 0.90 Euro per jar. This letter stated that the first truck 
would be delivered in November 2003 and that the rest of the deliveries were to continue until 
the end of May 2004. The seller stated that the 50,000 jars of sour cherries previously 
purchased, although these were obtained by the buyer from the seller after 13 June 2003, were 
not to be regarded as performance on the basis of this contract. The buyer purchased a total of 
130,464 jars between January and July 2004, paying between EUR 0.87 and 0.90 per jar for 
the six deliveries in this period. 
 
The buyer insisted that based on Article 14(1), there was no valid contract of sale of sour 
cherries at the price of EUR 0.90, alleging that the letters dated 13 June and 15 October 2003 
were neither offers within the meaning of Article 14(1) nor as commercial letters of 
confirmation. The buyer claimed that the letter dated 13 June 2003 lacked a price proposal 
and gave no implicit price. In the absence of implicit price, the buyer claimed that there was 
no binding contract and no obligation to accept a further 269, 536 jars of the cherries.  
 
The court nonetheless held that the second letter of the seller dated 15 October 2003 
constituted circumstantial evidence of conclusion of the contract and stated that the 
arrangement to fix the price ‘during the season’ indicated that the price was implicitly 
determinable within Article 14(1). Furthermore, the buyer had taken delivery of the goods and 
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paid the price charged by the seller with respect to every delivery received. The court also 
applied Article 8 and interpreted the clause ‘to be fixed during the season’ as an implicit 
agreement of the seasonal prices of the seller for the year 2003. 
 
Again, Article 14(1) was referred to in order to decide whether the price was determinable, 
but following Honnold, the courts did focus on intent to be bound by looking at the conduct of 
the parties and the fact that partial delivery had taken place. Article 55 was applicable without 
depending on Article 14(1) requirement of an implicit price, thus validating the contract 
without being affected by the vagueness of the phrase ‘to be fixed during the season.’  
 
In sum, this case shows that the CISG can be applied so as to allow for a contract where 
presentiation of the price of the goods, due to seasonal variations, as long as the price is 
sufficiently determined or at least determinable based on the market.   
 
5.5  Conclusion: amending or flexibly interpreting Article 55 makes it a more 
effective gap filler for intentional open-price contracts  
This chapter has shown that there is some room to allow for relational contracts under the 
CISG, subject to the presentiation requirement. While open price under Article 55 is an 
alternative to parties that deal with specialised or seasonal goods, such as in Malev and Pitted 
Sour Cherries respectively, Article 14(1) is often cited by an opportunistic party that intended 
to leave the relational contract. Clearly Article 14(1) governs the contract if both parties 
intend to be bound only if there is a fixed or implicitly fixed price in their contract. However, 
the situations in Malev and Pitted Sour Cherries were the opposite; both cases involve 
relational elements that require flexibility, and that parties intend to be bound even though the 
prices were not specified.  
 
In Malev, Pratt & Whitney was left uncompensated despite incurring reliance costs on the 
basis of the agreement. As the court’s decision was based on Article 14(1), it refused to go 
further into examining the determinability of the price of the jet engine. Instead, it concurred 
with the claim by the buyer (Malev) that there was no valid contract. In fact, evidence of 
intent and determinability of price existed in this case, as discussed above.
126
 In Pitted Sour 
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Cherries the buyer similarly relied on Article 14(1) in order to be released from the contract 
when in fact the buyer had accepted the partial delivery of the sour cherries.  
 
Adopting the approach of Section 2-305 of the UCC would improve the overall utility of the 
CISG as a sales law, for it merges both presentiation and relational elements in the overall 
structure of the law,
127
 and which of the two applies depends on what the parties have 
intended. If the parties intended for a fixed price, then clearly the presentiation method under 
Section 2-305(4) would be applicable; if the parties opted for open price, then the relational 
approach under Section 2-305(1) applies. This means that a UCC court validates or 
invalidates a contract based on what the parties have intended from the beginning of the 
contract. To opt for price flexibility is a matter of choice for the parties and the courts would 
decide accordingly. While both approaches are similarly found in the CISG, the courts are 
influenced by the presentiation character under Article 14(1) of fixed or implicitly fixed price 
seems to over Article 55 validation of open price.  
 
The distinction between Articles 14 and 55 originated from the compromise nature of the 
CISG, which resulted from the participation of its various member states. The common law, 
the socialist countries and the French legal system require a statement to be definite in order 
to qualify as an offer, and developing countries show less inclination for open price terms 
based on their uncertainty in the case of raw materials.
128
 For socialists and civil states, 
Article 14(1) under Part II is the ideal method of contracting, while Article 55 suits the needs 
of countries that are more receptive to open price.  
 
The CISG courts have not been able to decide whether or not intention to be bound is the 
main requirement of a valid relational sale that applies open price. Whether applying Articles 
14(1) or 55, the court has tended to consider whether a price term is sufficiently definite but 
without due consideration of the nature of the business in which the contract was formed. In 
Malev, the Supreme Court stated that Article 14(1) was not fulfilled effectively in deriving the 
intention of the parties, but neither stated nor explained whether Malev fell into the Article 55 
category.  
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Recognising the fact that an open price contract may be validly concluded (even without a 
clear offer and acceptance under Article 55, the writer agrees with the argument offered by 
Lookofsky, who stated that the courts and arbitrators ought to discern the intention of the 
parties in the concrete case, and determine whether or not the parties themselves actually 
wanted their open-price agreement to be binding.
129
  Amending or interpreting Article 55 in a 
similar way to Section 2-305 would benefit many relational sales in the future, as the courts 
would be able to evaluate the validity of a sale, as long as parties intend to be bound by a 
contract under Article 55. Recourse need not be had to Article 14(1) as Article 55 directly 
validates the contract. This enhances the relational character of Article 55 without being 
impeded by presentiational character of Article 14(1), a shift strongly recommended by 
Macneil and Llewellyn as explained in Chapter One.  
 
Another benefit of flexible interpretation of Article 55 would be that all member states 
(except Scandinavian states that have clearly excluded Article 14(1) and Part II of the 
CISG)
130
 that have ratified both Articles 14(1) and Article 55 would benefit from intentional 
open prices under Article 55. This improves the current situation where an incompletely 
drafted contract is subject to the interpretation of Article 14(1) which may or may not nullify 
an open price term even in cases where parties intended to be bound by the deal. 
 
Finally, and most importantly, opportunistic parties may not be able to use the requirement of 
a ‘sufficiently definite’ price under Article 14(1) to nullify the contract.  
 
Clearly Article 55 has not been as relational as the US had hoped for after opposing the 
language of Article 14(1) in Vienna. This is because Article 55 applies reasonable price at the 
time of entering into the contract rather than at the time of delivery. It does not exactly cater 
to the need of changing markets when applying ‘price generally charged at the time of the 
conclusion of the contract’, leading to the impracticality of the CISG in dealing with contracts 
of volatile prices. It seems that Article 55 is limited to resolving accidental omission of price 
such as seen in the Oven case, considering that an item such as an oven is not in the category 
of goods of volatile price.  
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We will see in Chapter Six that the price at the time of delivery matters in contracts that 
involve goods of volatile price, and is preferable to the price generally charged at the time of 
the conclusion of the contract provided by current Article 55. Indeed, based on the Pitted Sour 
Cherries case, it would appear the price at the time of delivery is more practical for 
considering the seasonal products, for which price determination is not possible until the 
season has started. For sales involving products such as steel and fuel, the sustainability of the 
sale if concluded under Article 55 is questionable, but certainly improvable by adopting a 
similar approach to that of Section 2-305 of the UCC. 
 
In sum, the interpretation of a contract should aim to fulfill the parties’ intention, but more 
importantly to uphold the international character of the CISG as pronounced by Article 
7(1).
131
 Moreover, the Preamble of the CISG states that ‘[c]onsidering that the development 
of international trade on the basis of equality and mutual benefit is an important element in 
promoting friendly relations among States’ shows that the CISG should minimise 
opportunism by parties who use Article 14(1) to release themselves from contractual 
obligations. Minimising presentiation under Article 14(1) improves the overall purpose of 
CISG as a sales law, in harmony with the spirit of integrating presentiation under the contract, 
as opposed to complete presentiation upon relational contracts.
132
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Chapter Six: Analysis 
 
6.0  Introduction 
This thesis proposes for the validation of open price based on the needs of a relational 
contract. Relational contract theory views contracts as relationships, rather than as discrete 
transactions.
1
 In a relational contract, the relationship between parties is based on trust, and it 
involves a high degree of cooperation on a long-term basis. The ongoing interaction between 
the parties grows and varies as events occur over time.
2
 To cope with the trend of the market, 
any sales law that based its principles on classic approach faces challenges in minimising 
presentiation and maximising flexibility when addressing open price in relational sales.
3
  
 
As discussed earlier, Macneil explained the four potential responses of a contract law when 
applied to relational sales;
4
 firstly, the contract law may not apply to the particular contract in 
question;
5
 secondly, the relational contract may be decided in accordance with concepts of 
presentiation present in the contract law;
6
 thirdly, the law may be modified in such a way that 
total presentiation is a theoretical and not an ultimate goal;
7
 or, finally, the overall structure of 
the contract law may be developed for a greater general application by merging both 
relational and presentiation elements.
8
  
 
This thesis classified the UCC, the SGA and the CISG based on the above four responses. On 
the one hand, the design of the UCC was based on the fourth response; it recognises 
presentiation, by enforcing a fixed-price contract, if that was intended by the parties from the 
beginning of the deal.
9
 At the same time, it promotes relational elements by validating 
contracts with inadvertent or deliberate open price terms. This is evident in Section 2-305(1) 
of the UCC, where a contract is valid on the basis of reasonable price in three situations: when 
parties are silent regarding price, when parties fail to agree on a price and when an appointed 
third party or a standard fails to set the price. The law merchant practices of open price and 
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duty to set the price in good faith enrich the overall structure of the UCC by merging 
presentiation and relational characteristics in a sale.  
 
On the other hand, the SGA and the CISG portray the characteristics of the second response. 
Many decisions on relational sales are made in accordance with the concept of presentiation.
10
 
While the SGA and CISG courts are inclined to take the approach in line with the third 
response, namely to limit presentiation as a theoretical rather than ultimate goal of the law, 
they are still limited by the principles of presentiation. For example, when deciding the 
validity of a relational sale, English courts frequently cite the May & Butcher principle of 
agreement to agree being a non-binding agreement on the basis of there being no price 
presentiated for the sale of tentage. The post-May & Butcher decisions such as  Hillas
11
 and 
Foley
12
 proved to be exceptions to the rule, but the current decision of Rafsanjan
13
 proves that 
presentiation under Section 8 and in May & Butcher remains the guiding principle of the 
SGA. The relational contract in Rafsanjan was invalidated even though the parties had been 
dealing with each other for eight years and there was an available market price for the 
pistachios that the court could refer to in order to apply reasonable price.  
 
Similarly, the CISG courts are bound by the presentiation character of Article 14(1) that 
requires „implicit price‟ as a requirement to a valid contract. In Pitted Sour Cherries case,14 
clearly the court had successfully departed from the presentiation element of Article 14(1), 
thus validating the contract on the basis of Article 55. However, Article 14(1) did invalidate 
the agreement in Malev
15
 on the basis of there being no fixed price for the additional jet 
engine even though parties were proven to be bound, and that the engine price was calculable 
from the data for base price calculation provided by the seller.  
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The abovementioned decisions prove that while the courts have been able to modify relational 
contracts to sustain enforceability, the way flexibility is applied to the contract is also crucial. 
The UCC proves to be advantageous as it allows parties, from the beginning of the contract, 
to choose to have a fixed price or an open price. The SGA, to a lesser extent allows flexibility, 
subject to the decision of the court, to enforce open price. Similar to the SGA, price flexibility 
under the CISG is granted by the courts when required, as opposed to being an option for the 
parties from the time when they first entered into the contract. As a result, potentially valuable 
relationships are unnecessarily difficult to enter into under both SGA and CISG. Parties may 
have no choice but to enter into a contract of sale with a fixed price, even at the risk of market 
fluctuation or other uncertainties. 
 
To test which of the three sales laws is the best at catering to uncertainty in the price of the 
goods, this chapter analyses the case of Scafom International BV v Lorraine Tubes S.A.S.
16
 
and demonstrates the consequence of limiting flexibility in price at the time of formation of 
the contract. The analysis of this chapter proves that a relational sale such as in Scafom 
International could have used an open price with a price index and/or a price renegotiation 
clause from the beginning of the contract to cater to the price fluctuations that had occurred 
before the delivery of the goods. The failure to do so indirectly invited judicial intervention 
that did not necessarily suit the relational nature of the contract. 
 
The three main points discussed in this chapter are: 1) the price flexibility offered by the 
CISG as a post-hardship remedy, rather than an available choice for the parties; 2) how the 
merged presentiation and flexibility feature under the UCC would have resolved the issue in 
Scafom International; and 3) how Scafom International would have found no solution under 
the SGA, considering that the limited flexibility provided under Section 8 of the SGA neither 
enforces, nor frustrates the contract. 
 
The section below begins by providing the facts and decisions of the presiding courts on 
Scafom International, before moving to the three main issues. 
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6.1  Scafom International BV v Lorraine Tubes S.A.S. 
Scafom International BV was a CISG case. The agreement was for the sale of warm-rolled 
steel tubes, between the seller Exma, a French-based company and the buyer, Scafom 
International BV, a Dutch company, in order for the latter to use them to produce scaffolding. 
The fixed terms in the contract were for the price, date and place of delivery of the steel (in 
Belgium), but there was no price adjustment clause in the event of supervening 
circumstances.  
 
After the conclusion of the contract but prior to delivery, the price of steel unexpectedly rose 
by about 70%. The seller then gave notice to the buyer to recalculate the agreed price due to 
the unforeseeable increase. The buyer did not accept the suggestion and sued the seller 
instead. 
 
Below are the specifics of the decisions from each deciding court on the case. 
 
6.1.1  The court decisions 
6.1.1.1    Tongeren Commercial Court 
The report of the decision was brief; it appears that the court ordered the seller to deliver the 
products to the buyer, and the buyer to pay half of the requested price increase. The court 
regarded the price fluctuations as foreseeable and believed that a price adjustment clause 
should have been included in the contract. As part of the business risk assumed by the seller, 
the court held that the circumstances did not make the contract impossible under Article 79, 
although they made the performance of it more onerous.  
 
6.1.1.2   Appeal Court 
Briefly reported, the Antwerp Court of Appeal similarly held that the contract was 
enforceable, but on a different basis. It held that the issue was not covered by the CISG, and 
that the question should therefore be governed by the national law applicable to the contract. 
The court referred to Article 4 of the Rome Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual 
Obligations, and then applied French law in the judgment. Article 1135 of the French Civil 
Code gave the parties in such circumstances the right to renegotiate the contract. The fact that 
the buyer refused to renegotiate the price constituted a breach of contract and therefore the 
appeal court entitled compensation to the seller. This caused the buyer to proceed for appeal 
in the Supreme Court. 
168 
 
6.1.1.3   The Supreme Court 
The Supreme Court held that the hardship caused by the price increase amounted to an 
impediment to the performance of the contract under Article 79 of the CISG. Article 79(1) 
states that a party is not liable for a failure to perform any of his obligations if the impediment 
was beyond his control, and if he could not reasonably be expected to have taken into 
account, avoided or overcome the impediment or its consequences at the time of the 
conclusion of the contract. A pure reliance on Article 79 meant that the contract was avoided. 
Hence Article 79(1) had a similar effect to a force majeure, and lead to the avoidance of the 
contract. 
 
While Article 79(1) resolves force majeure conditions by validating non-performance of a 
contract, there has not been any provision under the CISG that resolves situations of 
supervening change, such as market fluctuation, which render the performance more onerous 
or cause hardship to one of the parties. Realising that the price increase did not amount to a 
force majeure, the Supreme Court enforced the agreement by referring to Article 7(1) and (2) 
of the CISG. According to Article 7(1) and (2), reference to the general principles governing 
the law of international trade, such as the UNIDROIT Principles for International Commercial 
Contracts. Under the UNIDROIT Principles, the party invoking changed circumstances that 
have caused imbalance in the contract is entitled to seek the renegotiation of the contract.
17
  
 
Clearly the Supreme Court upheld the decision of the Court of Appeal, holding that 
renegotiation was the solution to the case, although both courts cited different legal principles 
to arrive at a similar conclusion. Both courts were unanimous in that the seller was accurate in 
claiming for renegotiation due to the hardship caused by the unforeseeable increase in the 
price of steel. Having no price adjustment clause in the contract to adapt to the fluctuation, the 
buyer was bound to agree to a new price. Renegotiation prevents an exceptionally detrimental 
situation for the seller, provided that such renegotiation is executed in good faith.
18
 
 
Hansebout commented that Scafom International was a landmark decision for two reasons;
19
 
primarily, the Supreme Court categorised market fluctuation as impediment under Article 79, 
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and secondly, for the first time in history, the Supreme Court referred to the UNIDROIT 
Principles in order to resolve a dispute. A question arises as to whether market fluctuations do 
impede the contract (and lead to its avoidance), or, are common affairs of business
20
 that is 
foreseeable (thus impeding the contract and leading to its avoidance), or whether fluctuations 
are common in business and are therefore foreseeable (not affecting the enforceability of the 
contract). 
 
6.2  Renegotiation as a post-fluctuation remedy under the CISG  
Chapter One demonstrated that traditional fixed-price method does ensure the optimal 
performance of a contract.
21
 This is particularly true when parties know all the risks or are 
risk neutral when entering a contract.
22
 Hence, under the circumstances of known or neutral 
risks, a rational person would not enter into a transaction, in conscious ignorance of the 
magnitude of risks that might affect his return, when there are ways to precisely determine the 
risks.
23
 Nevertheless, a fixed-term contract is less ideal when the risks are not easily 
determined.
24
 Previous chapters demonstrate that economic exchanges are relational and 
involved risks of market fluctuations,
25
 making fixed-price deals difficult to be executed 
during price fluctuations.
26
 As a result, presentiating price is less crucial or desirable when 
there is a risk in the uncertainty in price, unless and until future circumstances take place.
27
  
 
As elaborated in Chapter Two, long-term industries such as natural gas, uranium, coal and 
petroleum coke, have in general departed from the use of fixed price to price index, or a 
voluntary renegotiation clause, or a combination of both.  This shift of price flexibility took 
place in the early 1970s due to the market fluctuations that affected the industries.
28
 In fact, 
this shift does fulfil the aim of the Preamble of the CISG, which states that „[c]onsidering that 
the development of international trade on the basis of equality and mutual benefit is an 
important element in promoting friendly relations among States.‟ In relation to this chapter‟s 
analysis, as opposed to fixed price, open price based on price index or voluntary 
renegotiation, or both combined, allow equality and mutual benefit between foreign traders, in 
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accordance with the Preamble of the CISG. Open price lessens the risk of non-enforceability 
of a contract when prices of the goods are uncertain, plans the business relationships of parties 
that lead to expansion of business using flexible terms and most importantly and minimises 
the room for opportunistic behaviour of leaving the contract in fluctuating markets.
29
  
 
In the case of Scafom International, the courts unanimously remedied the situation using a 
similar shift; the fixed-price term was remedied by a price renegotiation method to enforce the 
contract. If the parties truly intended to be bound only by a fixed price, the contract should 
have remained valid despite market fluctuations; no price renegotiation would have been 
necessary to remedy rigidity caused by the fixed price. However, this was not the case for the 
parties in Scafom International. Although it was not clear why the parties did not include a 
price adjustment clause, they did intend to be bound by the contract. Both parties‟ conducts 
proved that they intended to proceed with the contract despite market fluctuation; the seller 
requested for price renegotiation, while the buyer insisted on the original price to apply, 
despite the fluctuation.  Applying both French Civil Code and the UNIDROIT Principles in 
Court of Appeal and Supreme Court respectively, the courts ordered for price renegotiation to 
enforce the contract; however, it is questionable whether this reflected the parties‟ intentions. 
 
Clearly, the courts permitted price flexibility only when the issue of hardship was brought 
before the courts. An alternative view to this method is if the CISG in itself allowed parties to 
incorporate a mechanism for price flexibility in the contract, so that recourse need not be had 
to these external principles each time the court decides to enforce a price term of the contract 
affected by fluctuation. This is feasible by flexibly interpreting Article 14(1) and thereby 
removes the dependency of the CISG upon supplemental law such as the UNIDROIT 
Principles and a State‟s civil code to provide flexibility to the contract due to changes in 
market prices.
30
  
 
Undeniably, the UNIDROIT Principles as a model law carries a great merit when correcting 
such major deficiency of impeding a contract by Article 79 of the CISG.
31
  However, 
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Flechtner stressed that the CISG ought to be independent from a supplemental law such as the 
UNIDROIT Principles.
32
 This is based on Article 7(2), which states that a gap under the CISG 
is to be filled by looking within its provisions to determine its general principles, and not by 
looking outside the CISG to determine general international law principles. Reference to the 
UNIDROIT Principles to renegotiate the contract price indicated that Article 7(2) has been 
compromised. If tribunals or courts continue to find a gap in a contract that the CISG could 
not fill, the CISG would be less than an ideal sales law to achieve its goal of creating a 
uniform international sales law. No doubt that the CISG was drafted to be simple and clear in 
character but there will always be an endless competition between the civil law and common 
law systems in proving which of the two incorporates a more familiar traditional approach 
into the decisions construing the CISG. 
 
6.3  Flexibility within Section 2-305(1) of the UCC: an option for the parties at the 
time of entering into the contract 
Within the four-part responses of Macneil, the UCC utilises the fourth response as it merges 
both presentiation and relational elements under Section 2-305. There would be two possible 
resolutions to situation in Scafom International under the UCC. Since the UCC recognises 
presentiation under Section 2-305(4), the first possibility is that the court would determine if 
the fixed-price term is the reason for parties to agree to the contract. If a UCC court finds that 
the parties did wish to set a fixed price, then the change in circumstances would not normally 
affect the enforceability of the contract. In other words, the price remains fixed, and the risk 
of fluctuation is borne the relevant party. 
 
The second possibility under the UCC is more interesting. Considering the volatile price of 
the steel, the parties themselves could have entered into a complete contract from the very 
beginning, yet left the price term open under Section 2-305(1). Deliberately setting an open 
price in Scafom International would have saved time and cost, as parties could have avoided 
price haggling process. A fair price could have been negotiated at a later stage, and the price 
decided would have to have been fair for both buyer and seller. Both buyer and seller in 
Scafom International could validly enter into the contract, yet need not incur court expenses
33
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to enforce the open price. Open price allows the dealing of goods that are susceptible to 
market fluctuation to be flexible, regardless of the contract duration.
34
 
 
Even if the parties or parties‟ agreed pricing method failed to set the price, Section 2-305(1) 
would allow the court to apply a reasonable price. Section 2-305(1) states that reasonable 
price at the time of delivery applies in three possible situations: silence of parties as to price,
35
 
agreement to agree
36
 and cases where price was not set by an appointed third party.
37
 Clearly, 
setting a reasonable price secures the validity of a contract that falls in any of these three 
situations. Applying reasonable price is in line with the aim of the UCC principal drafter, 
Llewellyn, who stressed that, unless the price at the time of delivery is discriminatory or 
commercially unreasonable, an objective reference as to price (such as that indicated by the 
current market) is all that is required for a valid open price under the UCC.
38
 
 
Does this indicate that the UCC enforces every open price agreements regardless of 
circumstances? With reference to Section 2-615 of the UCC, a contract is unenforceable in 
impracticable situation. Nevertheless, impracticability does not include cost increase or a 
change in market condition.
39
 Rather, frustrating circumstances such as war, embargo, crop 
failures, or the failure of a major source of supply that contributes to the market change or 
prevents a seller from obtaining supplies necessary to the performance of the contract are 
justifications for impracticability.
40
 Clearly, a non-performing party has fewer tendencies to 
be opportunistic within the limited circumstances of „impracticability,‟ which excludes 
market price changes. 
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6.4  Flexibility versus frustration within the SGA: which of the two prevails under 
Section 8? 
This section tests the hypothetical impact of Section 8 of the SGA on Scafom International. 
As seen in Chapter Four, the wording of Section 8(1) is: „[t]he price in a contract of sale may 
be fixed by the contract, or may be left to be fixed in a manner agreed by the contract, or may 
be determined by the course of dealings between the parties‟. Since the parties in Scafom 
International had primarily fixed the terms of the contract including the price of the steel 
tubes, the contract was valid in accordance with Section 8(1).  
 
However, Section 8 does not state whether a fixed-price contract remains enforceable in spite 
of changing circumstances. While there is no direct answer to the issue, Section 8(2) limits 
the application of „reasonable price‟ to situations where parties are silent as to price,41 or 
where parties have missed or forgotten to set it. Reasonable price does not apply when a 
fixed-price contract is affected by the market, as in the present case.  
 
Does the limited scope of application of reasonable price under Section 8(2) indicate that the 
English law perceives a contract such as one in Scafom International as frustrated or 
impracticable? Under the English law, there can be a relief from the total impossibility of 
performance or the total frustration of the purpose of the contract. However, similar to Section 
2-615 of the UCC, the English law does not categorise market fluctuation as a situation of 
impossibility of performance. While performance was impossible in Taylor v Caldwell
42
 due 
to a burnt down of a hired music hall prior to the hiring dates, a 1646 case of Paradine v 
Jane
43
 demonstrated that an obligation to pay money differs from impossibility of 
performance. The fact that the defendant was expelled from his possession by the German 
price and army did not release him from the obligation to pay his rent, for the rent was a duty 
created by the parties, and that „the law would not protect him beyond his own 
agreement…‟.44 
 
The English law would not view the 70% price increase in the steel market as frustration to 
the contract in Scafom International, for a frustration requires „a change in the significance of 
the obligation that the thing undertaken would, if performed, be a different thing from that 
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contracted for.‟45 An increase in the price of labour and materials would not normally impede 
the performance of the contract.
46
 For example, the failure of a supplier to supply the 
contractual material would not normally frustrate a contract,
47
 even if it was caused by 
electrical fault and interruptions in the supply by rail of raw materials to the sellers, as these 
occurrences were considered common in the world of business.
48
 If a seller makes an 
unqualified promise to sell, he bears the risk of his contemplated source of supply where that 
source is not a specific source, or the goods are not specific goods.
49
 He is not excused by 
frustration, unless it is physically impossible for him to deliver the goods.
50
  
 
Avoidance in performing the contract could, arguably, amount to opportunistic behaviour. 
Applying this principle to the present case, the seller accepted the risk of 70% increment in 
price. If the seller did not wish to take on that risk, it should have negotiated for the insertion 
of a price adjustment clause in the contract to cater to the market price. This, of course, is 
only possible if the legal system allows the parties to insert such clauses in the contract. 
 
6.4.1  Limited efforts of expanding reasonable price under Section 8(2) of the SGA in 
securing relational sales 
As have been discussed in the earlier section, the SGA would not invalidate the fixed-price 
term in Scafom International. In fact, current trend within the English courts‟ decisions show 
that Section 8(2) has been expanded to cover cases of price fluctuations. The approach is 
similar to CISG, where an English court would modify the contract, but only if the term is left 
open. A fixed price term that burdens a party in the performance of the contract is unlikely to 
be enforceable under the CISG and the SGA.  This differs from Section 2-305 of the UCC, 
where deliberate open price is an alternative method of contracting available for the parties 
beginning from the time when parties enter into the contract.  
 
In modifying contracts affected by the rigidity of presentiation, the English courts have 
resorted to the traditional maxim of certum est quod certum reddi potest to flexibly interpret 
reasonable price under Section 8(2) and have thereby departed from the classic approach of 
May & Butcher. The maxim assisted the court to validate a contract using reasonable price for 
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the handling fee, in the purchases of crude oil in Mamidoil-Jetoil Greek Petroleum Co SA v 
Okta Crude Oil Refinery AD (No 1).
51
 In addition to the maxim, Rix LJ reasoned that the 
departure from presentiation is possible in three circumstances.
52
 There are firstly, 
commercial dealings where parties are familiar with the trade in question, secondly 
„agreement to agree‟ that has come into existence, and thirdly, a contract of future 
performance over a period, where the parties may desire or need to leave matters to be 
adjusted in the working out of their contract. In these situations, the English courts would 
assist the parties to preserve rather than destroy the contract on the basis that what can be 
made certain is itself certain (certum est quod certum reddi potest). 
 
The first situation mentioned by Rix LJ on commercial dealings where parties are familiar 
with the trade, relates to Llewellyn‟s concept of objectivity, where an open price is 
determinable based on the market price/any objective standard
53
 referable at the time of 
delivery. In the second situation of an „agreement to agree‟, there is an example from a court 
decision of Acertec Construction Products Ltd (formerly BRC Limited) v Thamesteel 
Limited
54
 where the English court did validate an „agreement to agree‟ by applying reasonable 
price when the agreement provided no mechanism to ascertain price in default of agreement. 
Richard Sibbery QC held that the post-termination mechanisms were utilisable to enforce the 
clearly-expressed intention of the parties so that the obligations were binding upon the parties. 
The third situation refers to long-term contract, where matters are adjusted at a later stage of 
the contract on the basis of certum est quod certum reddi potest. Again, the courts should be 
willing to make certain what is already certain. This correlates well with Berman‟s idea that 
matters are best adjustable based on the gap between the time of contract formation and the 
time of delivery of the goods, as price fluctuation may take place at any point of time in the 
gap.
55
 This demonstrates the openness of the English court in accepting contract as a planning 
mechanism rather than a document of specified terms, although the SGA as a sales law has 
not been as expressive on the issue. In addition, the courts have been more receptive towards 
the element of trust between the parties in setting the price based on the parties‟ familiarity 
with each other through good repute and repeated interaction in the duration of the contract.
56
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Bearing in mind however, that Scafom International is distinguishable from Mamidoil and 
Acertec as it was a contract where the parties fixed the price upfront, without any reference to 
a price adjustment clause. An English court does not enforce a contract where parties have 
fixed the price, but affected by changing circumstance. Flexible interpretation of Section 8(2), 
(as seen in Mamidoil) is feasible only if the parties leave the price open whereby the court is 
willing to maintain the equilibrium of the contract by applying a fair and reasonable price for 
both buyer and seller.
57
  
 
Within the English law, elements of co-operation, flexibility and trust are not new ideas,
58
 
although the current English law is regarded to have fallen out of step with commercial 
practice
59
 and no longer reflects the reality of the market.
60
 Although Macneil‟s relational 
contract theory is not well-received in many decisions, recent trends exemplified in Mamidoil 
and Acertec Construction prove that English judges have been prepared to depart from the 
rigidity of requiring a definite or fixed price on the ground of the relational nature of a trade.  
In trades that typically involve a considerable gap between the time when the contract is 
formed and the time when actual delivery of the goods takes place, market fluctuations are 
common affairs, and the courts now recognise that parties should have the option of providing 
for their own price renegotiations. This applies not only to Scafom International, but also to 
Rafsanjan discussed in Chapter Four,
61
 where the parties could have opted for open price in 
order to allow for unforeseen circumstances and to save litigation costs. Open price allows 
long-term contracts to function as planning documents, instead of documents that specify 
terms,
62
 which often leads to hardship in performance during price fluctuations.  
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6.5  Conclusion  
While open price is an ideal alternative method in countering uncertainty in price, a fixed-
term contract is general preferable when both parties know the probability of all possible 
outcomes. In fact, if a buyer wants to be assured of a supply and that the seller is risk neutral, 
a fixed price works in such relationship. Otherwise, as illustrated by Westinghouse case, (as 
discussed in Chapters One and Two) the fixing of terms, particularly the price term, can make 
the overall sale unworkable. In Westinghouse, the fixed-price term caused the risk of the 
changing price unevenly distributed between a buyer and a seller. This is particularly true 
when the seller is at higher risk to honour the contract.
63
  
 
Clearly a similar effect of Westinghouse is seen in Scafom International, which illustrates the 
unworkability of a relational sale when a price is fixed and the parties cannot be confident that 
the courts will uphold an agreement with an open price. In fact, parties greatly depend on the 
courts to provide flexibility to counter the hardship caused by the fixed-price contract during 
market fluctuation. In Scafom International, the parties might have wished to have left the 
price open, as steel products have reference as to market price at the time of delivery. 
Alternatively, the parties might have included flexibility by agreeing on a voluntary 
renegotiation clause in case the market price fluctuates. While renegotiation seems ideal in 
keeping the contract in line with the current market conditions, the highlight of the UCC is 
that it validates deliberate open price as a choice for the parties at the time of entering a 
contract, as opposed to remedying the situation using price renegotiation after hardship / 
fluctuations occur. However, under the CISG, it was not clear that either route was possible. 
 
Cases involving situation such as that of Scafom International are common, and raise a 
crucial question of how a sales law resolves the unenforceability of a fixed-price in market 
fluctuations. While the CISG courts have successfully effected renegotiation in this case, 
recourse needed to be had to external principles ie the UNIDROIT Principles, instead of 
relying on the CISG itself.  There is no option for deliberate open price. Even if the parties did 
opt for open price, Article 55 is often bound by the interpretation of Article 14(1), which 
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means that the CISG court would not necessarily enforce the contract when circumstances 
changed. In fact, Article 55 applies „price generally charged at the time of the conclusion of 
the contract for such goods sold under comparable circumstances in the trade concerned‟ 
which does not address the impact of the 70% price increase that has affected the seller in 
order to deliver the goods.  
 
The English law would have not perceived the situation of Scafom International as to have 
been frustrated, at the same time it would not modify the contract for the parties as the price 
was agreed and fixed. In Mamidoil, the contract was enforceable because the parties left the 
price open. The court applied reasonable price (or rather the reasonable fee on the open 
handling fee) using the old legal maxim certum est quod certum reddi potest (that is certain 
which can be made certain) open term.
64
 Open price has been an acceptable concept, although 
not expressly acceptable statutorily. More than eight decades ago, Scrutton LJ took a similar 
approach to secure the agreement to agree on a petrol price in Foley v Classique Coaches,
65
 
using the principle in The Moorcock.
66
 As a commercial code, the UCC stood out in its 
efficiency with relational contracts; not only by securing the validity of relational sale during 
price fluctuations but by also providing the parties to flexibly price the goods, in lieu of the 
traditional fixed-price method, from the time parties enter into the contract. The UCC is not a 
flawless sales law but its trait of enabling a balance between flexibility and certainty of a 
contract is commendable. Clearly a similar concept is implementable by the SGA and the 
CISG, given the fact that these sales laws implement flexibility only to remedy hardships, 
rather than provide extensive flexibility as a method of contracting method for contracting 
parties.  
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Chapter Seven: Conclusion 
 
 
The thesis has covered the issue of validity of open price in relational sales, and how open 
price benefits long-term businesses, yet secures the business relationships from being 
invalidated by the classic fixed-price requirement. The analysis proves that the UCC provides 
the advantageous open-price method for the parties in dealing with relational sales, and how 
the fixed-price method detrimented the parties in Scafom International, in that it imposed 
hardship for the seller in order to honour the contract.  
 
Clearly not every sales law responded to the needs of relational contracts in the like manner 
to the UCC. Macneil explained the four ways in which a sales law that based its principles on 
presentiation could respond to problems relating to relational contracts. A sales law may 
firstly, not apply at all to the relational sale, or may interpret a relational contract based on the 
presentiation character of the sales law itself, or uphold its presentiation characteristics as an 
integral part rather than its ultimate goal of the law, (which means that flexible interpretation 
of rigid provisions is allowed to fit with the relational element) and finally, a sales law may 
be changed in terms of its overall structure by merging both the presentiation and the 
relational elements of its provisions, as seen under the UCC. 
 
As profit clearly is the central aim of every sale, every effort, not only of the parties but also 
of the sales law, should respond to relational contracts in such a way that they realise the 
mutual goal of buyer and seller in obtaining profit as agreed from the contract. Neither party 
should be opportunistic of each other so that joint profits could be maximised in the fairest 
possible manner. This thesis recommends increasing the adaptability of a sales law with the 
unpredictable prices of goods during market price fluctuations. To enhance the adaptability of 
a sales law, this thesis accepts the implementation of presentiation as an integral part, rather 
than an ultimate goal, of a sales law. If parties know the probability of all possible outcomes, 
they should be able to fix the price term with full certainty.
1
 However, in cases where parties 
cannot easily predict the future price of goods, they could still enter into a contract with full 
certainty using an open price term. Using open price, the contract is secured from being 
invalidated by hardship caused by fluctuations of price. This idea is practical when a contract 
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involves goods that have volatile price such as steel, oil and seasonal goods. The 
effectiveness of open price is thus tested by this thesis in three distinct sales laws.  
 
The selected jurisdictions are the US, England and the international sales law of the United 
Nations. The UCC in the US was chosen as it demonstrates the fourth response listed by 
Macneil: it merges both relational and presentiation elements, and overall, has been able to 
adapt to most relational contracts. The current thesis chose it as a model law because of its 
success in reviving the practice of the international community of merchants engaged in trade 
in the modern relational sales. The UCC expressly legalises ‘open –ended’ contracts, 
departing from the classical view that every sale must have a price term. Section 2-305 of the 
UCC clearly states that as long as parties intend to be bound by an open-ended contract, 
leaving a price term open based on the nature of the trade or a mere failure of an agreed price 
determination method should not vitiate a deal.  
 
The second sales law namely, the SGA in England, was chosen by this thesis for its important 
role in the past, within the sale of international commodities involving multinational traders, 
who were not necessarily English. It also played a leading role in the sale of cotton and 
homogenous commodities to foreign parties and/or in contracts that did not take place in 
England. Based on Macneil’s method of response, as a sales law, the SGA seems to respond 
to relational sale by maintaining its presentiation characteristics. While it has had a long 
history of absorbing mercantile traditions into its body of law, the current Sections 8 and 9 of 
the SGA do not resolve situations of deliberate open price or of failure of the set price 
mechanism, even in cases where the parties do intend to be bound by the contract.  Section 
8(2) sets a limitation whereby the mercantile principle of reasonable price applies only in 
cases of the unintentional omission of a price term, excluding cases of intentional open price, 
which is often used to better adapt to price uncertainty. Although it seems that the English 
courts have been successful in interpreting Section 8(2) in a flexible manner (complying with 
Macneil’s third method of response), the SGA in verbatim holds strong presentiation 
characteristics that may have suited many transactions in the past, but are not necessarily 
appropriate for relational contracts, which are often long-term and involve the risk of price 
changes. 
 
The third sales law chosen for the comparative study in this thesis was the United Nations 
CISG 1980. The CISG serves the development of international trade based on equality and 
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mutual benefit, promoting friendly relations between states. The CISG takes a dual approach 
to price fixing, under Articles 14 and 55. While the articles were drafted for various member 
states as part of the compromising nature of the CISG, open price terms under Article 55 are 
often considered sufficiently definite price terms under Article 14. This makes the concept of 
open price, in its truest sense, questionable under the CISG. The CISG addresses the issue of 
open price using two responses; firstly, by requiring the presentiation of the price term under 
Article 14(1) and secondly, by allowing some form of price flexibility under Article 55, 
particularly in the case of unintended omission of price (but not necessarily of intentional 
open price in relational contracts). 
 
This thesis has addressed the fact that open price is a practice that is tailored to meet the 
needs of certain industries and is derived from the principles of law merchants, where 
contracting parties have a duty to renegotiate the contract to adapt to changed circumstances. 
The relevance of open price continues not only to the trade of the merchants of the eighteenth 
century, but also to today’s trades. However, the SGA and the CISG have been limiting the 
validity of intentional open price. The SGA was designed by Chalmers based on a small-scale 
basis that involved less complex markets, and the CISG has a compromising nature between 
fixed and open price policies in two distinguished provisions, namely Articles 14(1) and 55. 
As a result of these limiting features, the courts in both jurisdictions often resort to the 
external principles found in non-sales decisions in order to enforce open price; the CISG 
court for example, resorted to the external principle of Article 6.2.2 (1) of the UNIDROIT 
Principle,
2
 while the SGA court resorts to principles found in non-sales decisions such as The 
Moorcock
3
 to effect flexible open price terms. Both external rules have been used to depart 
from the presentiational nature of the sales laws, by deriving the intention of the parties under 
the circumstances of relational trade. 
 
In this thesis, the ideas of Llewellyn, Macneil and Scott have substantiated the need for open 
price in relational sales. Scholars unanimously agree that the extra-legal norm of flexibility is 
part of relational sales, which tend not to be as predictable as discrete transactions. Flexibility 
in setting the price allows restoration of the equilibrium of contracts so that one party does 
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not opportunistically gain from the excessive loss of another. If the price is rigidly fixed, the 
contract tends to be unbalanced when market price changes.  
In Westinghouse,
4
 the sale of fixed-price uranium was a burden upon the seller, who had to 
honour the contract when the price increased from 12 to 40 dollars. In such a situation, 
contractual adjustment by court was crucial to rebalance the contract. The uranium industry 
affected by price fluctuations from early 1970s is an example of a relational industry that 
experienced a shift from the fixed-price method, to open-price method based on the market 
price, price index and voluntary renegotiation clauses.
5
  
 
Applying the UCC as a model law, the thesis statement found in Chapter Two proposed 
greater adaptability, and fewer presentiational features under the SGA and the CISG in 
requiring a fixed price. Based on the self-enforcing nature of a relational, long-term contract 
between parties, as well as on the commercial context of trades, an open price rather than a 
fixed price is convenient, as long as parties are proven to have intention to be bound. 
Presentiating the future price, on the other hand makes the long-term, relational deal less 
viable in times of fluctuation, as the parties do not know the precise risks they are facing. A 
strict compliance with classical contract law that demands rigidity in price-fixing is ‘a 
convenient trap-door through which the imprudent or unscrupulous obligor can escape, which 
may leave the innocent obligee to suffer loss of expected benefits and also potentially, loss to 
subpurchasers’.6    
 
Chapter One explained the history of the incompleteness of contracts that were common 
among merchants before the eighteenth century.  Gradually, the law merchant became less 
influential in codified sales law, due to the efforts of national judges and legislators, and 
commercial law was nationalised and separated from the practice of the merchants, not only 
in England and the US, but also in France, Germany and other European countries. However, 
in the US, the UCC has fully upheld the traditions of the merchants. The practice of the 
international community of merchants engaged in trade across national boundaries has been 
well-absorbed by the UCC, proving the relevance of mercantile elements such as the use of 
flexible, open price term in sales contracts.  
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 In Chapter Two, practices in industries such as natural gas, aluminium, petroleum coke, coal 
and uranium were summarised in terms of the shift of sales contracts from the traditional 
fixed-price method, to more flexible methods such as the use of a price index and voluntary 
renegotiations between the seller and the buyer. This change in method of contracting made 
agreements more workable, maintained co-operation between the parties, saved parties’ costs 
and time of haggling over uncertainty of price and most importantly, ensured performance at 
a fair price. The extensive study by Macneil concludes that the failure of classical contract 
law was due to its unrealistic demands for presentiation. While presentiation works in 
discrete transactions, it barely works for highly planned, very extensive inter-firm contracts 
between large, legally independent yet economically interdependent firms. Parties will find it 
difficult to predict the future.  
 
Chapter Three on the UCC began with an explanation of the Uniform Sales Act, which was 
not receptive of the practice of the merchants. This was due to the Willistonian formalism 
that originated from the common law principle, which could barely cope with the needs of the 
trade practice. Recognising the applicability of price flexibility in various industries, 
Llewellyn demonstrated that a deal between merchants is a matter of collective, rather than of 
individual self-interest.
7
 The UCC was established based on the principle of the law 
merchants’ principle that each party had a good faith obligation to renegotiate the contract if 
there was a need to adapt it to changed circumstances in order to ensure continued 
performance from both parties.
8
 This is supported by Scott, who believed that the merchants 
typically entered into open term contract, relying upon the notion that their contracts were 
self-enforcing in nature.
9
 According to Scott, self-enforcement is extensible to contracts 
between strangers, although this type of contract is not covered by this thesis.  
 
The mercantile manner of business practice is practical and convenient, and, more 
importantly, saves on costs for both buyer and seller. Without court adjustment to contracts, 
they could be designed to be adaptable to the changing market in the first place. Both 
Chapters Four and Five explained the limitations under the SGA and CISG respectively. 
Firstly, Chapter 4 explained the limitation of the SGA on open price. The current Section 8(2) 
of the SGA limits the application of reasonable price to cases of unintentional omission of the 
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price term. If the UCC is not adopted, English courts will struggle to distinguish cases like 
May and Butcher, from cases like Foley. Persistent mistake for courts was applying the 
‘presentiation’ method under Section 8 in cases where the trade does not require parties to 
presentiate. Factors such as parties’ experiences, established practices and intentions are less 
prioritised, and English courts continue to decide cases based on their facts and 
circumstances. While this method is workable, it cannot allow for market changes.  
 
Chapter Five explained the limitations of the CISG with regard to open price. While Article 
55 of the CISG allows open price to be determinable by operation of law, it is often bound by 
Article 14’s interpretation of what amounts to a sufficiently definite contract. Often, the 
CISG courts decide whether a contract contains an implicit price instead of using Article 55 
to determine the reasonable price for the parties. 
 
Chapter Six analysed Scafom International and found that, a fixed price is not the ideal 
method in the case of long-term steel trading contracts, which are highly relational in nature. 
In this case, the parties made the mistake of presentiating the price for the steel tubes. The 
contract was risky due to price fluctuations. To rebalance the contract, clearly renegotiation is 
the ideal solution post the agreement, but open price is the more useful alternative when 
comes to deciding the ex ante profits of an agreement. An open price could have prevented 
the parties from needing to haggle, and they may have avoided incurring court costs. If the 
price had been open, it could have been determined using the agreed method. If the price of 
the goods had been fixed, it would nevertheless have required adjustment at a later stage in 
order to ensure that no profit was gained through excessive loss of the other.  
 
In conclusion, where full adoption of the UCC’s approach does not take place, the provisions 
of Section 8(2) of the SGA and Article 55 of the CISG could be flexibly interpreted to allow 
parties to make contracts more suited to the situations in cases such as Westinghouse and 
Scafom International. Although it is arguable that in risky trades the duration of a contract 
could be reduced by terminating the agreement in times of market volatility, an open price 
stands as a useful alternative and avoids unnecessary termination. It reduces the conflict 
between the need to fix responsibilities at the outset and the need to readjust them over the 
duration of a long-term contractual relationship. Excluding situations of frustration of 
contract, where performance of a deal is entirely impossible, parties may still be bound by an 
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open-price contract. Such an arrangement would make a deal enforceable in times of price 
fluctuation and leave no room for opportunism. 
 
Macneil stated that the need for a contract law system that enhances discreteness and 
presentiation would never disappear. However, Macneil also pointed out that such a system 
‘may rub in an unnecessarily abrasive manner against the realities of coexistence with 
relational needs for flexibility and change’.10 The reason for such abrasion is that relational 
contracts require the flexibility to adapt to changes. To minimise unnecessary abrasion 
between relational contracts and the presentiational nature of classical contract law, it is 
preferable to view elements of presentiation as integral parts of overall contract law rather 
than as an independent system. The abrasion would not disappear, but abrasion resulting from 
the application of contract laws based on the assumption that contractual relationship is 
entirely based on written contract would disappear.
11
 
 
Therefore, a flexible interpretation of the current provisions under the SGA and the CISG 
with regards to open price is warranted. This means that, even if full adoption of the UCC’s 
concept of open price does not take place, the English and the CISG courts may still play 
crucial roles in interpreting Section 8 and Article 55 flexibly. As a result, the validity of 
intentional open-price contracts within specific, long-term trades would not be unnecessarily 
impeded by presentiation. Thus far, the UCC has been an exemplary model permitting open 
price based on ‘reasonable price’ and on prices set in ‘good faith’- both concepts being very 
much anti-presentiating in nature.
12
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